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Abstract  
Keywords: Phishing, Data Mining, Neural Network, Classification, Ensemble, Concept Drift, 
        Incremental Learning, Self-Structuring, Website Features 
Classification in data mining is one of the well-known tasks that aim to construct a 
classification model from a labelled input data set. Most classification models are 
devoted to a static environment where the complete training data set is presented to the 
classification algorithm. This data set is assumed to cover all information needed to 
learn the pertinent concepts (rules and patterns) related to how to classify unseen 
examples to predefined classes. However, in dynamic (non-stationary) domains, the set 
of features (input data attributes) may change over time. For instance, some features 
that are considered significant at time Ti might become useless or irrelevant at time Ti+j. 
This situation results in a phenomena called Virtual Concept Drift. Yet, the set of 
features that are dropped at time Ti+j might return to become significant again in the 
future. Such a situation results in the so-called Cyclical Concept Drift, which is a direct 
result of the frequently called catastrophic forgetting dilemma. Catastrophic forgetting 
happens when the learning of new knowledge completely removes the previously 
learned knowledge. 
Phishing is a dynamic classification problem where a virtual concept drift might occur. 
Yet, the virtual concept drift that occurs in phishing might be guided by some 
malevolent intelligent agent rather than occurring naturally. One reason why phishers 
keep changing the features combination when creating phishing websites might be that 
they have the ability to interpret the anti-phishing tool and thus they pick a new set of 
features that can circumvent it. However, besides the generalisation capability, fault 
tolerance, and strong ability to learn, a Neural Network (NN) classification model is 
considered as a black box. Hence, if someone has the skills to hack into the NN based 
classification model, he might face difficulties to interpret and understand how the NN 
processes the input data in order to produce the final decision (assign class value).  
In this thesis, we investigate the problem of virtual concept drift by proposing a 
framework that can keep pace with the continuous changes in the input features. The 
proposed framework has been applied to phishing websites classification problem and 
it shows competitive results with respect to various evaluation measures (Harmonic 
Mean (F1-score), precision, accuracy, etc.) when compared to several other data mining 
techniques. The framework creates an ensemble of classifiers (group of classifiers) and it 
offers a balance between stability (maintaining previously learned knowledge) and 
plasticity (learning knowledge from the newly offered training data set). Hence, the 
framework can also handle the cyclical concept drift. The classifiers that constitute the 
ensemble are created using an improved Self-Structuring Neural Networks algorithm 
(SSNN). Traditionally, NN modelling techniques rely on trial and error, which is a 
tedious and time-consuming process. The SSNN simplifies structuring NN classifiers 
with minimum intervention from the user. The framework evaluates the ensemble 
whenever a new data set chunk is collected. If the overall accuracy of the combined 
results from the ensemble drops significantly, a new classifier is created using the SSNN 
and added to the ensemble. Overall, the experimental results show that the proposed 
framework affords a balance between stability and plasticity and can effectively handle 
the virtual concept drift when applied to phishing websites classification problem. Most 
of the chapters of this thesis have been subject to publication. 
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1. CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
With the digital revolution, digitized data have become easy to capture and to 
some extent inexpensive to store. The true value of raw data is substantiated 
based on its ability to produce useful information that might help in decision 
making or understanding the domain governing the data source. In most cases, 
data analysis is a conventional manual process where analysts would 
familiarise themselves with the domain, and with the help of statistical tools, 
they would generate reports and summaries to describe data insight. However, 
this approach may quickly deteriorate when the size and dimension of data 
increase. Hence, when the data exploration goes beyond abilities of typical 
manual analysis, analysts start looking for a more reliable knowledge discovery 
method to process data.  
Data Mining (DM) comes into sight as an effective method to facilitate 
producing possibly useful knowledge for decision makers. DM or sometimes 
referred to as Knowledge Discovery (Kaufmann et al., 2011) is the method of 
analysing databases from different viewpoints and reforming them into 
meaningful forms. In other words, DM is the process of searching and 
analysing large amounts of raw data with the intention of discovering valuable 
rules and patterns (Linoff & Berry, 2011). A comprehensive definition of DM 
Chapter ‎1 Page 2 
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comes from Gartner Inc1 (Gartner IT Glossary, 2011) which defines DM as the 
process of analysing large amounts of data by means of some pattern 
recognition techniques, statistical, and mathematical practices in order to find 
out correlations, patterns and trends. However, the term DM can be 
generalized to any type of decision supporting system such as Business 
Intelligence (an umbrella term that refers to a variety of software applications 
used to analyse an organization's raw data), Machine Learning (ML) (a type of 
artificial intelligence that provides computers with the ability to learn without 
being explicitly programmed), and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (the simulation of 
human intelligence processes by machines) (Usama et al., 1996). 
Classification is a widely studied task in the DM. Classification is the process of 
developing a classifier (model) from a historical data set to forecast the value of 
the class variable(s) of an unseen example (Witten et al., 2011). Classiﬁcation is 
a supervised learning approach because it is driven by means of an initial data 
set where the training examples are provided along with their corresponding 
class values. Typically, a classification model learns concepts (rules and 
patterns) from a static data set where the set of input features do not change. 
This data set is therefore assumed to contain all information required to learn 
the relevant knowledge pertaining to the underlying domain. A classification 
model created from a static data set is commonly called an offline classification 
model because the learning phase is a one shot process (Gaber, 2012). Such 
learning strategy, however, has proven unrealistic for many real world 
scenarios (Farid et al., 2013) (Hoens et al., 2012) (Polikar et al., 2001) such as 
phishing websites classification (fake websites created to induce users to 
voluntarily reveal their personal information) where the data set is often 
obtained over time in streams of instances instead of all training data sets being 
                                                 
1 An information technology research and advisory firm. 
Chapter ‎1 Page 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
available from the start. In addition, this learning strategy cannot accommodate 
new knowledge as soon as new data sets become available.  
Evolving data sets may result in a system working in a dynamic (non-
stationary) environment, which in turn raises the so-called concept drift 
dilemma. Concept drift signifies the changes in the relations connecting the 
input variables to the output variables. Concept drift has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 including how the dynamic domains affected by the concept 
drift, why concept drift, and types of concept drift. Also in Chapter 3, we 
elaborate why the concept drift might occur in phishing websites and we gave 
some examples of the concept drift that occurring in phishing websites.  
In general, learning under the presence of a continuously changing data set 
requires a model that can be updated regularly in order to leverage the newly 
collected data, while simultaneously maintaining the performance of the model 
on old data. The competing motivations of this aim give rise to another 
dilemma; that is the stability (maintain previously learnt knowledge) plasticity 
(learn new knowledge) dilemma (Sections 2.7 and 2.8). Among the most 
popular learning approaches that can effectively handle concept drift dilemma 
is the ensemble learning approach (Farid et al., 2013) (Wang et al., 2003) 
(Polikar et al., 2001) (Section 2.10.2). Such approach affords that the 
classification model learns new knowledge and at the same time preserves the 
previously learnt knowledge. Hence, the ensemble learning approach not only 
handles the concept drift dilemma, but also furnishes a balance between 
stability and plasticity.  
Phishing websites is considered a typical example of the dynamic classification 
scenarios where the data set examples are continuously arriving (Ma et al., 
2009) (Basnet et al., 2012). Phishing websites attracted researchers to address 
this problem from an intelligent point of view. In the last decade, several anti-
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phishing techniques have been introduced as shown in Chapter 3. Yet, these 
techniques are far from perfect. For instance, whitelist and blacklist based 
techniques could not detect the zero-days phishing webpages. By contrast, 
intelligent methods based around DM have a possibility to recognize these 
websites (Aburrous et al., 2010 B). Nevertheless, most of the contemporary DM 
based anti-phishing models address the phishing websites as a static problem 
where the complete data sets are introduced to the DM algorithm (Abu-Nimeh 
et al., 2007), (Zhang et al., 2007), (Fette et al., 2007), (Miyamoto et al., 2008), 
(Basnet et al., 2008), (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), and (Abdelhamid et al., 2014). 
However, phishing websites is an evolving problem whereby the set of features 
that might be used to determine the type of a website are constantly changing 
over time (Basnet et al., 2012). Such a situation commonly referred to as a 
virtual concept drift (Polikar et al., 2001). Phishers know that the longer a 
phishing campaign uses the same set of features the more likely the anti-
phishing parties will detect and deploy countermeasures against it. Phishers, 
therefore, adapt by constantly changing the set of features used to design such 
fake websites. Hence, a virtual concept drift might occur. 
Yet, the virtual concept drift that occurs in phishing websites is considered a 
cyclical concept drift in the sense that the set of features that are used in 
predicting phishing might disappear at specific time and return to reappear 
again in the future (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et al., 2012). In addition, it is not 
guaranteed that all phishing website from an old campaign are no longer exist; 
and some of them are still alive. Hence, learning a new classifier from scratch 
might protect users from a phishing website generated from a new campaign 
but it might leave them susceptible to a phishing website generated from an old 
campaign as a direct result of the so-called catastrophic forgetting (Section 2.8). 
Thus, Catastrophic forgetting is another issue that we aim to address in our 
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thesis by ensuring that learning a new classifier does not mean forgetting the 
previously learned knowledge. 
In general, building a classification model that is updated regularly in order to 
keep abreast of changes that may affect the model performance is an important 
and timely issue. The model should provide a high true positive (the 
proportion of legitimate websites that are correctly classified as such) and true 
negative (the proportion of phishing websites correctly classified as such) rates. 
The motivation behind the current research is to propose a new framework that 
is capable to create a classification model that can obtain knowledge from 
evolving data sets where a concept drift, particularly virtual concept drift 
might occur. Then, the proposed framework is applied to phishing websites 
classification problem. 
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives 
This thesis explores the area of classification and focuses on the domains that 
are working in dynamic (non-stationary) environments where a virtual concept 
drift might occur with the aim of creating a framework that can improve the 
performance of the classification models if a virtual concept drift has occurred. 
The framework will be then applied to a serious web security problem, which 
is the phishing websites classification problem in order to assess whether the 
framework can handle the virtual concept drift that characterizes the phishing 
websites.  
Another aim of applying the proposed framework to phishing websites 
classification problem is to assess if the proposed framework will handle the 
catastrophic forgetting dilemma. That might be achieved by ensuring that the 
framework learns incrementally, hence, it will offer a balance between stability 
and plasticity.  
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The virtual concept drift that occurs in phishing websites has a peculiarity, as it 
might be guided by some malevolent intelligent agent rather than occurring 
naturally. Therefore, another aim of this thesis is to minimize the cause of 
intentional virtual concept drift by making use of the black box nature of 
Neural Network (NN). The black box nature of NN signifies that the only 
visible parts in any NN classification model are the input and output, whereas 
the process that transforms the inputs into outputs is obscured. This 
characteristic makes the task of picking a new set of features that can 
circumvent the classification model increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, most 
NN classification models are traditionally created using the trial and error 
method. Thus, one more aim of this thesis is to create an algorithm that 
simplifies structuring NN classifiers. The algorithm plays an important role in 
the proposed framework since it will derive the classifiers that are added to the 
ensemble. After confirming the presence of a concept drift, a new classifier will 
be created using the algorithm. Such a classifier is added to the previously 
derived classifiers forming an ensemble of classifiers each of which is 
considered an expert in a particular part of input features.  
In order to apply the proposed framework to phishing websites, a set of 
variables known as inputs or features should be clearly identified. The set of 
features utilised in previous studies will be adopted in this research. However, 
we believe that we can find some more features if we dig into a set of phishing 
and legitimate websites. Hence, a set of phishing and legitimate websites will 
be collected, and then we will compare the phishing websites against the 
legitimate ones with the aim to come across new and possibly effective 
features. 
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1.3. Thesis Contributions  
Several achievements have been accomplished in this research including the 
development of a new constructive NN algorithm that simplifies structuring 
binary NN based classifiers. Such an algorithm has been utilised in developing 
a classification framework based on ensemble self-structuring neural network. 
The framework is considered another contribution achieved in this research. 
The proposed framework has been applied to phishing websites classification 
problem. Hereunder, we underline the main contributions of this research. 
1. A Classification Framework based on Ensemble Self-
Structuring Neural Network (ESSNN) 
A framework that is able to contend with the virtual concept drift is proposed 
in this research. As soon as a new data set arrives, and after confirming the 
presence of a virtual concept drift, a new classifier is created. The newly 
derived classifier is combined with all previously created classifiers to produce 
an ensemble of classifiers. When a new unseen example arrives, each classifier 
makes its calculations and gives the result about the value assigned to the class 
variable. The results produced from each classifier will be combined together; 
hence, the decision of ESSNN is a collective decision. The proposed framework 
learns incrementally and is able to accommodate new data and does not forget 
the previously learnt knowledge.  
The proposed framework has been published in (Mohammad et al., 2016-A). 
2. An Implementation of ESSNN to Phishing Websites  
Most current DM based anti-phishing models are devoted to an offline learning 
strategy according to which as soon as the model is created it can gain no 
further knowledge. However, any phishing websites classification model is 
prone to the presence of a virtual concept drift. The proposed ESSNN has been 
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applied to phishing websites classification problem in order to assess whether 
it can handle the virtual concept drift that occurring in phishing websites. 
Another aim of applying the ESSNN to phishing websites is to empirically 
evaluate the performance of the ESSNN and verify that it will offer a balance 
between stability and plasticity when applied to phishing websites.   
The results of applying the ESSNN on phishing websites have been published 
in (Mohammad et al., 2016-A). 
3. An Improved  Neural Network Structuring Algorithm 
A new algorithm for structuring NN classifiers is created in this research. Such 
an algorithm is called Self-Structuring Neural Network algorithm (SSNN), 
which facilitates the creation of NN classifiers. This can simplify deriving NN 
classifiers with good generalization ability. This algorithm does not need to 
guess an appropriate NN structure; it automatically finds it. The SSNN 
algorithm creates the classifiers that are added to the ESSNN. 
The SSNN algorithm has been published in (Mohammad et al., 2013-B). 
4. Empirical Evaluation of SSNN 
Several experiments have been conducted in order to evaluate the performance 
of SSNN algorithm when compared to several other classification algorithms 
including decision tree, logistic regression, and standard feed-forward neural 
network algorithm implemented in WEKA (Hall et al., 2011). Two sets of 
experiments have been conducted. In the first set, ten different binary data sets 
from University of California Irvine repository (UCI Repository) have been used. 
However, in the second set of experiments, the SSNN has been applied to 
phishing websites classification problem. The experimental results show that the 
SSNN algorithm is able to produce classifiers with good generalization ability.  
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The experimental results have been published in (Mohammad et al., 2016-B). 
5. Dissemination of Structured Phishing Websites Training Data 
sets 
One of the key challenges encountered in this research has been the 
unavailability of a structured training data set. In fact, this challenge faces any 
researcher in the field. Although plenty of articles about predicting phishing 
websites have been published, no structured training data sets have been 
offered publicly. To the best of our knowledge, we have introduced the first 
publicly published structured phishing websites training data sets.  
These data sets can be accessed from the University of Huddersfield repository 
(Mohammad et al., 2015-C) and from the University of California Irvine 
repository (UCI Repository) (Mohammad et al., 2015-B). Our data sets have 
been utilised in several Journal articles, Conference articles and PhD theses as 
in (Abdelhamid, 2013) (Singh & Patil, 2014) (Abdelhamid et al., 2014) (Zeydan 
et al., 2014) (Abdelhamid, 2015) (Qabajeh & Thabtah, 2014) and (Mansour & 
Alshihri, 2015).  
6. Background and Literature Review on Phishing 
Nowadays, phishing websites problem has attracted many researchers. In this 
thesis, we have produced a detailed survey of phishing websites so that other 
scholars can use our analysis as a starting point for their researches. In this 
survey, we shed light on the current developments in phishing and provide a 
comprehensive study on the precautionary measures with emphasis on the 
intelligent anti-phishing methods. We approach the phishing websites problem 
from a different perspective, since in this thesis the problem has been presented 
as a dynamic not static problem. Such kind of problems requires specific 
attention to some criteria such as concept drift, catastrophic forgetting and 
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stability-plasticity. These criteria have also been discussed in this thesis. The 
ensemble approach poses as one possible solution that can address the 
dynamic nature of the problem.  
Parts of this review have been published in (Mohammad et al., 2012) 
(Mohammad et al., 2013-A) (Mohammad et al., 2013-B) (Mohammad et al., 
2013-C) (Mohammad et al., 2016-A) (Mohammad et al., 2016-B) and an 
extended full version in (Mohammad et al., 2015-A). 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
The subsequent chapters of the thesis are organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 elaborates the main difficulties of creating any classification model. 
Concept drift, catastrophic forgetting, and stability plasticity dilemmas 
have been debated as the main issues to be considered when creating any 
classification model working in a dynamic domain. The difficulties of 
creating neural network classifiers are also discussed in this chapter. In 
addition, this chapter presents a brief overview of some offline 
classification algorithms.  
Chapter 3 discusses the phishing phenomenon in detail and shows that 
phishing websites is a dynamic classification problem where a virtual 
concept drift might occur. In addition, in this chapter we will review and 
evaluate the contemporary researches on the intelligent anti-phishing 
measures in order to recognise the issues that is still predominating this 
area. Also in this chapter, we argue that an adaptive intelligent precaution 
model is needed to cope with the evolving nature of the phishing 
websites problem.  
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Chapter 4 describes the main phases of the Ensemble Self-Structuring Neural 
Network (ESSNN) framework that continuously gains knowledge from 
evolving data sets. In addition, in this chapter we have proposed an 
improved NN structuring algorithm called Self-Structuring Neural 
Network (SSNN) that is considered the cornerstone in creating the 
proposed classification framework. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the performance of the SSNN algorithm. Several 
experiments have been accomplished to assess the performance of the 
SSNN algorithm. Two sets of experiments have been done. In the first set, 
the algorithm has been assessed against several DM classification 
algorithms on a number of binary data sets from UCI repository. In the 
second set, the SSNN algorithm has been applied to phishing websites 
classification problem and the results have been compared with other DM 
classification algorithms. Also in this chapter, we shed light on the 
important features that have proved to be sound and effective in 
predicting phishing websites. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the applicability of the ESSNN when applied to phishing 
websites. Several experiments have been conducted to compare the 
performance of the ESSNN with other DM techniques. Finally, the 
experimental results are discussed. 
Chapter 7 summarizes what have been achieved in this research. In addition, in 
this chapter several future works are presented.   
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2. CHAPTER 2  
Classification and Dynamic Domains 
2.1. Introduction 
The function type that a DM tool provides is usually referred to as a DM 
method (Witten et al., 2011). The most popular and commonly used DM 
methods are clustering, prediction, association rule discovery, and outlier 
analysis (Chen et al., 1996) (Linoff & Berry, 2011). Nevertheless, the non-
inclusion of a method in the first place list does not mean that this method does 
not exist, but that could be because some researchers assign special terms for 
the method. For instance, in case of prediction, if the class variable holds 
categorical values; then it is called classification. On the other hand, if the class 
variable holds real values; then the prediction process is called regression 
(Fayyad et al., 1996). There is no specific DM method suitable to address all 
problems. As soon as it is time to select a DM method for a specific problem, 
the selection should be taken very carefully, as one method might fit a specific 
domain, but it might produce poor results somewhere else. In general, the DM 
methods can be divided into two categories namely predictive (supervised), 
and descriptive (unsupervised) (Witten et al., 2011) (Chen et al., 1996). 
Supervised DM methods produce models that are able to forecast a target 
variable (Witten et al., 2011). However, unsupervised DM methods divide the 
observations into clusters where similar observations are grouped together 
(Witten et al., 2011).  
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Classification is a well-known task in data mining. A classification model aims 
to map a data set item to one of predefined categorical groups.  
The most commonly used classification algorithms are (Witten et al., 2011), 
Decision trees (DT) (Quinlan, 1979) (Quinlan, 1986) (Quinlan, 1993) (Quinlan, 
1998), Rule Induction (RI) (Cohen, 1995), Bayesian Network (BN) (Friedman et 
al., 1997), Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Witten et al., 2011) (Cortes & 
Vapnik, 1995), and Logistic Regression (LR) (Witten et al., 2011). These 
algorithms are commonly used in the domain of phishing classification (Abu-
Nimeh et al., 2007), (Zhang et al., 2007), (Fette et al., 2007), (Miyamoto et al., 
2008), (Basnet et al., 2008), (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), and (Abdelhamid et al., 
2014). Such algorithms have been briefly discussed in Appendix A.  
However, in order to produce a classification model that can achieve good 
classification performance several criteria must be put in mind. For instance, in 
dynamic domains the training data set is not static, but steadily evolving. Such 
data set might make the previously discovered rules and patterns become 
inaccurate or outdated. Hence, a model that is considered perfect might produce 
poor results over time. Another problem that should be addressed when 
creating any classification model is the overfitting problem. Overfitting occurs 
when the training phase runs for a long time with the aim of decreasing the 
error-rate on the training data set, but the overall performance on the testing 
data set may deteriorate. Corrupted data set, i.e. a data set that contains noisy, 
missing, or irrelevant items is also an important issue when creating any 
classification model.  
In this chapter, we elaborate the main difficulties that may affect the overall 
performance of any classification model, with emphasis on classification 
models that are working in dynamic domains. Concept drift, catastrophic 
forgetting, and stability plasticity dilemmas will be discussed as the key issues 
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to be addressed when creating any classification model. Neural network 
structuring approaches and the difficulties of creating a neural network 
classification models are also discussed in this chapter. 
2.2. Continuity Strategies for Classification models 
that are Working in Dynamic Domains 
As soon as a classification model is installed and utilised in everyday 
operations, its performance should be assessed regularly. If there is no 
significant change in the future performance, keeping the initial model might 
be justified. If, on the other hand, the performance drops significantly, keeping 
the model might lead to unstable results as an effect to the incorrect decisions 
being made. In general, two possible strategies could be followed when 
applying any classification model: 
1. Keep applying the model without making any improvements on it even if 
some changes occur in the domain. This strategy is computationally cheap 
but with the risk that the model will be susceptible to concept drifts.  
2. The examination and alteration of the existing model to reconstitute it in a 
new form to cope with any changes occurring in the domain. Although this 
strategy might be expensive, it ensures the availability of an up to date 
model. Three possible strategies might be applied in this case: 
A) Re-engineering the current model by tuning a set of its parameters. 
B) Retraining the model as soon as a new training data set becomes available. 
C) Moving from one training method to another because the new training 
method might be more suitable to process the new data set. 
One may say that option (B) above is the best choice. However, offline 
classification algorithms are not by default incremental learners since the 
previously learnt knowledge will be lost after a new model is created (Franklin 
et al., 2007) (Polikar et al., 2001). 
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2.3. Concept Drift and Dynamic Domains 
Normally, offline classification algorithms attempt to learn knowledge from a 
static training data set. However, this approach has proven impractical for 
many scenarios where a concept drift may emerge (Gaber et al., 2005) (Tsai et 
al., 2009) (Masud et al., 2012) (Hoens et al., 2012) (Farid et al., 2013). When 
designing a classification model, a series of training data set examples can be 
obtained occasionally. However, if there is any alteration in the underlying 
data between any two consecutive time steps, there is a concept drift resulting 
in a model working in a non-stationary domain. 
In general, the concept drift signifies that the relations connecting the input 
variables to the output variables are changing over time in unpredicted ways 
(Widmer & Kubat, 1996) (Tsai et al., 2009) (Hoens et al., 2012) (Farid et al., 2013) 
(Gama et al., 2014). In other words, concept drift can be described as the 
changes that occur in the learned knowledge. This results in some problems 
because the predictions become less accurate as the time passes. Formally, 
concept drift can be defined as follows (Gama et al., 2014): 
𝑑𝑡0(𝐹, 𝑟) ≠ 𝑑𝑡1(𝐹, 𝑟) 
Where d signifies the joint distribution at time t0 and t1 between the set of input 
variables F and the target variable r.  
2.4. Why Concept Drift 
If we look at the big image of any supervised training data set, we can see that 
every training example consists of only two parts, features part and class part. 
Any change occurs in any part leads to the emergence of the concept drift. 
Hence, we can distinguish between two styles of concept drifts (Parikh & 
Polikar, 2007): 
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1. Real concept drift: refers to changes in the class variable, i.e. the emergence 
of some new values for the class variable. Such changes can happen either 
with or without change in the input variables (input features). 
2. Virtual concept drift: refers to changes in the input features, i.e. the 
emergence of some new input features. Such change happens without any 
changes in the class variable (Polikar et al., 2001). 
For dynamic domains where a virtual concept drift occurs, irrelevant or 
redundant features might be restricted to a specific period of time. However, 
irrelevant set of features might be ignored permanently when creating an 
offline classification model even if these features become relevant in the future. 
From a practical point of view, it does not matter what kind of concept drifts 
occur, as in all cases the model needs to be updated.  
2.5. Types of Concept Drift 
Concept drift may manifest in different forms as per Figure ‎2.1.   
 
Figure ‎2.1 Concept drift categories 
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Concept drift may occur suddenly by switching from one concept to another 
(e.g. replacement of a sensor with another sensor that has a different calibration 
in a chemical plant) (Gama et al., 2014), or incrementally, by passing through 
several concepts to reach the final one (e.g. a sensor slowly wears off and 
becomes less accurate) (Gama et al., 2014). However, incremental concept drift 
can be seen as small sudden drifts (Gaber, 2012). Some researchers may use 
gradual concept drift as a synonym for incremental concept drift (Farid et al., 
2013). The last category of concept drift is recurring or cyclical concept drift 
(e.g. seasonal fashion). This kind of drift arises (in case of virtual concept drift) 
when some features underlying the class variable switch over time at irregular 
time intervals (e.g. consider a text stream where each data point is a document, 
and each word is a feature. Since it is impossible to know which words will 
appear in the future, the complete feature space is unknown). Therefore, some 
influential set of features may disappear for a while, but they may return and 
reappear again in the future. However, it is not clear when the previous 
features may appear again. 
2.6. Offline, Online, and Incremental Learning 
strategies 
Typically, classification models are trained in an offline mode. Firstly, a 
classification model learns how to perform a certain task and later it is applied 
to perform similar tasks. No tasks can be performed during the learning phase, 
and as soon as the learning phase is finished, the model can no further be 
adjusted or modified. In contrast, online and incremental learning approaches 
have been employed with various meanings in the literature and are frequently 
mixed. The most essential difference of online and incremental learning from 
offline learning is that online and incremental learning approaches assume that 
the training data set examples emerge continuously over time. Hence, the 
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training data set is not static, but steadily evolving. Online learning approaches 
are able to perform a certain task and learn at the same time. These approaches 
are updated whenever a new training instance is offered; being capable to 
achieve lifelong learning since they do not ever stop learning. On the other 
hand, incremental learning approaches can also work in the changing domains.  
Yet, incremental learning approaches are capable to work in a more general 
scenario, where the training data sets can be processed in chunks (Oza & 
Russell, 2001-A). In other words, incremental learning approaches can process 
new data in terms of blocks of training data sets, whereas online learning 
approaches process every training instance separately as soon as it arrives. This 
differentiation is particularly important in this research because the framework 
proposed in this study is considered an incremental learning method that 
processes each training chunk as soon as it becomes available.  
2.7. The Stability-Plasticity Dilemma  
Any classification model works in a dynamic domain has to be improved 
constantly to contend with any changes that may affect its performance. To 
achieve this goal, the training procedure has to be able to cope with the 
plasticity of the new knowledge. However, learning new knowledge should 
not mean the loss of the old one. Yet, learning new information without losing 
previously learnt knowledge raises the so-called stability-plasticity dilemma 
(Hoens et al., 2012). The dilemma draws attention to the fact that completely 
stable models will preserve previously learnt knowledge, but will not 
accommodate any new knowledge. In contrast, completely plastic models will 
learn new knowledge, but will not preserve previously learnt knowledge.  
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2.8. Catastrophic Forgetting 
Several DM models and algorithms are faced with the so-called Catastrophic 
Forgetting dilemma. Catastrophic forgetting, or sometimes called 
“Catastrophic Interference” or “The Sequential Learning Problem” is first 
introduced by (McCloskey & Cohen, 1989). Catastrophic forgetting occurs 
when a model is trained on one task, and then trained on a second task; the 
model might forget how to do the ﬁrst task (Goodfellow et al., 2015). In other 
words, catastrophic forgetting happens when old knowledge is deleted when 
trying to obtain new knowledge. 
Catastrophic forgetting is normally seen in conjunction with the so-called 
stability-plasticity dilemma (Hoens et al., 2012). Normally, catastrophic 
forgetting and the stability-plasticity are tackled by ensuring that the DM 
model learns incrementally. Human learning is the best example of the 
incremental learning. One learns the concept description from the offered 
information and incrementally refines these descriptions when new 
information and observations become available. Newly added information is 
used to improve knowledge structure and rarely causes reformulation of all the 
knowledge the person has about the subject at hand. Incremental learning is an 
important capability for brain-like intelligent systems. 
2.9. Viability of Incremental Learning for Dynamic 
Domains 
Faced with the ever-evolving data sets, the direction of adaptive DM 
approaches seems to be the right choice to reveal the new knowledge that 
might be included in such data sets. This knowledge if not discovered might 
affect the overall performance of the classification model. Any adaptive model 
is subject to progressive developments. How good the model is in describing 
the data set insight controls the direction and rate of these developments. 
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Normally, an adaptive model can be achieved by ensuring that the 
classification model learns incrementally (Farid et al., 2013). In general, an 
incremental system should satisfy the following criteria (Polikar et al., 2001): 
1. Learn new knowledge from any new data set that becomes available 
2. Learning new knowledge does not lead to forgetting previously learnt 
knowledge 
3. Learning new knowledge does not involve accessing previous training data 
sets 
4. Should be able to accommodate new classes if introduced in the new data set 
However, the fourth criterion is not applicable for domains where a virtual 
concept drift might occur. Incremental learning is normally a reaction to the 
presence of a concept drift and it can be described in several ways, such as 
online versus batch methods subject to the number of instances used at each 
training step; or single versus ensemble based classifiers subject to the number 
of classifiers used to come up with the final decision. Several techniques have 
already been suggested with view to creating incremental models that allow 
the learning of new knowledge without forgetting old ones.  
The simplest technique is called interleaved learning (Seipone & Bullinaria, 
2005) where the original training data set is combined with the new one. Then 
we can either retrain the existing model, or discard the previous model and 
build a new one from scratch. This way, the interleaved learning technique 
fulfils the first and the second criteria above, but the third criterion is clearly 
violated. Moreover, this technique might be computationally expensive and 
memory consuming (Parikh & Polikar, 2007). Some other techniques work by 
reducing the size of the full data set by utilising a subset of the new examples 
rather than using the complete data set (Engelbrecht & Brits, 2001). Yet, this 
approach still needs access to the old data. Several methods use some form of a 
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sliding window over the incoming data. The batch of examples that fall inside 
the window is considered the new training data set, and a new classifier is 
created from such batch. However, sliding window technique may result in the 
so-called catastrophic forgetting (Hamker, 2001), hence, infringing the second 
criterion of the incremental learning definition. Moreover, this technique may 
fail if the concept drift in the problem is a cyclical concept drift. However, the 
use of ensemble methods is popular in incremental learning scenarios due in 
part to their empirical effectiveness (Polikar et al., 2001).  
In this research, the ensemble based incremental learning method has been 
utilised to create an adaptive classification framework.  
2.10. Handling Catastrophic Forgetting and Stability 
Plasticity Dilemma 
Two different approaches can be followed in order to produce a classification 
model that offers a balance between stability and plasticity those are, single 
based approach and ensemble based approach. These approaches ensure that 
the classification model learns incrementally and is not susceptible to 
catastrophic forgetting (Hamker, 2001). 
2.10.1. Single Classifier based Approach 
In this sense, a single classifier is updated regularly to ensure that it will 
efficiently contend with the stability-plasticity dilemma. This approach selects 
and maintains a portion of the earlier training examples that are then merged 
with new examples in subsequent training phases. This approach is also known 
as window based technique (Widmer & Kubat, 1996). Window based technique 
provides a simple forgetting procedure. This technique stores only the most 
recent examples in the first-in-first-out (FIFO) data structure. As soon as new 
instances arrive, they are embedded into the start of the window. A same 
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number of instances are expelled from the end of the window as indicated in 
Figure ‎2.2.  
 
Figure ‎2.2  Window based learning schema 
 
This technique assumes that the knowledge learnt from the older instances are 
conceptually worthless for classifying new examples and therefore such old 
instances are dropped from the training data set. A classifier is created using the 
data set examples within a fixed or a dynamic sliding window. The fixed sliding 
window techniques store the most recent n instances, where n is specified by the 
system designer. At each training phase, the learning algorithm builds a new 
classifier using the examples within the window. However, the examples that 
are moving out of the window are discarded. Yet, in the dynamic sliding 
window, the window size is dynamically adjusted over time (Gama et al., 2014). 
The key challenge in the dynamic sliding window technique is to select an 
appropriate window size. A small window reflects the current distribution more 
accurately but that may affect the classifier performance on the old examples 
(Gama et al., 2014) because the old examples might be dropped from the 
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window as there is no space to keep them within the window. On the other 
hand, a large window might preserve the classifier performance on the older 
examples, but it reacts slowly to the concept drift (Gama et al., 2014). Examples 
of window based techniques include, FLOating Rough Approximation (FLORA) 
family of algorithms (Widmer & Kubat, 1996), Floating Rough Approximation in 
Neural Network (FRANN) (Kubat & Widmer, 1995), Timed-Windowed 
Forgetting (TWF) (Salganicoff, 1997), and ADaptive sliding Window (ADWIN) 
(Bifet & Gavaldà, 2006). 
Weight based approach is considered a special case of the window based 
technique. Traditionally, the age of an example determines whether it will be 
dropped or maintained within the window. However, some old examples may 
still valid for the current state. Hence, the key issue in the weight based 
windowing method is how to choose the most relevant examples from the old 
data set, maintain and merge them with the most recent data set, and use them 
in upcoming learning episodes. Weight based method gives an advantage over 
windowing method because it allows the learning algorithm to have more 
control over how examples are incorporated into the model than simply exist 
or not exist (Hoens et al., 2012). Each data set example is assigned a weight. The 
weights determine which data set instance becomes outdated and then drop it 
from the training data set. However, assigning a weight for each data set 
example might consume time (Gama et al., 2014) and some data set examples 
that are dropped from the training data set may become relevant again in the 
future. An example of such algorithms is WINNOW algorithm (Littlestone, 
1988). 
In general, the window based approach achieves good results in small data sets 
(Gaber et al., 2005). In addition, this approach might bias the classifier toward 
the recent state (Gaber et al., 2005) (Gama et al., 2014). Most importantly, this 
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approach might not be the right choice if we face a cyclical concept drift (Gama 
et al., 2014). Phishing websites problem is a typical example where the cyclical 
concept drift might occur.  
Information theoretic measures, such as entropy (Coifman, 1992), mutual 
information (Peng et al., 2005), or hoeffding bounds (Hoeffding, 1963) have also 
been used for updating a classifier, typically using the decision tree algorithm. 
The Very Fast Decision Tree algorithm (VFDT) (Domingos & Hulten, 2000) is 
one of the first algorithms that use hoeffding bounds to grow decision trees in 
streaming data. The authors in (Domingos & Hulten, 2000) reveal that applying 
hoeffding bounds to a subset of data (in case of continuously evolving data 
sets) can with high confidence choose the same split attribute as when using 
the whole training data set. Many modifications to the VFDT algorithm have 
been made. One of which is the Concept Adapting Very Fast Decision Tree 
(CVFDT) (Hulten et al., 2001). CVFDT uses a fixed-size window to determine 
which nodes might need updating. More recently, a new algorithm has been 
proposed that improves the CVFDT. Such algorithm is called Hoeffding 
Adaptive Tree (HAT) (Bifet & Gavaldà, 2009). In this algorithm, each node in 
the tree can determine which of the previous examples are relevant for it. 
2.10.2. Ensemble based Approach 
This approach combines a set of classifiers whose individual decisions are 
combined together in some way with the aim of producing an improved 
composite model with high classification performance. Majority voting is 
considerably the simplest method for combining classifiers outcomes (Lam & 
Suen, 1997). Each classifier in the ensemble makes its own decision on the value 
of the class variable for a specific instance. The final decision is assigned to the 
class value that has a consensus or when at least d of the classifiers are agreed 
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on the class value. d is calculated as per equation 2.1 where n is the number of 
classifiers in the ensemble.  
d = {
n
2
+ 1 if n is even
n+1
2
 if n is odd
 (2.1) 
The Weighted Majority Algorithm (WMA) (Littlestone & Warmuth, 1994) is 
another technique for combining classifiers outcomes. In this method, a set of 
classifiers are weighted according to their performance. For each testing 
example, the ensemble collects weighted votes from all classifiers in the 
ensemble and produces the prediction that has a higher vote. If the ensemble 
makes a mistake, the weight of the classifiers that contributed to the wrong 
prediction is reduced by a certain ratio.    
Naturally, ensemble based approach learns incrementally, does not forget the 
previously learnt knowledge and does not require access to the previously seen 
training data sets (Polikar et al., 2001). Ensemble based methods have been the 
most common solution for domains where a cyclical concept drift occurs 
(Hoens et al., 2012) since an ensemble normally contains classifiers built from 
past data set; such classifiers can be reused to classify newly arrived examples 
if they are drawn from a reoccurring concept.  
When creating an ensemble, it is important to have a set of classifiers that are 
competent and at the same time complement to each other (Gama et al., 2014) 
hence, if one classifier makes an error, the others will correct that error. In 
(Hansen & Salamon, 1990) the authors proved that one key factor when 
creating an ensemble is to have a set of classifiers each of which produces an 
error rate < 50%.  
Several techniques might be used to create a set of classifiers that are un-
correlated as much as possible. For instance, Bagging (Breiman, 1996) and 
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Boosting (Freund & Schapire, 1997) deliver classifiers diversity by training each 
classifier with a different subset of training examples. Bagging utilises 
resampling with replacement technique to produce different training data sets. 
Nevertheless, some examples may be selected several times while others may 
not be selected at all. On the other hand, in Boosting, instances that are 
incorrectly classified by previous classifiers are selected more often than 
instances that are correctly classified. Bagging and Boosting techniques assume 
that the training data set is completely offered at the training phase (Grbovic & 
Vucetic, 2011) hence, diversity can be easily drawn by splitting the original 
data set into different subsets. However, the framework proposed in this 
research is more inclined towards dynamic nature where the data set examples 
are obtained on different time slots. Other techniques ensure diversity by 
creating several classifiers each of which is produced by means of a different 
DM algorithm.  
Ensemble approach has successfully been applied in several domains, for 
example, intrusion detection (Mukkamala et al., 2003), anomaly detection 
(Shoemaker & Hall, 2011), spam detection (Wang et al., 2009), cyber-attack 
classification (Dharamkar & Singh, 2014) and credit card fraud detection (Wang 
et al., 2004). 
2.11. Issues when Structuring a Neural Network Model 
ANN proved its merits in several classification domains. A NN classifier is 
considered as a black box, i.e. the only visible parts are the input and output, 
whereas the process that transforms the inputs into outputs is concealed. This 
characteristic has successfully applied in different security domains where the 
intentional concept drift might occur (Arvandi et al., 2008), (Alallayah et al., 
2010), and (Al-Ubaidy, 2004). This thesis has benefited from the black box 
nature in order to minimize the cause of intentional virtual concept drift. 
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Nevertheless, NN classifiers are normally created using a painstaking trial and 
error method. Although selecting a suitable number of hidden neurons and 
determining the value of some parameters, i.e. learning rate, number of hidden 
layers, and epoch size showed to be crucial when constructing any NN 
classification model (McCaffrey, 2012) there is no clear mechanism for 
determining such parameters, and most model designers rely on trial and error 
approach. However, although the trial and error might be suitable for domains 
where rich prior experience and a knowledgeable NN expert exist, it often 
involves a tedious process because rich prior knowledge and experienced 
human experts are hard to get in practice. Moreover, the trial and error 
technique has been criticised of being a time-consuming process (Ma & 
Khorasani, 2003).  
A poorly structured NN model may under-fit the training data set. On the 
contrary, exaggeration in re-structuring the model to suit every single instance 
in the training data set might cause the model to be over-fitted (Polikar et al., 
2001). One possible solution to avoid the overfitting problem is by 
restructuring the NN model in terms of tuning certain parameters, adding new 
neurons to the hidden layer or adding a new layer to the network (Widrow et 
al., 1990) (Kwok & Yeung, 1997). A NN with a small number of hidden neurons 
may not have a satisfactory representational power to model the complexity in 
the training data. On the other hand, a network with too many hidden nodes 
could over-fit the data. However, at a certain stage, the model can no further be 
improved; hence, the structuring process should be terminated. Therefore, an 
acceptable error margin should be specified when building any NN model, 
which itself is considered a problem, since it is difficult to specify the desired 
error rate a priori. For instance, the user may set the desired error-rate to an 
unreachable value, which may led the model to be trapped in a local minima 
Chapter ‎2 Page 28 
CLASSIFICATION AND DYNAMIC DOMAINS 
 
(Kriesel, 2007) as shown in Figure ‎2.3 or sometimes the model designer may set 
the acceptable error-rate to a value that can further be improved. 
 
Figure ‎2.3 Local and Global minimum/maximum 
Overall, automating the structuring process of NN models is a timely issue and 
it might displace some of the burden from the model designer. However, 
automating structuring NN models does not merely means adding new 
neuron(s) to the hidden layer because the more hidden neurons does not 
necessarily mean that the accuracy will improve (Ganatra et al., 2011) (Hornik 
et al., 1989). Hence, it is important to try improving the NN performance by 
adjusting several parameters such as the desired error-rate and the learning 
rate before adding a new neuron to the hidden layer. Sadly, selecting the 
learning rate value is also a trial and error process. Yet, although several 
studies have been made to come up with the best NN structure, the optimal 
desired error-rate and learning rate values are still concealed. 
Chapter ‎2 Page 29 
CLASSIFICATION AND DYNAMIC DOMAINS 
 
2.12. Neural Networks Structuring Approaches 
2.12.1. Constructive Approach 
This approach starts with a simple NN structure, i.e. one hidden layered NN 
with a single neuron in the hidden layer (Islam et al., 2009) and recursively new 
parameters, i.e. hidden layers, hidden neurons, and connections are added to 
the initial structure until reaching a satisfactory result. After each addition, the 
entire network or only the recently added parameter is retrained. Constructive 
approach is relatively easy for inexperienced users because they are normally 
asked to specify few initial parameters, for example the number of neurons in 
the input layer and epoch size and then new parameters are added to the 
network. This approach is computationally efficient because it searches for 
small structures first (Islam et al., 2009). However, constructive approach has 
some hurdles that should carefully be addressed. For example, the user has to 
decide when to add a new hidden neuron, when to stop the addition process, 
and when to terminate training and produces the network (Kwok & Yeung, 
1997).     
2.12.2. Pruning Approach 
Unlike constructive approach, the pruning approach starts with an oversized 
NN structure, i.e. a multi hidden layered NN with a large number of hidden 
neurons in each hidden layer. Later on, some parameters, i.e. connections, 
hidden neurons, and hidden layers are removed from the network. After each 
training process, the user removes some parameters from the network and the 
new structure is retrained so that the remaining parameters can compensate 
the functions played by the removed parameters. If the network performance 
improved, the user removes more parameters and retrains the network again. 
However, if the network performance does not improved, the user restores 
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what have been deleted and tries to remove other parameters. This process is 
repeated recursively until achieving the final network. Usually, only one 
parameter is removed in each pruning phase (Islam et al., 2009). Overall, this 
approach is a time consuming. In addition, the user does not know a priori 
how big the initial NN structure should be for a specific problem. 
2.12.3. Constructive-Pruning Approach 
This approach comprises two phases, a constructive and a pruning. During the 
training phase new hidden layers, hidden neurons, and connections are added. 
The constructive phase may result in a ridiculously complicated structure. 
Hence, a pruning phase is employed to reduce the network structure and at the 
same time preserves or improves the network performance. The pruning phase 
can run simultaneously with the constructive phase, or it can be started as soon 
as the training phase is accomplished (Islam et al., 2009).  
2.13. Feature Selection Methods 
Features selection is an important step when creating any classification model. 
As shown in section ‎2.4, for domains where a virtual concept drift might occur, 
the set of input features change over time. Therefore, it is important to identify 
the set of significant features before proceeding in updating the classification 
model or creating a new one. In general, any classification model aims to 
approximate the functional link f() between an input attributes  
N = {n1, n2, ... ,nW} and an output attributes T = {t1, t2, ... ,tH}. Sometimes the 
output attributes can be concluded by only a sub-set of the input attributes  
{n(1), n(2), ... , n(w)} where w < W. Hence, it might be reasonable not to use the 
whole set of input attributes. Yet, with the availability of sufficient resources, it 
might be acceptable to use all input attributes, even the ones that are redundant 
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or irrelevant. Two different techniques can be used to select the most effective 
set of features those are as follows: 
A) Filter method 
In this approach, the selection process is independent of the data mining 
algorithm that will be utilised on the chosen features. Normally, filter methods 
evaluate the features significance by examining the inherent characteristics in 
the data. Once features relevance score is calculating the set of features that do 
not pass a pre-determined threshold are deleted. However, the set of remaining 
features is presented to the data mining algorithm as an input features. This 
technique is computationally fast and simple (Sánchez-Maroño et al., 2007). In 
addition, in this method the features selection phase needs to be completed one 
time only (Sánchez-Maroño et al., 2007).  
Several feature selection algorithms can be used, for instance, Information Gain 
(Shannon, 1948), Chi-Square (Greenwood & Nikulin, 1996) and Gain Ratio 
(Quinlan, 1993).  
1- Information Gain (IG): is the most frequently used algorithm in filter 
methods (Bramer, 2013), (Dash & Liu, 1997), (Yu & Liu, 2004). Information 
Gain employs an information theoretic measurement called entropy, which 
assesses the uncertainty in a data set associated with a particular variable 
(normally the class variable). The entropy is calculated as per equation 2.2. 
E(D) = ∑ −𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑝𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  (2.2) 
Where pi is the relative frequency of class i in data set D comprising N 
classes. In case of binary classification, we can customize the entropy 
equation as per equation 2.3. 
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E(D) = −𝑃𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑃𝑙)  −  𝑃𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑃𝑝) (2.3) 
Where Pl signifies the possibility that a sample holds the first class; and Pp is 
the possibility that the sample holds the second class. After calculating the 
entropy, we start examining the effect of each feature on the IG. The feature 
that minimizes the entropy is added to the minimal data set. The IG is 
calculated as per equation 2.4. 
IG (D, F) = E(D) - ∑
𝐷𝑣
𝐷𝑣∈𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝐹)
 𝐸(𝐷𝑣) (2.4) 
Where E(D) is the entropy of the whole data set, F is the feature in which 
the IG is assessed, and Dv is the number of features in D, and E(Dv) is the 
entropy of the sub data set that has the value v for the feature F. The higher 
the IG value, the more helpful the feature will be for classification.  
2- Chi-Square: is utilised to measure whether the occurrence of a specific class 
and the occurrence of a specific input attribute (feature) are independent. 
The high value of Chi-Square means that the class attribute and the input 
attribute are dependent, hence, the input feature is added to the selected 
feature set. On the other hand, low value of Chi-Square means that the 
input feature is independent of the class and therefore it is considered 
irrelevant for classification (Witten et al., 2011). Chi-Square is calculated as 
per equation 2.5. 
𝑥2(𝑓, 𝑡) =
𝑁(𝐴𝐷−𝐶𝐵 )2
(𝐴+𝐶)(𝐵+𝐷)(𝐴+𝐵)(𝐶+𝐷)
 (2.5) 
Where f is an input feature, t is a class variable, A denotes how many times 
that t and f co-occur, B is the number of times that f occurs without t, C is 
the number of times that t occurs without f, D is the number of times neither 
t or f occur, and N is the number of instances in the data set.  
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3- Gain Ratio: utilises an iterative process for feature selection. These iterations 
terminate when there is only predefined number of features remaining. The 
higher the Gain Ratio for a specific feature the more useful the feature is for 
classification. The Gain Ratio uses split information for normalizing the 
Information Gain score. The split information value represents the potential 
information generated by partitioning the training dataset D into V 
partitions, resulting to V outcomes on attribute A. Split information is 
calculate as per equation 2.6. 
Split Info A(D) = - ∑ |𝐷𝑗|
|𝐷|
𝑣
j=1
× 𝑙𝑜𝑔2
|𝐷𝑗|
|𝐷|
 (2.6) 
The Gain Ratio is calculated as per equation (2.7) 
Gain Ratio (A) = Information Gain (A) / Split Info (A) (2.7) 
B) Wrapper method 
This technique uses the results of the data mining algorithm to assess how 
good a given feature subset is. The main advantage of this method is that the 
quality of a features subset is assessed by the performance of the data mining 
algorithm applied to that subset. However, this technique is much slower than 
the filter method (Sánchez-Maroño et al., 2007). In addition, this method is 
computationally expensive compared to filter methods. 
2.14. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides and overview of the main obstacles when creating any 
classification model. Concept drift, catastrophic forgetting, and stability 
plasticity dilemmas have been debated as the main issues to be considered 
when creating any classification model for dynamic. Two possible approaches 
that can be used to provide a balance between stability and plasticity when 
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creating any classification model for dynamic domains have been discussed, i.e. 
single classifier approach and ensemble based approach. In addition, we 
discussed the main issues that should be taken into account when creating NN 
based classification models. Also, in this chapter several classification 
algorithms have been briefly described. 
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3. CHAPTER 3  
Phishing Websites and Contemporary 
Anti-Phishing Techniques 
3.1. Introduction 
The Internet has become an essential component of our everyday social and 
financial activities. The Internet is not important only for individual users, but 
also for organizations, because organizations that offer online trading can 
achieve a competitive edge by serving worldwide clients. The Internet 
facilitates reaching clients all over the world with effective use of e-commerce 
and without any market place restrictions. Therefore, the number of consumers 
who use the Internet to perform procurements is increasing significantly. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars are transferred through the Internet every day. 
This amount of money is enticing the fraudsters to carry out their fraudulent 
campaigns. Hence, Internet users may be susceptible to different types of web 
threats, which may cause financial damages, identity theft, loss of private 
information, brand reputation damage and loss of customers’ confidence in e-
commerce and online banking. Therefore, some users may doubt the suitability 
of the Internet for commercial transactions. 
Phishing is considered a form of web threats that is defined as the art of 
impersonating a website of an honest enterprise aiming to obtain users’ private 
information such as social security number, username, and password. 
Presumably, these fake webpages have high visual similarities to the genuine 
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ones. Technical tricks and social engineering are commonly combined together 
to start a phishing attack. Normally, a website phishing attack starts by sending 
an e-mail that seems authentic to potential victims urging them to update or 
validate their information by following a URL link within the email. Predicting 
and stopping phishing attacks is a critical issue towards protecting online 
transactions. The Internet community has devoted a considerable amount of 
effort into defensive measures against phishing. However, the problem is 
continuously evolving and ever more complicated deceptive methods are 
appearing. Therefore, a promising intelligent solution that must be improved 
constantly is needed to keep pace with this continuous evolution. Recognizing 
phishing websites accurately reflects how good an anti-phishing tool is. 
In this chapter, the phishing phenomenon will be discussed in detail with the 
aim to realize the up to date developments in phishing and its precautionary 
measures. In addition, we produce a survey of the contemporary researches on 
the intelligent anti-phishing measures and provide an evaluation of these 
researches to recognise the gap that is still predominating this area. Also in this 
chapter, we argue that an adaptive intelligent precaution framework is needed 
to cope with the evolving nature of the phishing websites problem. Such a 
framework should address several issues such as, concept drift, catastrophic 
forgetting, and stability-plasticity dilemma.  
3.2. Phishing Websites Timeline 
In the early 1990’s, with the growing popularity of the Internet, we have 
witnessed the birth of a new type of cybercrime; that is PHISHING. In 1987, a 
detailed description of phishing was introduced, and the first recorded attack 
was in 1995 (James, 2005). Deceiving users into giving their private information 
has a long tradition in the cybercrime community. At the beginning, phishers 
acted individually, or in small and simple groups. Surveys commonly depict 
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early phishers as mischief-makers aiming to collect information to make long-
distance phone calls (Watson et al., 2005). In the early age of phishing, phishers 
mainly designed their attacks to deceive English-speaking users. Today, 
phishers have broadened their attack to cover users and businesses all over the 
globe (Sullins, 2006).  
Usually, phishing is accomplished through the practice of social engineering. 
An attacker may introduce himself as a humble and respectable person 
claiming to be new at the job, a helpdesk person, or a researcher. An example 
of using social engineering is urgency by asking the user to submit his 
information as soon as possible. Risk of terrible results if the user denies 
complying is another tactic used to start social phishing. For instance, phishers 
warn the user that his account will be closed or the service will be terminated if 
he does not respond. However, some social engineering tactics promise big 
prizes by showing a message claiming that the user has won a big prize and to 
receive it he needs to submit his information. Nowadays, as monetary 
organizations have improved their online investments, the economic benefit of 
obtaining online account information has become much larger. Thus, phishing 
attacks have become more proficient, planned and efficient. Although phishers 
focus on individual customers, the organizations that phishers are mimicking 
are also victims because their brand and reputation is compromised. 
Phishing is an alternate of the word fishing, and it refers to a bait used by 
phishers who are waiting for the victims to be bitten (James, 2005). One of the 
earliest methods of hacking was targeting telephone networks and it was called 
Phone Phreaking. This name was behind the origin of the ph replacement of the 
character ‘f’ in the word fishing. There are several definitions of phishing; some 
definitions believe that phishing demands sociological skills in combination 
with technical skills, as in the definition that comes from the Anti-Phishing 
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Working Group (APWG) (Aaron & Manning, 2014 A): “Phishing is a criminal 
mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal 
consumers’ personal identity and financial account credentials”. Another definition 
comes from (Qi & Yang, 2006): “A phishing website is a style of offence that network 
fishermen tempt victim with pseudo website to surrender important information 
voluntarily”. A detailed description stated by (Kirda & Kruegel, 2005): “Phishing 
is creating a fake online company to impersonate a legitimate organization; and asking 
for personal information from unwary consumers depending on social skills and 
website deceiving methods to trick victims into disclosure of their personal information 
which is usually used in an illegal transaction”. Some definitions assume that the 
success of phishing websites depends on their ability to mimic a legitimate 
website, because most Internet users, even those having good expertise in the 
Internet and information security have a propensity to decide on a website’s 
validity based on its look-and-feel, which might be orchestrated proficiently by 
phishers. An example of such definitions comes from (James, 2005) [: “Phishing 
attempts to masquerade as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication to trick 
recipients into divulging sensitive information such as bank account numbers, 
passwords, and credit card details”. We may outline all the previous definitions in 
one sentence: “A phishing website is the practice of creating a copy of a legitimate 
website and using social skills to fool a victim into submitting his personal 
information”. 
3.3. Phishing Techniques 
Until recently, phishers have relied heavily on spoofed emails to start a 
phishing attack by urging the victims to reply with the desired information. 
These days’, social networking websites are used to spread suspicious links to 
entice victims to visit phishing webpages. A recent study from Symantec 
Corporation (Nahorney, 2015) estimated that one phishing email occurs every 
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2,901.7 emails sent through their system daily in the finance sector. In another 
report (Symantec Corporation, 2013) it was shown that the number of phishing 
websites that imitate social networking websites’ rose by 12% in 2013. If a 
phishers is able to obtain users’ social networking login information, he can 
send out phishing emails to all their contacts. An email that seems to be 
initiated from a well-known person looks much more reliable. These days, 
novel phishing methods are becoming more frequent, such as Man-In-The-
Middle attacks (MITM) (Keizer, 2007) and malware. 
3.4. Life Cycle of Phishing Attacks  
To tackle phishing, we have to thoroughly explore the nuts and bolts of the 
attacks. In this section, we will explain the life cycle of phishing attacks, which 
is shown in Figure ‎3.1. 
 
Figure ‎3.1 Phishing Websites Life Cycle 
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1. Planning: usually, a phisher starts planning for his attack by selecting his 
victims, the information to be collected and which method to use in the 
attack. The main aspects considered by phishers to pick their targets are 
how to obtain the maximum profits at the lowest costs and the least 
possible risk. Phishers might need to breach the organization calendar, a 
social networking website, or the employee list in an organization. A study 
(Jagatic et al., 2007) offered by ACM magazine showed that Internet users 
are 4.5 times more likely to be victims of phishing if they received an 
invitation to visit a URL link from a person they know. That explains why 
phishers target social networking sites. Email remains the main spreading 
channel for phishing URL links (Kaspersky Lab, 2013). However, phishing 
has spread beyond email to include Internet Relay Chat (IRC), forums, 
Instant Messaging (IM), vulnerable websites such as blogs, peer-to-peer file 
sharing, Voice over IP (VoIP), Short Messaging Service (SMS) and Social 
Networking Sites.  
2. Collecting: the moment the user takes an action that makes him prone to 
credentials theft, he is then incited to submit his information through a 
trustworthy-looking web page. Commonly, the fake webpage is hosted on 
a compromised server, which has been exploited by the phisher for this 
purpose. Sometimes, phishers may use the free cloud applications, such as 
Google spreadsheets in order to host their fake webpages. No one will 
block spreadsheets.google.com or even google.com. Thus, not only naïve 
users will be conned, but also expert users’ are less likely to block these 
websites. 
3. Fraud: once the phisher have achieved his goal, he then becomes involved in 
fraud by impersonating the victim. Sometimes, the users’ credentials are 
sold on the Internet black-markets. The amounts of activities that take place 
within the first few hours of a phishing life cycle are the most important 
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aspect of any attack. Once the fake website has been created and the 
phishing email has been sent, the anti-phishing tool should detect and stop 
the phishing website before the user submits his credentials as we 
recommend in Figure ‎3.1 above.    
3.5. Significance of Phishing 
A report disseminated by the APWG (Aaron & Manning, 2014 A) shows that 
the number of detected phishing websites reached a monthly high of more than 
17,000 phishing attempts in December 2014. The total number of unique 
phishing reports submitted to APWG in the fourth quarter of 2014 was more 
than 197,000 URLs. This was an increase of 18% from the third quarter of the 
same year. The USA continued to be the top hosting country of phishing 
websites. The number of targeted brands increased to 300 brands in December 
2014 after reaching 271 brands in October of the same quarter. The average 
number of phishing URLs per brand increased to 57.73 URLs in December 2014 
after reaching 56.25 URLs in October. The ratio of IP-address based phishing 
URLs increased in this quarter to 2.4%. More than 20,000 unique phishing 
emails were sent monthly during that period. The most industrial sector 
targeted by phishers was the Retail/Service sector with 29.37%, followed by the 
Payment Services sector with 25.13%. The UK financial sector targeted heavily 
in this quarter, and high-profile targets such as Barclays, Halifax, and 
Santander were phished significantly in the final quarter of the 2014. However, 
Ihab Shraim, the president and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) at 
MarkMonitor2 (MarkMonitor, 2013) say, “it is unlikely that traditional phishing 
will stop since the cost of producing a phishing website is almost insignificant”. A 
survey disseminated by Gartner, Inc (McCall, 2007) reveals that phishing 
websites continue to escalate and cost US financial sector an estimated $3.2 
                                                 
2
 A service provider for the protection of corporate trademarks on the Internet. 
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billion annually. The same survey estimated that 3.6 million victims fall in such 
attack. In July 2013, a report distributed by The British House of Commons, 
Home Affairs Committee (Authority of the House of Commons, 2013) 
estimated that the overall cost of cybercrime to the UK is valued at £27 billion 
in 2012, with more than £600 million directly owing to phishing attacks. A poll 
of 2,000 US adults carried out by (Harris Poll, 2006) shows that 30% of those 
surveyed have limited their online transactions and 24% have limited their e-
banking transactions because of phishing. 
Several academic studies, commercial and non-commercial solutions are 
offered these days to mitigate phishing attacks. Some non-profit organizations 
such as APWG, PhishTank and MillerSmiles provide forums of opinions as 
well as distribution of some practices that can be organized against phishing. In 
May 2014, the free software download repository (Download.com, 2014) 
offered more than 400 anti-phishing tool. Yet, with the availability of this 
amount of precautionary measures, one might ask:  
Why phishing still alive? 
To answer this question we need to understand that a phishing attack is a 
combination of technical and social engineering practices. From the social 
engineering perspective, phishing is an example of a larger category of web 
threat known as semantic attack. Such attack focus on how a user interacts with 
computers or how he assigns meanings to emails and website contents (Liu et al., 
2006). In this sense, the key principle in combating phishing websites is, the 
Internet users have to inspect the security indicators within a website. However, most 
Internet users lack the basic skills in recognizing such decisive indicators 
(Dhamija et al., 2006). In other words, users’ tend to trust emails and webpages 
based on superficial trust information provided by phony clues within the email 
or the webpage. In general, phishers recognise that the Internet users’ are the 
weakest link in the protection chain. However, from the technical perspective, 
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phishers know that the longer a phishing campaign uses the same set of features 
the more likely the anti-phishing parties will detect and deploy countermeasures 
against it. Phishers, therefore, adapt by constantly changing the set of features 
used to design such fake websites. 
Overall, we believe that one possible solution to address this threat is by 
creating an intelligent model that reduces the human factor role. Such model 
needs to be updated regularly to keep pace with the latest phishing techniques. 
3.6. Phishing and Concept Drift 
The anti-phishing measures may take several forms including educational, 
technical and legal methods. In this study, technical methods are the subject of 
specific interest, precisely, intelligent heuristic-based approaches. The heuristic 
based approaches depend mainly on picking a set of decisive features obtained 
from the websites (Gastellier-Prevos et al., 2011). The method in which these 
features are processed is very important in producing a sound and effective 
decision. In many perspectives, such features are processed manually. By this 
means, after extracts some features, the user analyses the features and finally 
he decides on the website status. However, automating the classification 
process becoming an urgent need because tactics used become more 
complicated, phishing websites become more stylish, and the analysis time 
increases.  
Data mining introduces itself as a promising technique that can produce sound 
and accurate decisions. Phishing websites problem can be posed as a 
supervised classification DM task that aims to learn a classifier that is able to 
assign each website to one of predefined classes according to some decisive 
criteria. Phishing can be thought as a binary classification problem since the 
target class has two possible values, i.e. phishing or legitimate. Yet, most of the 
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contemporary DM based anti-phishing models are devoted to a static learning 
strategy where the complete data sets are introduced to the DM algorithm 
(Abu-Nimeh et al., 2007), (Zhang et al., 2007), (Fette et al., 2007), (Miyamoto et 
al., 2008), (Basnet et al., 2008), (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), and (Abdelhamid et al., 
2014). Such learning method is called offline learning. This learning method 
relies on assumptions of stationarity of the phishing websites problem, which 
must be strongly questioned (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et al., 2012). However, for 
domains where the training data set examples are constantly flowing as in 
phishing websites problem, the classification models should continuously be 
updated because offline classification models of a pre-determined structure 
might be prone to concept drift (Polikar et al., 2001). The concept drift that 
occurs in phishing websites classification problem is considered a cyclical 
concept drift in the sense that the set of features that are used in predicting 
phishing might disappear at specific time and return to reappear again in the 
future.  
In (Basnet et al., 2011), the authors suggest identifying a significant and 
representative subset of phishing websites features as soon as a new data set 
becomes available to create a new classification model. Yet, although the 
experimental results look promising, this solution might result in the so-called 
catastrophic forgetting. Another solution (Ma et al., 2009), suggests merging the 
newly collected data set with all historical ones and the resulting data set is 
used to create a new model. Nevertheless, this solution might be a high 
memory cost solution.  
In general, phishing websites is a dynamic supervised classification problem 
that can be characterized as a constantly evolving phenomenon. Therefore, an 
effective anti-phishing model is needed and must be improved regularly in 
order to cope with the evolving nature of the problem.   
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3.7. Examples of the Virtual Concept Drift that Occurs 
in Phishing Websites 
To ensure long life, any classification model should be updated if there is a 
catalyst to do so. In phishing websites problem, the constant changing in the 
input features is considered the catalyst for modifying the model. As long as 
the input features are constantly changing, the classification model should also 
be changed.  
One example of the catalysts for modifying the anti-phishing classification 
model emanates from the utilization of the redirect URL feature. In their article 
(Aburrous et al., 2010 A) the authors reveal that redirect URL is ineffective in 
predicting phishing websites since it has appeared 10% only in their data sets. 
Nevertheless, these days a new phishing method that is based mainly on a 
delayed redirect URL has emerged. Such technique is called Tabnabbing 
(Mesh, 2013). If the user visits the doubtful webpage, a message will appear 
asking him to wait while the webpage is loaded. Meanwhile, the user may 
switch to another tab because he is a multi-tasking. As soon as the malicious 
webpage realize that another tab is opened it will redirect itself to a phishing 
webpage. When the user goes back to the tab where the malicious webpage is 
loaded, he might think that he signed out of his email or his business 
application, thus, he will write down his credentials in the fake webpage. Once 
the credentials are entered, they are grabbed by the phisher and the victim is 
redirected back to the legitimate webpage. Another example comes across the 
use of long and tiny URL features. Some techniques assume that long URL is 
an important clue about the website legitimacy (McGrath & Gupta, 2008), 
(Aburrous et al., 2010 B), (Basnet et al., 2011). However, phishers can make 
phishing URLs less suspicious by using tiny URL method. Hence, long URL 
might become insignificant in revealing phishing websites. The use of iframe 
feature is another example of the catalysts for modifying the anti-phishing 
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model. In their article (Alkhozae & Batarfi, 2011) the authors confirmed that 
iframe is a significant feature in predicting phishing websites. Yet, iframe 
might also be used to deliver advertisements to users. 
However, the virtual concept drift occurring in phishing websites might 
happen deliberately. If phishers were able to recognize the set of features 
employed in predicting phishing websites within a particular anti-phishing 
tool, then their mission in designing a new phishing website could become 
easier. For instance, they can modify the way in which a specific feature is 
normally used, or invent new features that can circumvent the anti-phishing 
tool. This rationale explains why phishers directly target anti-phishing 
organizations. More specifically, in 2009, the hackers who breached Google’s 
network were able to steal the source code for the company’s global password 
system (Zette, 2010). Although the users are not directly affected, the hackers 
could study the software for security vulnerabilities to devise methods to 
breach the system, which may have consequential ramifications on users, as 
highlighted in the New York Times (Markoff, 2010). In this digital era of 
tremendous globalization, hackers phish for the source code of leading 
technology companies such as Microsoft, Apple, Oracle and Adobe, in order to 
use in future sophisticated and targeted attacks, as mentioned by FireEye’s 
Chief Executive Officer, David Dewalt (Stevenson, 2014). According to Dewalt, 
“Phishers go for source code as if they can get the source code and find a hole 
to get round users' defenses”. 
3.8. Abilities of Offline Intelligent Techniques in 
Predicting Phishing Websites 
Conventional offline DM techniques are widely applied to become more viable 
in predicting phishing. Some studies evaluate the performance of several DM 
and ML algorithms in detecting phishing, such as (Fette et al., 2007), (Abu-
Chapter ‎3 Page 47 
PHISHING WEBSITES AND CONTEMPORARY ANTI-PHISHING TECHNIQUES 
 
Nimeh et al., 2007), (Basnet et al., 2008), (Miyamoto et al., 2008) and 
(Mohammad et al., 2013-A). Several DM and ML algorithms, feature sets, and 
evaluation criteria are utilised in these studies. The results indicate that 
although offline DM and ML prove their merits, there is no optimal algorithm 
outperforming all others in all cases.  
Most importantly, phishers know that the longer a phishing campaign uses the 
same set of features the more likely the anti-phishing parties will detect and 
deploy countermeasures against it. Phishers, therefore, adapt by constantly 
changing the set of features used to design such fake websites. Therefore, 
although offline classification algorithms have produced good prediction 
results in many contexts, they have been inefficient for long life because 
phishing techniques constantly changing (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et al., 2012).  
Moreover, these methods do not take into consideration the possibility to 
accommodate new knowledge whenever new training data sets are acquired 
since the learning phase is a one-time process. Therefore, the performance of 
the conventional offline DM and ML based anti-phishing models may fall 
remarkably if some domain attributes change. Most importantly, the learning 
process in such techniques assumes that the data sets are completely offered 
before the training phase takes place; however, that is not always true, since 
training data set is often obtained over time in streams of single instances or a 
batch of instances. Such scenario raises an important dilemma, since the set of 
features that best predicts the class variables may differ from one batch to 
another, hence, a virtual concept drift occurs (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et al., 
2012).  
However, it is difficult to anticipate what these new features will be or when 
they might appear. As a result, it would be difficult to determine a specific size 
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of the training data set that should be collected in order to create a new 
classifier. 
In general, the one shot store-now and mine-later techniques are often 
impractical in domains where the underlying data are constantly changing 
(Hoens et al., 2012) as in phishing websites problem (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et 
al., 2012). Learning from such data sets demands a model that can be updated 
continuously in order to derive benefits from the newly available data. Such 
model should also maintain its performance on the old data, i.e. it does not 
forget the previously learnt knowledge. 
3.9. Anti-Phishing Approaches 
Identifying phishing websites is an essential step towards protecting Internet 
users against posting their sensitive information online. Several approaches 
have been suggested to tackle phishing. Anti-phishing methodologies can be 
grouped into seven categories: human based protection approach, legal 
solutions, blacklist and whitelist based approach, instantaneous based 
approach, decision supporting tools, community rating based approach, and 
intelligent heuristic based approaches. Below, we shed the light on common 
anti-phishing techniques by evaluating a list of related works and 
substantiating the need for an automated technique, as opposed to human 
involvement when fighting against phishing. 
3.9.1. Human based Protection Approach 
One strategy for fighting phishing attacks is by educating Internet users to 
recognize phishing attempts rather than just warning them about possible 
risks. In (Dhamija et al., 2006) a usability study conducted to understand how 
and why phishing works shows that lack of attention to some security 
indicators, the lack of knowledge of computer systems, and lack of attention to 
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the absence of some security indicators are the main reasons of why users 
become victims of phishing. In (Ronald et al., 2007), the authors reveal that 
training and educating Internet users about web security is one of the most 
essential aspects of an organization’s security situation. A study conducted at 
Indiana University (Jagatic et al., 2007) shows that users are more likely to fall 
victims of deception when they are emailed by someone they knew. In 2007, a 
survey was conducted to measure the users understanding of the malicious 
contents within the webpages (Julie S. et al., 2007). The survey found that 
despite that several participants evinced some technical background they 
refused to enter their personal information into legitimate webpages due to the 
potential of severe results. An interesting education technique that essentially 
uses the game based learning practice was proposed in (Sheng et al., 2007). This 
technique offers a close link between action and instantaneous feedback. The 
authors have created an online game called Anti-Phishing Phil.  The study 
shows that a user who plays this game becomes more cautious of phishing 
websites. An email based education technique called PhishGuru (Kumaraguru 
et al., 2007) that educates Internet users how to use evidences in URLs to evade 
phishing attacks suggests that alongside the automated detection systems users 
education may offer a complementary method to help Internet users to identify 
deceptive emails and webpages. A recent study (Sheng et al., 2010) founds that 
the users might rely on superficial heuristics in determining how to reply to 
emails. For instance, some users assume that since the organisation they are 
dealing with already has their information it would be safe to give it again. The 
same study shows that age and gender are two key demographics to predict 
phishing.  
Overall, although education might be a good method in fighting phishing it 
requires high costs. Not all organizations are able to pay out extra money on 
users’ education, given that users’ education is not a one-time cost. In addition, 
Chapter ‎3 Page 50 
PHISHING WEBSITES AND CONTEMPORARY ANTI-PHISHING TECHNIQUES 
 
it is not sure that after appropriate education the users’ will act in an ideal way. 
Moreover, this approach requires a long-winded process and users’ have to 
dedicate a substantial amount of their time to studying the phenomenon. 
Further, phishers are becoming more skilled in mimicking genuine webpages 
even to the extent that security experts might be deceived. 
3.9.2. Legal Solutions 
Followed by many countries, the USA was the first to enact laws against 
phishing activities. Phishing has been added to the computer crime list for the 
first time in January 2004 by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)3. In May 
2006, the US president George W. Bush gave his orders for the establishing of 
the President’s Identity Theft Task Force (Executive-Order-13402, 2006) that aims 
to ensure that the efforts of the Federal Authorities become more effective and 
more efficient in the area of preventing and identifying cybercrime attempts. In 
January 2005, the General Assembly of Virginia added phishing to its computer 
crimes act (General Assembly of Virginia, 2005). In March 2005, the anti-
phishing act was introduced in the US Congress by Senator Patrick Leahy 
(Gross, 2004). In 2006, the UK government strengthened its legal arsenal 
against fraud by prohibiting the development of phishing websites and enacted 
penalties of up to 10-year imprisonment. In 2005, the Australian government 
signed a partnership with Microsoft to teach law enforcement officials how to 
combat different cybercrimes.  
Although law enforcement officials have successfully arrested, prosecuted and 
convicted some phishers for the past few years (BBC News, 2005) (TrendMicro, 
2013), a criminal act does a poor job of preventing phishing since it is hard to 
trace phishers. In addition, phishing attacks can be performed quickly and later 
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 A US government agency that aims to promote consumer protection. 
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the phisher may disappear into cyberspace. Therefore, law enforcement 
authorities must act rapidly because on average most phishing websites live 
only for 54 hours (Dhamija et al., 2006). 
3.9.3. Blacklists and Whitelists based Approach 
A blacklist is a list of URLs thought to be malicious. Several methods might be 
used to set up a blacklist, such as heuristics from web manual voting, crawlers, 
and honeypots4. Whenever a website is visited, the browser refers it to the 
blacklist to examine if that website exists within the list. If so, the website is a 
malicious website, and hence, the browser warns users of a possible attack. 
Blacklists can be saved either locally on the user’s machine or on a server that is 
queried by the browser for every requested URL. The main aspects of blacklists 
are quantity, quality and timing. Quantity refers to the amount of phishing 
URLs that are available within the list. On the other hand, quality can be 
measured in terms of erroneous listing and is commonly known as the false 
positive rate. The third and most significant aspect is timing. If the blacklist 
updating process is slow, this will give the phishers the opportunity to carry 
out their attacks. Blacklists are updated at various speeds. In a recent study 
(Sheng et al., 2009) the authors estimated that approximately 47% - 83% of 
phishing URLs are displayed on blacklists almost 12 hours after they are 
launched. The same study ascertained that zero hours defence delivered from 
most well-known blacklist based toolbars claimed a true positive rate ranges 
from 15% to 40%. A survey published by APWG (Rasmussen & Aaron, 2010) 
revealed that 78% of phishing domains were hacked domains and at the same 
time, they were already serving legitimate websites. Consequently, blacklisting 
those domains will in-turn add legitimate websites to the blacklist. Even if 
phishing webpages are removed from the blacklisted domain, legitimate 
                                                 
4 A trap set to detect and counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. 
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webpages hosted on the same domain might be left on the blacklist for a long 
time, thus causing significant harm to the reputation of the legitimate website 
or organization. Several solutions that are using blacklists approach have been 
deployed these days, one of which is Google Safe Browsing (Google-Safe-
Browsing, 2010). Another solution is Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 anti-
phishing protection (Microsoft-Support, 2012). Site Advisor (McAfee 
SiteAdvisor, 2006) is a database-backed measure that is designed essentially to 
defend against malware based threats such as Trojan horses and Spyware. Site 
Advisor comprises automated crawlers that browse websites, then carry out 
tests and build threat assessments for every visited website. Regrettably, like 
other blacklists, Site Advisors cannot recognize newly created threats. VeriSign 
(Symantic, 1995) has a web-crawler that collects millions of websites to 
recognize clones to discover phishing webpages. One potential drawback with 
crawling and blacklist approaches might be that anti-phishing parties will 
always race against attackers. Netcraft (Netcraft Toolbar, 1995) is a small 
software package that is activated every time a user browses the Internet. 
Netcraft relies on a blacklist which consists of fraudulent websites recognized 
by Netcraft and those URLs submitted by the users and verified by Netcraft.  
The main problem with Netcraft is that the final decisions regarding website 
legitimacy are primarily made by the Netcraft server, rather than the user’s 
machine. Accordingly, if the connection to the server is lost for any reason, then 
the user will be under threat during this period.  
The study in (Ludl et al., 2007)  analyses and measures the effectiveness of two 
popular anti-phishing solutions based on blacklists, namely:  
1. Blacklists preserved by Google and used by Mozilla Firefox.  
2. Blacklists preserved by Microsoft and used by Internet Explorer. 
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The data set used to conduct the experiments consisted of 10,000 phishing 
URLs. The first experiment was aimed to study the effectiveness of both 
blacklists. Only Google gave back proper responses for all URLs in the data set. 
On the other hand, Microsoft server accurately responded to only 60% of the 
data set. One more experiment was conducted taking into consideration those 
URLs for which both servers returned a response and which were online at the 
time of conducting the experiment. The results showed that Google was 
capable of labelling 90% of the data set items correctly, whereas Microsoft only 
labelled around 67%. An additional experiment was conducted to assess the 
time needed to update the blacklist for both servers by testing URLs that were 
not initially blacklisted but added after some period of time to the list. The 
results showed that Microsoft blacklist was updated after 9 hours and 7 
minutes at the best; however, at worst, it was updated after 9 days and 6 hours. 
Google’s fastest update took about 20 hours and the slowest update time was 
almost after 12 days.  
The authors in (Sharifi & Siadati, 2008) suggested a method to shape blacklists 
automatically by making use of search engines such as Google search engine. 
The proposed method starts by extracting the company name from the 
suspected URL, and then the search engine is used to search for the extracted 
company name. If the suspected URL is shown in the first 10 returned results, 
then the URL is considered a legitimate URL, otherwise, it is considered a 
phishing one; hence, it will be added to the blacklist. However, the same study 
acknowledges that this method introduces additional delay in the Internet 
browsing.  
Whitelists are the opposite term to blacklists. A whitelist consists of a set of 
trusted URLs, whereas all others are thought undependable. Whitelisting is an 
approach that encompasses a new identity problem since a newly visited 
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website is initially marked as malicious. However, to overcome this problem, 
all websites expected to be visited by the user must be listed within the 
whitelist. However, it is virtually impossible to anticipate where a user might 
browse. A solution could be achieved by using dynamic whitelisting whereby a 
user is involved in creating the list independently. For every visited website, 
the user must decide whether to add this website to the whitelist or not. 
However, if phishing websites persuade users to submit their sensitive 
information, they could also positively persuade them to add it to the whitelist.  
The authors in (Chen & Guo, 2006) proposed an Automated Individual 
Whitelist (AIWL), which is an anti-phishing tool based on an individual user’s 
whitelist of known trusted websites. AIWL traces every login attempt by 
individual users. In case a repeated successful login for a specific website is 
achieved, AIWL prompts the user to add the website to the whitelist. However, 
this technique assumes that users only submit their credentials to legitimate 
sites, whereas all others are considered malicious.  
Another solution that primarily depends on the whitelist technique was 
presented in PhishZoo (Afroz & Greenstadt, 2011). This technique builds 
profiles of trusted websites based on fuzzy hash techniques. A profile of a 
website is a fusion of several metrics that exclusively identify a specific website 
such as URL, images, HTML code, scripts and SSL certificate. As soon as a new 
website is visited, PhishZoo builds a profile for that website. The new profile is 
compared to the profiles in PhishZoo database. If PhishZoo finds an identical 
copy of the loaded website in PhishZoo database, then this website is 
considered legitimate. Otherwise, if PhishZoo finds a partially matches, then: 
1. If a website’s profile does not match, but SSL certificate and addresses do, 
then PhishZoo will update the profile stored on the PhishZoo database.  
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2. If website’s profile match, but SSL certificate or addresses do not match, then 
PhishZoo will assign phishing to the website.  
However, if PhishZoo does not find any matching, then it will prompt the user 
to build a new profile. Yet, PhishZoo revealed that most phishing websites 
were simply copies of real websites. Nonetheless, if the loaded website, which 
could be a phishing website, does not look like its imitation (either by changing 
the size or position of the website logo) then PhishZoo will ask the user to 
decide on the website’s legitimacy.  
3.9.4. Instantaneous based Protection Approach 
Online transaction systems consist of three components: the users, the websites 
(from which all transactions are performed) and the stock database. We believe 
that the Instantaneous based Protection Approach (IBPA) protects the 
migration of sensitive information during the transaction process by protecting 
the source or the destination of the information or sometimes protecting both 
the source and destination. Users are considered the source of information, 
whereas websites are considered the destination. IBPA protects sources of 
information by either authenticating user’s credentials or protecting the input 
information instantly. However, to protect the destination of information, the 
IBPA authenticates the website or server so that the user is assured that the 
website he is dealing with directly corresponds with the website where his 
credential will migrate. 
A white paper published by Cryptomathic (Cryptomathic, 2012) categorizes 
user authentication mechanisms into three types, as follows: 
1. Something the user knows such as a password, a secret code or a PIN 
number. 
2. Something physical such as a fingerprint or an iris scan. 
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3. Something a user owns, for instance a credit card or a token generator. 
Phishing arises from a reliance on the first category. A strong authentication 
may be achieved using two completely diverse credentials proof. This is often 
referred to as Two-Factor-Authentication (2FA). Typically, 2FA generates and 
displays a one-time password (OTP) which is valid for one time use only or 
sometimes for a specific period of time to ensure that the user not just fills in 
his password but also he uses an OTP. However, 2FA is a server-side approach; 
hence, if the server breaks down, then the user would not be able to access his 
account. Moreover, although 2FA decreases the risk of phishing attempts, 
phishers have invented some circumventing techniques such as switching to 
real-time MITM attacks using malware techniques. America Online (AOL) 
distributes RSA5 SecurID devices (RSA, 2012) as per Figure ‎3.2 to AOL users. 
This device produces a unique 6-digit token every minute. The user should 
submit his password along with this token in order to log into his account. 
Figure ‎3.2 RSA SecurID Device 
 
Hardware token based technique is considered quite costly since each user 
should have his own device. In their article, Mannan and Oorschot recommend 
using mobile phones to verify identity on the Internet (Mannan & Oorschot, 
2007). Similarly, (Mizuno et al., 2005) proposed multiple communication 
channels to authenticate user’s identity. Their solution enables Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) to use trusted communication channels to verify the user’s 
                                                 
5 RSA stands for Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman, the inventors of the technique. 
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identity on non-trusted modes of communication. The authors also suggested 
using mobile phones as an example of trusted communication channels.  
Most Internet users use one single password for several personal accounts. 
Therefore, if phishers are able to break low security websites, then they can 
obtain thousands of username and password pairs and use them on secure e-
commerce websites such as Amazon, eBay and PayPal. In (Ross et al., 2005) the 
authors suggested a solution for this problem by creating a browser extension 
called PwdHash which instantly alters a user’s password into domains specific 
password that consists of the pair (Password, Domain name). Hence, the user 
can securely re-use the same password on several websites. However, the 
safest way to shield users against phishing attacks is to predict phishing 
websites, rather than encrypt user password.  
A browser sidebar used for handling user logins was proposed by (Wu et al., 
2006) as per Figure ‎3.3. The users are advised to submit any sensitive 
information using the Web Wallet sidebar and not through website forms. The 
Web Wallet has some similarities to Microsoft InfoCard identity meta-system 
(Brown, 2006) since it requires users to enter their information via an 
authentication interface. However, there are several variations, as websites 
should be modified to accept InfoCard, whereas Web Wallet is used with web 
browsers. InfoCard requires support from identity providers, i.e. banks, credit 
card issuer and government agencies. InfoCard users are compelled to get 
InfoCard from various identity providers and users should authenticate 
themselves whenever they choose InfoCard.  
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Figure ‎3.3 Web Wallet SideBar 
 
Several techniques protect user’s credentials by adding some random 
information to the original credentials so that it becomes quite hard for 
phishers to isolate real credentials. These approaches decide whether a website 
is valid or not by examining the consistent HTTP response code which could be 
either 200 Success or 401 Authentication Failed. A website is classified as 
phishing, if the response is always success or failure on all retries.  
A new scheme, called Dynamic Security Skins (Dhamija & Tygar, 2005), allows 
a remote server to prove its identity to the user by showing a secret image. The 
strength of this schema comes from the difficulty for the phishers to spoof. This 
method requires the user to make verification based on what image he expects 
with an image generated by the server. One drawback of this schema is that the 
user bears the burden of deciding whether the website is phishing or not. 
Moreover, this approach suggests a fundamental change for both servers and 
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clients within the web’s infrastructure, which therefore can only succeed if the 
entire industry supports it. In addition, this method does not offer security if 
the user accesses his account from a public workstation. The advantage with 
this approach is that the user does not need to understand what the digital 
certificates are; or any technical aspects of the security mechanisms. The user 
simply has to verify that the generated image and the received one are 
identical.  
Kirda and Kruegel proposed an approach that instantly monitors the data flow, 
such as passwords and credit card information (Kirda & Kruegel, 2005). The 
authors create a tool referred to as AntiPhish which is a Mozilla Firefox 
extension. This approach assumes that each domain is related to only one 
password on each specific machine. Thus, if the user visits a website and types 
in his password, a list of random domain and password pairs is created. Then, 
AntiPhish keeps watching the password fields on any visited websites, and 
searches the domain of that website among a list of previously visited ones, 
when an identical password is found, AntiPhish warns users of potential 
attacks since the same password is entered on two different pages. The main 
drawback of this tool is that the false positive rate may increase if identical 
passwords are used on multiple websites, which what users usually tend to do. 
In addition, if the user has more than one account on the same website an 
unwanted warning message will appear.  
3.9.5. Decision Supporting Tools 
These tools do not make any decision on the website legitimacy, but they 
extract some features from the websites and clarify them to the user. However, 
the final decision on the website legitimacy is made by the user, i.e. a human 
factor. The user’s experience and attention to the clues displayed by decision 
supporting tools are the decisive factors in making the final decision. An 
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example of decision supporting tools is SpoofStick (Spoofstick, 2005) which is a 
toolbar that can be installed on both Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer. 
SpoofStick shows the website’s actual domain name. For instance, if the user 
visits a URL such as www.ebay.com.spoofone.ca then SpoofStick will consider 
spoofone.ca to be the domain of that URL. SpoofStick performs reverse DNS 
query to display the real IP address of the website. A user can take advantage 
of this information to decide whether the website is a legitimate website or not. 
(Herzberg & Gbara, 2004) developed a Mozilla add-on called Trustbar as shown 
in Figure ‎3.4. Trustbar shows some information about the website credentials 
such as website name, logo, owner, certifying authority, or a warning message 
for unprotected websites. One of the drawbacks of Trustbar is that it shows the 
website’s Certification Authority (CA) without checking its trustworthiness, and 
the user has to do such verification. Unfortunately, most Internet users have no 
idea about how to do such verification.  
 
Figure ‎3.4 TrustBar  
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iTrustPage (Ronda et al., 2008) performs a Google search using the webpage’s 
key-terms. However, iTrustPage does not solely rely on extracting heuristics, 
then judging on the website’s legitimacy, but it partially depends on the user’s 
input to make the right decision because the search terms are provided by the 
user.  When the user encounters a website that does not exist in the iTrustPage’s 
predefined whitelist, he is prompted to a collection of search terms that may be 
used to make a Google search. In general, Decision-supporting tools eventually 
depend on the user’s skills to take the right decision on the website’s 
legitimacy. 
3.9.6. Community Rating based Approach 
This approach relies on the user’s experience to decide whether a website is 
phishing or not. Organizations such as APWG (APWG, 2003), Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) (FTC, 2015), and PhishTank (PhishTank, 2011), have 
introduced cooperative enforcement programs to fight phishing and identity 
theft. PhishTank (PhishTank, 2011) was launched in October 2006. The main 
goal of PhishTank is to provide the parent company OpenDNS (OpenDNS, 
2006) with a reliable phishing data set. PhishTank makes all its databases open 
and accessible. Thus, developers and organizations such as Yahoo, Mozilla, and 
Microsoft as well as leading academic institutions, can make use of such 
databases. Cloudmark is another example of community based anti-phishing 
approach (Cloudmark Inc, 2002). The fundamental principle in Cloudmark is 
“if you visit a website which you recognize to be unsafe, just click the block button to 
warn other users”.  Whenever a user is browsing the Internet, he can rate the 
website as Good or Unsafe. The users themselves are also evaluated based on 
their history of accurately labelling phishing websites. The user’s reputation 
increases if he accurately blocks a fraudulent website and unblocks a legitimate 
one. Web of Trust (WOT, 2006) is a community based safe surfing tool that uses 
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an intuitive rating system to keep users safe while they shop, browse, and 
search online. For every searching attempt, WOT provides ratings to the 
searching results. The rates are updated constantly by various members of the 
WOT community and from various reliable resources, such as PhishTank 
(PhishTank, 2011), hpHosts (Malwarebytes, 2005), Panda Security 
(PandaSecurity, 1990), LegitScript (LegitScript, 2007) and TRUSTe (TRUSTe, 
1997).  
Overall, the effectiveness of the community based rating approach depends on 
the honest and active work done by users. In addition, some legitimate 
websites may not be rated, and thus, they may be considered bad websites. 
Moreover, some websites might be good, and then they might become bad and 
vice versa. 
3.9.7. Intelligent Heuristics based Approach  
This approach collects a set of features that can separate phishing websites 
from legitimate ones, then an intelligent model is trained using the collected 
features, and finally the trained model is used to recognize phishing websites 
in the real world. Selecting the features set is an essential step towards 
achieving a model with high accuracy. Several features have been suggested 
for detecting phishing websites; nevertheless, some of these features do not 
seem to be sufficiently discernment. Most importantly, phishers keep changing 
the features space constantly. Hence, a good intelligent anti-phishing model 
should constantly be updated.  
The study in (Aburrous et al., 2010 B) is based on experimentally comparing 
associative classification algorithms. The authors have gathered 27 different 
features from various websites as shown in Table ‎3.1.  
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Table ‎3.1 Features used in Fuzzy based model  
 
These features range among three fuzzy set values (Legitimate, Genuine and 
Doubtful). The experimental results demonstrated that Domain Identity 
features and URL based features are the most significant features in predicting 
phishing websites. However, the Page Style has a minor impact on Social 
Human Factor criteria. Later, the authors use their 27 features to build a model 
to predict websites class based on fuzzy DM (Aburrous et al., 2010 C). 
Although their method is a promising solution, the authors do not clarify how 
the features are extracted from the website and specifically the features related 
to human factors, i.e. Much Emphasis on Security and Response, Generic 
Salutation, and Buying Time to Access Accounts. Moreover, the authors 
classify the website as very-legitimate, legitimate, suspicious, phishy or very-
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phishy, but they do not explain the fine line that separates one class from 
another. In general, fuzzy DM uses approximations, which are not considered a 
good candidate for managing domains that require extreme precision (Sodiya 
et al., 2007).  
An innovative model proposed by (Pan & Ding, 2006) is essentially based on 
capturing abnormal behaviours demonstrated by phishing websites. The model 
consists of two components:  
1. Identity Extractor: which is an abbreviation of the organization’s full name 
and/or a unique string appears in its domain name.  
2. Page Classifier: this utilises some structural features that cannot be freely 
fabricated, such as the features relevant to website identity.  
In their experiments, the authors have selected six structural features, i.e. 
Abnormal URL, Abnormal DNS record, Abnormal anchors, Server form 
handler, Abnormal cookies and Abnormal certificate in SSL. Support Vector 
Machine classifier was employed to decide on the website legitimacy. The 
experiments showed that the Identity Extractor presents better results when it 
comes across phishing websites because the legitimate websites are 
independent, whereas most of the phishing websites are interrelated (Pan & 
Ding, 2006). Moreover, the performance of the Page Classifier depends mainly 
on the results extracted from Identity Extractor. The overall classification 
accuracy of this method was 84% which is relatively considered low. However, 
this method snubs some features that can play a key role in determining the 
legitimacy of the website, which explains the low detection rate. One solution 
to improve this method could be by using additional features.  
The method proposed in (Zhang et al., 2007) suggests utilizing CANTINA 
technique, which is content based technique to detect phishing websites using 
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the Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) measures 
(Manning et al., 2008). CANTINA stands for Carnegie Mellon Anti-phishing 
and Network Analysis Tool and it examines the webpage contents, then 
decides whether it is phishing or not by using TF-IDF. TF-IDF produces 
weights that assess the word importance to a document by counting its 
frequency. CANTINA works as follows: 
1. Calculate the TF-IDF for a given webpage. 
2. Take the five highest TF-IDF terms and add them to the URL to find the 
lexical signature. 
3. Feed the lexical signature into a search engine. 
If the N tops searching result contains the current website, hence, the website is 
a legitimate website. If not, on the other hand, it is a phishing website. N was 
set to 30 in the experiments. However, if the search engine returns zero results, 
then the website is labelled as phishing. This argument is the main drawback of 
using such technique as stated by the authors. To overcome this weakness, the 
authors combined TF-IDF with some other features, which are: Age of Domain, 
Known Images, Suspicious URL, Suspicious Link, IP Address, Dotes in URL 
and Using Forms. However, most legitimate websites contain images; thus, 
using the TF-IDF may not be right. In addition, this approach does not deal 
with the hidden text, which might be effective in detecting the type of the 
webpage.  
Another method that utilises CANTINA with additional attributes is proposed 
in (Sanglerdsinlapachai & Rungsawang, 2010). The authors have used 100 
phishing websites and 100 legitimate ones, which are considered limited in 
their experiments. The same set of features as in CANTINA has been used in 
this study, but with some changes as follows: 
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1. The Using-Forms feature has been considered as a filter to decide whether to 
start the classification process or not.   
2. The Known Image and Domain Age features have been ignored.  
3. A new feature has been suggested that is Domain Top-page Similarity.  
The authors have performed three experiments. The first experiment evaluates 
a reduced CANTINA feature set. The second experiment tests whether the 
newly proposed feature is significant in detecting phishing websites. The third 
experiment evaluates the prediction accuracy after adding the new feature to 
the reduced CANTINA features. The results show that the new feature 
significantly improves the detection rate. The most accurate algorithm was NN, 
followed by SVM and Random Forest whereas Naïve Bayes gave the worst 
result.  
Typically, toolbar based approach relies on blacklists to judge on the website 
validity. However, some toolbars decide on the website legitimacy by 
extracting a set of features from the website, then make some calculations and 
finally produce the final decision on the website status. One example of such 
toolbars is shown in Figure ‎3.5 and is called SpoofGuard (Chou et al., 2004). 
SpoofGuard calculates a spoof index and alerts the user if the index goes 
beyond a predefined threshold.  
 
Figure ‎3.5 SpoofGuard Toolbar 
 
 
SpoofGuard uses configurable weighted heuristics to determine the likelihood 
that a website is a malicious website. The user is able to configure the weights 
for each feature as shown in Figure ‎3.6. One negative aspect of SpoofGuard is 
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that if the user is warned of a possible phishing attack, he could override this 
warning, hence, no more warnings will appear in the future for any webpage 
having the same domain name. However, a phisher may create a harmless 
website and later the truthful website is replaced with a malicious one; thus, 
SpoofGuard will not warn the user of possible attacks. This kind of attack is 
called Bait and Switch Attack.  
 
Figure ‎3.6 Configure Features Weights Window 
 
Some organizations offer toolbars to their customers to keep them safe from 
being phished. An example of such toolbars is the eBay toolbar (eBay Toolbar's, 
1995). This toolbar is solely designed to protect eBay and PayPal users only. 
However, like SpoofGuard, this toolbar is prone to a Bait and Switch attack.  
In 2006, a study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of five toolbars (Wu et al., 
2006), those are: SpoofStick (Spoofstick, 2005), Netcraft (Netcraft Toolbar, 1995), 
Trustbar (Herzberg & Gbara, 2004), eBay Account Guard (eBay Toolbar's, 1995) 
and SpoofGuard (Chou et al., 2004). The results reveal that there are two 
reasons why the users’ fall victims to phishing: Firstly, most Internet users 
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discard what the toolbars display because they tend to judge on the website 
class based on its look-and-feel. Secondly, several companies do not follow 
sensible practice in designing their websites. Hence, the toolbars cannot help 
the Internet users’ to differentiate between a poorly designed website and a 
malicious one.  
URL and HTML DOM objects are not the only places to extract the phishing 
website features, but also the features might be extracted from visual related 
elements. The basic idea is that detecting phishing websites is similar to 
plagiarism and duplicate-document detection, except that phishing detection 
focuses on visual similarities whereas plagiarism detection focuses on text 
based similarity. One promising method proposed by (Wenyin et al., 2005) 
suggests detecting phishing websites based on visual similarities between 
phishing and legitimate websites. Initially, this technique decomposes the 
webpage into salient block regions depending on visual cues. The visual 
similarity between phishing and legitimate webpages is then evaluated in three 
metrics: block level similarity, layout similarity, and overall style similarity. A 
webpage is considered a phishing attempt if any metric has a value higher than 
a predefined threshold. However, this technique might be inaccurate because 
of the high plasticity of the webpage layout.  
The authors in (Liu et al., 2006) suggested a phishing detection model using the 
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) (Rubner et al., 1998). EMD is a measurement 
technique to assess the distance between two probability distributions. This 
approach assesses the similarity between phishing and legitimate websites at 
the pixel level of the websites without looking at the source code similarities. 
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3.10. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have shed the light on what phishing websites mean, the 
phishing websites life cycle, and we introduced some statistics that show the 
effect of phishing websites on the Internet community. In addition, several anti-
phishing methodologies have been discussed. Such methodologies are 
categorized into seven groups. In addition, in this chapter, we showed that 
most intelligent anti-phishing techniques are based on an offline learning 
schema, according to which once the anti-phishing tool is produced it can 
obtain no further knowledge. Concept drift and catastrophic forgetting 
dilemmas have been discussed as the main issues to be addressed when 
designing an anti-phishing model.  
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4. CHAPTER 4  
A Classification Framework based on 
Ensemble Self-Structuring Neural Network  
4.1. Introduction 
A challenging problem when designing a classification model for dynamic 
domains (as in phishing websites classification problem) is how to make the 
model learns continuously from evolving data sets. Resolving this issue 
demands a technique that can trace any changes that might affect the 
classification model overall accuracy; hence, revising the decision boundaries 
accordingly. Such a situation requires a learning schema that offers balance 
between stability and plasticity.  
In this chapter, a new classification framework that continuously obtains 
knowledge from evolving data sets is proposed and is called Ensemble Self-
Structuring Neural Network (ESSNN). The framework shown in Figure ‎4.1 
suggests that as soon as a new data set batch arrives at time t and after 
confirming the presence of a virtual concept drift, a new classifier ct is created. 
The newly derived classifier is combined with all previously created classifiers 
to produce a band of classifiers (ensemble of classifiers) Ct. The decision 
(assigning class value to test data) of Ct is a collective decision.    
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Data set at time t2 
Data set at time tn 
Create classifier S3 using SSNN 
 
Create classifier S4using SSNN 
 
Vote 
Data set at time t1 
Data set at time t2 
Create classifier S1using SSNN 
Create classifier S2 using SSNN 
 
Final Decision 
Figure ‎4.1 The proposed ESSNN framework  
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Combining multiple classifiers, i.e. ensemble of classifiers, ensures that all 
previously created classifiers participate in the prediction phase rather than 
depending only on a single classifier (in particular the one created last) in 
making the final class prediction. Hence, no classifier is discarded based on its 
age since we may face the problem of a cyclical concept drift. The proposed 
framework supports reinforcement learning because it uses the set of 
misclassified instances at time ti to derive a new classifier at time ti+1. In 
addition, the framework explores the advantage of regularly repeating the 
feature selection process to provoke new features into play.  
According to section ‎2.4, two reasons may lead to the occurrence of the concept 
drift, i.e. virtual and real. The proposed framework in this chapter is more 
inclined to the virtual one where the features utilized in predicting the class 
variable may change from one data set to another. Virtual concept drift might 
occur unintentionally due to the changes occurring naturally in the domain. 
Nevertheless, it might also occur purposely with the aim to circumvent the 
classification model. Security based domains are good examples where virtual 
concept drift might be guided by some malevolent agent (Dhillon, 2001). One 
way for those malicious people to be the reason for the occurrence of the virtual 
concept drift is by hacking into the classification model, and picking a new set 
of features that can circumvent it as discussed in section ‎3.7.  
Neural Network proved its superiority in several of classification domains such 
as image classification (Kesari et al., 2014), pattern recognition (Insung & 
Wang, 2007), speech recognition (Hinton et al., 2012), and medical diagnosis 
(Amato et al., 2013). The power of NNs is gained for several reasons, for 
instance, their strong ability to learn (White, 1990), their power to generalize 
(Hornik et al., 1989) (Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000), and their fault tolerance 
(McCaffrey, 2012). Yet, it might be difficult to interpret how a NN classifier 
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produces its results, and it is regarded as a black box (Benitez et al., 1997). 
Hence, even if those malevolent agents were able to hack into the NN based 
classification model they might face some difficulties to comprehend how the 
features are employed to produce the final decision. In other words, the only 
visible parts in any NN model are the input and output, whereas the process 
that transforms the inputs into outputs is obscured. This characteristic has 
successfully applied in different security domains such as the work done in 
(Arvandi et al., 2008), (Alallayah et al., 2010), and (Al-Ubaidy, 2004). 
Nevertheless, NN classifiers are normally created using a painstaking trial and 
error method. In this chapter, we have proposed an improved NN structuring 
algorithm called Self-Structuring Neural Network (SSNN) that simplifies 
structuring NN classifiers and add them to the ESSNN.  
Hereinafter, we discuss the phases of the proposed framework as well as the 
SSNN algorithm in detail. 
4.2. The main phases of the ESSNN 
1. Training Data set Formation  
Any supervised classification method needs a set of independent variables 
denoted as input features to build a classifier. Such variables have influence on 
dependent variable(s), i.e. class variable(s). Thus, a set of objects containing 
such dependent and independent variables should be collected, and from each 
object, a set of input features and corresponding class variable(s) are extracted. 
Hence, a structured training data set is created.  
The resulting data set is merged with a set of instances that were misclassified 
by the ESSNN in previous testing phases. In other words, the newly collected 
data set is merged with a set of old but may be useful instances. The main aim of 
merging the set of misclassified examples with the newly collected data set is to 
Chapter ‎4 Page 74 
A CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK BASED ON ENSEMBLE SELF-STRUCTURING NEURAL NETWORK 
 
reinforce learning and create a strong classifier next time a new classifier is 
derived. One possible reason for misclassifying some instances is that the 
ESSNN may be lacking some knowledge. Such knowledge can be acquired by 
studying the misclassified examples.  
The output of this step is a data set that contains all possible input features 
even the redundant ones; this is why we call it large data set. However, we 
realize that not all features are equally important in predicting the class 
variable (Guyon & Elisseeff, 2003). Some features might be more significant 
than others. Yet, the set of significant features at time ti might become 
insignificant at time ti+1 and vice versa because of the emergence of a virtual 
concept drift. Hence, as soon as a large data set is formed the set of significant 
features are identified as we will see in section ‎2. 
2. Creating Minimal Data sets and Concept Drift 
Identification 
This phase aims at selecting an effective set of features from the large data set. 
In other words, it aims to pick a sub-set of features that most contributes in 
determining the value of the class variable. The output of this phase is called 
minimal data set since it will include only the most effective set of features 
whereas the redundant features will be removed. Several feature selection 
methods can be used to produce the minimal data set including Information 
Gain (IG) (Shannon, 1948), Chi-Square (Greenwood & Nikulin, 1996), Gain 
Ratio (Quinlan, 1993), etc. Normally, these methods assign a rank value that 
corresponds to the feature’s significance. The set of features that have a ranking 
value greater than a predefined threshold value will be used to create a new 
classifier. However, since no agreement was found on a specific ranking value 
for picking the most effective set of features, several threshold values will be 
used to create several minimal data sets. From each resulting minimal data set, 
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a new classifier will be derived and the classifier that best improves the 
ensemble’s performance is added to the ESSNN (section ‎3). 
However, besides ensuring the simplicity and compactness of our framework, 
another primary aim of creating the minimal data set is to assess whether a 
virtual concept drift occurs or not and ensure classifiers’ diversity in the 
resulting ensemble. To that end, we compare the features in each minimal data 
set with the features used in deriving the classifiers currently existing in the 
ESSNN.  
Given a minimal dataset b, which has n distinct features A1, A2, …, An. If the 
same set of features in b have been used to create a classifier currently existing 
in the ESSNN, hence, no classifier will be created. Otherwise, we assume that a 
virtual concept drift might occur. In other words, there is no need to derive a 
new classifier if the set of features in the minimal data set has been used to 
derive a classifier that currently exists in the ESSNN because that would result 
in two classifiers having the same set of features.  
However, our assumption about concept drift existence will lead us to assess to 
what extent the concept drift affect the overall accuracy of the ESSNN. 
Sometimes a virtual concept drift occurs because there are some features that 
have a minor impact on the ESSNN accuracy have been dropped from; or added 
to the minimal data set. Therefore, before the new classifier ct is created, the 
accuracy of the current composite classifiers Ct is evaluated on the new large 
data set St. Hence, the new large data set is considered as a testing data set for 
the currently available classifiers in the ESSNN. Each classifier in the ESSNN 
will fetch the set of features that were used to create it, thus disregarding others 
and ensuring that Ct is not biased. If the overall accuracy of the combined 
results from Ct shows a significant drop, then a virtual concept drift occurs and 
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a new classifier could be added to the ESSNN. Thus, we proceed in creating a 
new classifier (section ‎3).   
3. Creating a new Classifier using Self-Structuring 
Neural Network Algorithm 
If a virtual concept drift occurs, then we use the set of minimal data sets created 
in section ‎2 to derive several classifiers. As soon as a new classifier is created, it 
will temporarily be added to the ensemble to assess the improvement the 
classifier adds to the ensemble. Then, we save the result and remove the 
classifier from the ensemble. The classifier that best improves the ensemble 
accuracy will be added permanently to the ensemble. The procedure performed 
to pick the best classifier is explained in Figure ‎4.2. 
 
Figure ‎4.2 An Algorithm for adding a new classifier to ensemble 
The classifiers are created using the SSNN algorithm. The pseudocode of the 
SSNN algorithm is shown in Figure ‎4.3. Hereinafter, the main steps of the 
SSNN algorithm are discussed in detail.  
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A. Parameter Settings 
This phase involves several activities as follows: 
1. The number of neurons in the input layer is set to the number of input 
variables offered in the training data set (line 1 in Figure ‎4.3).  
2. The number of neurons in the output layer is set to one because SSNN aims 
to create binary classification models (line 2). In other words, we will create 
a single neuron that might hold two possible values. 
Figure ‎4.3 The SSNN Algorithm Pseudocode 
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3. The number of neurons in the hidden layer is to be determined by the 
algorithm. Constructive NN structuring approach normally starts with one 
hidden neuron (Islam et al., 2009). The SSNN algorithm creates the simplest 
NN structure that contains one neuron in the hidden layer (line 3), this 
neuron is connected to all neurons in the input and output layers. 
4. Small non-zero random values will be assigned for each connection weight 
(line 4).  
5. The learning rate value commonly ranges from ≈0 to ≈1 (Basheer & Hajmeer, 
2000). Following the default value of WEKA (Hall et al., 2011), the learning 
rate and momentum value are set to 0.3 and 0.2 respectively (line 5) and (line 
6). However, the learning rate value will be adjusted several times during 
the network training process as we will see in the Main Training Phase 
(sub-section ‎C). 
6. One key when creating an ensemble is to derive a set of classifiers each of 
which produces an error-rate less than 50% (Rokach, 2010) (Dietterich, 2000) 
(Hansen & Salamon, 1990). Therefore, the initial desired error-rate (DER) is 
set to 50% (line 7). This value will be used to assess if the algorithm can find 
a possible solution (sub-section ‎B). In addition, this value will be adjusted 
several times, as we will see in the Main Training Phase (sub-section ‎C).  
7. The model designer specifies the maximum number of epochs. 
8. The model designer sets the maximum number of allowed hidden neurons. 
9. The training data set is divided into training, testing, and validation data 
sets. The training data set will be used to learn the model and update 
weights; the testing data set will be used to assess the overall performance 
of the derived classifier. However, the validation data set plays an 
important role in producing the final model, as we will see later in the Main 
Training Phase (sub-section ‎C).  
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B. Warming-up Training Phase 
In this phase (lines 8–9), the algorithm decides whether to proceed with 
creating a new classifier or not. The algorithm computes the calculated error-
rate (CER), aiming to determine what the DER to be achieved in the next 
training epoch is[. In other words, the CER is the DER to be achieved in the next 
training session. Hence, the algorithm trains the network and finds the CER. 
If the algorithm finds a CER less than the initial DER before reaching the 
maximum number of epochs, then the algorithm assumes that the current 
structure can further be improved; hence, the algorithm resets the epoch, and 
assumes that the DER to be achieved in the next training epoch is the CER. 
Then the algorithm moves to the Main Training Phase (sub-section ‎C). On the 
other hand, if the CER is bigger than the initial DER, then the algorithm will be 
terminated (line 24). The CER is equivalent to Mean Square Error (MSE) and is 
calculated as per equation 4.1. Where Ak is the predicted value for example k; 
and Dk is the real value associated with example k in a training data set having 
n examples. 
 𝐶𝐸𝑅 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝐴𝑘 − 𝐷𝑘)
2𝑛
𝑘=0
 (4.1) 
C. Main Training Phase 
In this phase (lines 10-13), the SSNN algorithm continues training the network 
until the CER is less than the DER or the maximum number of epochs is 
reached or achieving the early stopping condition. 
Each training epoch starts by updating the learning rate based on the CER 
achieved in the previous epoch. One of the simplest methods for updating the 
learning rate is the bold driver method (Battiti, 1989). After each training epoch, 
the algorithm compares the CER at time t with the CER at time t-1 and if the 
error has decreased, the learning rate is slightly increased by a specific ratio φ 
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in order to accelerate the error-rate reduction process and converge quickly to 
the possible solution. In this case, the weights are updated. On the other hand, 
if the error has increased or has not changed, SSNN will heavily decrease the 
learning rate by φ’ because we might be approaching one possible solution and 
we need to slow down and study the possible solution more deeply. In this 
case, the weights are not updated. Commonly, φ and φ’ are set to 0.1 and 0.5 
respectively (Battiti, 1989) (Duffner & Garcia, 2007). The reason that φ is 
smaller than φ’ is because we do not want to make a big step that causes the 
algorithm to diverge from the possible solution. However, as soon as the SSNN 
approaches a possible solution, we need to examine that solution more deeply; 
therefore the learning rate is heavily decreased.  
After each training epoch, the SSNN algorithm calculates the error on the 
validation data set. When the error on the validation data set starts to increase, 
that mean the model has begun to over-fit the data, and the training should 
halt (McCaffrey, 2012). Nevertheless, the validation data set may have several 
local minima (as show in section ‎2.11); thus, if we stop training at the first 
increase, we may lose some points that achieve better results because the error-
rate may decrease again at some further points. Therefore, SSNN algorithm 
tracks the error on the validation data set. If the lastly achieved error is less 
than the minimum achieved error, that means the generalisation ability of the 
classifier is improved; thus the algorithm saves the weights and continues 
training the network. On the other hand, if the lastly achieved error is bigger 
than the minimum achieved error, the algorithm continues the training process 
without saving the weights. However, if the lastly achieved error is bigger than 
the minimum achieved error with a specific threshold α, then the algorithm 
terminates the training process (early stopping) since exceeding that threshold 
value might mean that the network diverges from the ideal solution and is 
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difficult to converge back again. A recent study on early stopping (Riley et al., 
2010) finds that the early stopping is triggered if α=50%.  
For the purpose of this research, equation 4.2 has been proposed. Such equation 
clarifies how SSNN algorithm handles the early stopping. Where, 𝜀 is the lastly 
achieved error, and 𝜀′ is the minimum error. 
𝐼𝐹 {
𝜀 <  𝜀′ 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑑
→           𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
(𝜀 >  𝜀′)𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝜀 < [(1 + α) ∗ 𝜀′])
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑑
→              𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑧𝑒 →  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
   (4.2) 
D. Improvement Phase 
In the main training phase, if the SSNN obtains a CER less than the DER before 
reaching the maximum epoch, this could be an indication that the network can 
further be improved without adding any neurons to the hidden layer (lines 14-
15). Therefore, SSNN maintains the learning rate and weights achieved so far; 
resets the epoch, assumes that the DER to be achieved in the next training 
phase is the CER, and goes back to the Main Training Phase. Otherwise, the 
SSNN goes to Adding a New Hidden Neuron Phase (line 16). 
E. Adding a New Hidden Neuron Phase 
SSNN algorithm arrives at this phase if it cannot achieve the DER and reaches 
the maximum allowed epoch or the early stopping condition. In this case, we 
assume that the current structure has been squeezed to the limit and the 
network’s ability of processing the information is insufficient. Therefore, the 
algorithm will add a new neuron to the hidden layer (line 17). The algorithm 
connects the new neuron to all input and output neurons, assigns small non-
zero value to its weight, maintains the learning rate and weights achieved so 
far, and resets the epoch.  
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Yet, adding a new neuron to the hidden layer does not mean that this neuron is 
permanently added into the network, we must first assess whether the new 
neuron improves the network performance or not. Hence, the algorithm 
continues training the network (line 18). If (after adding a new hidden neuron) 
the DER is achieved, then the algorithm approves adding the new neuron, 
maintains the learning rate and weights, resets the epoch, assumes that the 
DER to be achieved in the next training phase is the CER, and goes back to the 
Main Training Phase (lines 19-20). Otherwise, the algorithm moves to 
Producing the Final Network Phase (line 21). 
The main concern in this phase is that the number of hidden neurons can freely 
evolve resulting in a complicated structure. Thus, the algorithm allows the 
system designer to set the maximum number of hidden neurons. 
F. Producing the Final Network Phase 
If adding a new hidden neuron to the network does not improve the network 
performance, then the SSNN removes the lastly added neuron, resets the 
learning rate and the weights as they were before adding the new neuron, 
terminates the training process, and the final network is produced (line 22).  
The most obvious network parameters to evolve in the SSNN algorithm are the 
learning rate, the connection weights, and the number of hidden neurons. 
TANH activation function has been used for the input layer, whereas, the 
bipolar hard limit activation function has been used for the hidden layer. The 
selection for the TANH activation function is that it convergence faster than 
other activation functions (Kriesel, 2007) (Kalman & Kwasny, 1992). However, 
bipolar activation function has been selected because SSNN derives binary 
classifiers.  
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4. Combine the Classifiers Results  
As soon as a new unseen example arrives, each classifier in the ESSNN will 
come up with its own decision about the example’s class and then their 
outcomes are combined in some ways as shown in section ‎2.10.2. In our 
ensemble, each classifier is assigned a weight based on its performance on a 
testing data set consisting of the testing data set achieved from the most recent 
data set and historical testing data sets, i.e. testing data sets of the previously 
created classifiers that currently exist in the ESSNN. The overall accuracy 
produced from classifier ci is considered the weight of that classifier, where i=1, 
2, 3…Z, and Z is the total number of classifiers in the ESSNN. When a new 
unseen example arrives, the ESSNN calculates the weighted voting sum for 
each class. The prediction value produced from the ESSNN is the class that has 
the highest weighted voting sum. 
Finally, after creating the ensemble, any misclassified example in the testing 
data set will be kept and used in the next training session. Misclassified 
examples are used to reinforce learning and create a strong classifier next time 
a new classifier is created and added to the ensemble. 
4.3. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, we propose a classification framework called Ensemble Self-
Structuring Neural Network (ESSNN). The ESSNN has the ability to 
accommodate new knowledge, and does not discard previously learnt 
knowledge. Thus, the proposed framework furnishes a balance between 
stability and plasticity. The ESSNN is evaluated as soon as a new data set 
chunk is collected. If the produced accuracy is significantly drops, a new 
classifier is created and added to the ESSNN. Each classifier is assigned a 
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weight based on its accuracy. The prediction value produced from the ESSNN is 
the class that has the highest weighted voting sum.  
The proposed framework is more inclined to the virtual concept drift where the 
significant features utilized in predicting the class variable may change over 
time. In this research, we explore the advantage of regularly repeating the 
feature selection process to provoke new features into play. The classifiers that 
are added to the ESSNN are created using an improved Self-Structuring Neural 
Networks algorithm (SSNN) that simplifies creating NN classifiers. 
The SSNN algorithm will be evaluated in the next chapter (chapter 5) in order 
to assess if the SSNN algorithm is able to derive good classifiers and add them 
to the ESSNN. Later, in chapter 6, we will apply the ESSNN on a vital web 
security problem where a virtual concept drift might occur, that is the phishing 
websites classification problem with the aim to assess if it can handle the 
virtual concept drift and offers a balance between stability and plasticity when 
applied to phishing websites classification problem. 
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5. CHAPTER 5  
Evaluating the SSNN Algorithm 
5.1. Introduction  
Creating a NN classifier is traditionally accomplished using trial and error. 
However, this method has several difficulties as discussed in section ‎2.12. In 
chapter 4, we have proposed an algorithm that aims at simplifying structuring 
NN classifiers that are added to the ESSNN framework. Such an algorithm is 
called Self-Structuring Neural Network (SSNN). SSNN is a family member of 
the constructive NN structuring approach. The classifiers derived from SSNN 
are assumed to learn from the training data set and to generalise the output on 
test data set.  
In this chapter, several experiments will be accomplished to evaluate the 
performance of the SSNN algorithm with the aim to assess if the SSNN is able 
to derive good classifiers. Two sets of experiments will be conducted. The first 
set compares the SSNN against several DM classification algorithms on a 
number of binary data sets from the UCI repository. In the second set of 
experiments, the SSNN will be applied to phishing websites classification 
problem and the results will be compared to the results achieved from several 
other DM classification algorithms.  
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5.2. Evaluating the SSNN on UCI Data sets 
5.2.1. Algorithms Used for Comparison and the 
Experimental Settings 
The experimental evaluation compares the SSNN algorithm with Decision Tree 
(C4.5) (Quinlan, 1998), Bayesian Network (BN) (Friedman et al., 1997), Logistic 
Regression (LR) (Witten et al., 2011), and the standard Feed Forward Neural 
Network (FFNN) algorithm implemented in WEKA (Hall et al., 2011). The 
selection of these algorithms is because these algorithms utilise different 
strategies in producing classifiers and are commonly used in creating 
classification models (Abdelhamid et al., 2012), (Thabtah et al., 2005), (Witten et 
al., 2011). Such algorithms have been discussed briefly in sections Appendix A. 
However, the FFNN algorithm assumes that the number of neurons in the 
input layers equals the number of attributes in the training data set, whereas 
the number of neurons in the output layer equals the number of classes. The 
number of neurons in the hidden layer is the average number of neurons in the 
input and output layers (Hall et al., 2011), and is calculated as per equation 5.1. 
However, the default epoch size used in FFNN is 500 (Hall et al., 2011). 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠+𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠
 (5.1) 
Other algorithms were selected since they use different strategies in producing 
classification models and they have been discussed briefly in sections 
Appendix A.  
For all comparable algorithms, we use the default parameter settings of WEKA 
(Hall et al., 2011). Whereas, for SSNN algorithm, two input values should be 
entered from the system designer, i.e. number of epochs and maximum 
number of possible hidden neurons. There is no rule of thumb in which one 
can decide on these values (Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000). Therefore, following 
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some recent studies which employ NN to create classification models in 
different domains (Kesari et al., 2014), (Madhusmita et al., 2012), (Ganatra et al., 
2011), (Insung & Wang, 2007), (Hossein et al., 2003), (Shamik et al., 2011), 
(Paulin & Santhakumaran, 2011), (Amato et al., 2013) we set the maximum 
number of possible neurons in the hidden neurons to 15. Yet, these studies 
utilise different epoch sizes and the most commonly used epoch size values are 
100, 200, 500, and 1000. Four sub-experiments will be conducted, in which the 
maximum number of possible hidden neurons is 15, and epoch size has been 
set to 100, 200, 500, and 1000 for sub-experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The 
SSNN algorithm has been implemented in Java. All experiments were 
conducted in a system with CPU Pentium Intel® CoreTM i5-2430M @ 2.40 
GHz, RAM 4.00 GB. The platform is Windows 7 64-bit Operating System. 
5.2.2. Training Data sets 
Ten different binary classification data sets from the University of California 
Irvine repository (UCI) (Lichman, 2013) have been chosen. We have picked 
small, medium and large data sets with several numbers of attributes for fair 
selection. Table ‎5.1 shows their description, i.e. name, number of attributes, 
number of instances, and class distribution for each data set. 
Table ‎5.1 UCI data sets description 
Data set Number of attributes Number of Instances Class Distribution 
Breast 9 699 66%     34% 
Labor 16 57 35%     65% 
Liver 6 345 42%     58% 
Ionosphere 34 351 36%     64% 
Pima 8 786 65%     35% 
Tic-Tac 9 958 35%     65% 
Sonar 60 208 47%     53% 
Hepatitis 19 155 21%     79% 
Vote 16 435 61%     39% 
kr-vs-kp 36 3196 52%     48% 
Some data sets hold categorical values. Yet, SSNN algorithm requires 
converting these categorical values into numerical values. In addition, SSNN 
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algorithm will produce either 1 or -1 because the activation function in the 
hidden layer is a bipolar hard limit activation function. Hence, any class 
variable holds values other than 1 and -1 will be converted to 1 and -1 for 
experiments purposes. In order, to differentiate input attributes from class 
variables, we assign 0.5 and -0.5 for the binary attributes, and 0.5, 0, and -0.5 for 
trinary attributes. Other attributes holding numerical values are left without 
any changes.  
5.2.3. Validation Technique and Evaluation Metrics 
The hold-out validation technique is used in our experiments. Following some 
previous studies (Bubtiena et al., 2011), (McCaffrey, 2012), (Sivanandam et al., 
2006) (Amato et al., 2013), (Gabralla et al., 2014), all data sets will be divided 
into 80% for training and 20% for testing. Moreover, when creating the SSNN 
classifiers the training data sets will be further divided into 80% for training 
and 20% for validation. 
In any supervised classification model, four classification possibilities are 
employed as per confusion matrix shown in Table ‎5.2. 
Table ‎5.2 Confusion Matrix 
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 V
a
lu
e
 Actual Value  
 
Classified as Positive Classified as Negative 
Is Positive TP FP 
Is Negative FN TN 
 
Where True Positive (Sensitivity) (TP) is the number of positive examples 
correctly classified as positive, False Negative (FN) is the number of positive 
examples incorrectly classified as negative, False Positive (FP) is the number of 
negative examples incorrectly classified as positive and True Negative 
(Specificity) (TN) is the number of negative examples correctly classified as 
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negative. Several evaluation metrics can be derived from the confusion matrix. 
In the first set of experiments, the SSNN algorithm will be compared with other 
classification algorithms in terms of produced error-rate (described in section 
5.2.5), relative accuracy-rate (section 5.2.6), and time taken to produce 
classifiers (section 5.2.7) these metrics are commonly used to evaluate any 
classification model (Abdelhamid et al., 2012) (Thabtah et al., 2005). 
5.2.4. Results and Discussion 
1- Error Rate Analysis 
The error rate is calculated as per equation 5.2. 
error-rate = 1 - Accuracy(%) (5.2) 
Where Accuracy(%) is the proportion of instances that have correct 
classification from the size of the data set and is calculated as per equation 5.3.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (%) =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁
 (5.3) 
Table ‎5.3 shows the error rate produced from SSNN and other considered 
algorithms. 
Table ‎5.3 Error rate of SSNN and other considered algorithms 
Data set C4.5 BN LR FFNN 
SSNN- 
100 
SSNN- 
200 
SSNN-
500 
SSNN-
1000 
Breast 7.14% 3.57% 2.86% 4.29% 3.57% 3.57% 3.57% 3.57% 
Labor 27.27% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 
Liver 40.58% 39.13% 28.99% 31.88% 39.13% 31.88% 34.78% 34.78% 
Ionosphere 20.00% 12.86% 18.57% 15.71% 20.00% 17.14% 17.14% 15.71% 
Pima 24.03% 17.53% 18.83% 25.97% 19.48% 18.18% 20.13% 20.13% 
Tic-Tac 16.15% 29.69% 1.57% 3.15% 2.08% 3.15% 1.44% 3.56% 
Sonar 19.05% 23.81% 16.67% 9.52% 14.29% 11.52% 9.52% 9.52% 
Hepatitis 32.26% 9.68% 16.12% 16.12% 16.12% 19.35% 9.68% 16.12% 
Vote 5.75% 11.49% 1.15% 4.60% 3.45% 4.60% 4.60% 3.45% 
kr-vs-kp 0.47% 12.52% 2.19% 0.78% 2.03% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 
Average  19.27% 16.94% 11.61% 12.11% 12.92% 11.90% 11.04% 11.64% 
 
From Table ‎5.3 and Figure ‎5.1, the results clearly show that the classifiers 
produced from the SSNN when epoch size is set to 500 have the least error-rate 
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on average. Such classifiers have achieved on average 0.57%, 1.07%, 5.90% and 
8.23% lower error-rate than LR, FFNN, BN and C4.5 respectively. These results 
have a good sign that NN based algorithms, i.e. FFNN and SSNN generate 
better classifiers than C4.5 and BN in terms of error-rate. One possible reason is 
the fact that these algorithms have the ability to deal with fault tolerance 
situations, i.e. their performance is not significantly affected if some data are 
missing in the training data set (Kantardzic, 2011). That explains the high error-
rate of C4.5 in some data sets such as Breast, Labor, and Hepatitis given that 
these data sets have 16, 326, and 167 missing values respectively. The average 
error-rate produced from LR is slightly better than the classifiers produced 
from SSNN when epoch size is set to 100, 200 and 1000, given that LR produces 
good results if it is applied in binary classification domains (Witten et al., 2011). 
That explains the low error-rate produced from LR on Vote data set since in 
this data set not only the class variable holds binary values but also the input 
features. SSNN outperforms all considered algorithms in terms of average 
error-rate when epoch size is set to 500. 
 
Figure ‎5.1 Error-rate from SSNN and other considered algorithms 
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Overall, SSNN is able to produce competitive results on different epoch sizes. 
That can be attributed because SSNN is able to produce well-structured 
classifiers. To elaborate, SSNN keeps pushing on the learning rate to improve 
the NN performance by adjusting the desired error-rate several times before 
adding a new hidden neuron. The learning rate in SSNN is not static but it 
changes after each training epoch. If the error-rate achieved at epoch i is 
smaller than the error at epoch i-1, the SSNN increases the learning rate in 
order to converge quickly to the possible solutions. However, if the error-rate 
at epoch i is higher than the error-rate at epoch i-1 the SSNN decreases the 
learning rate since we might approach one possible solution and the SSNN 
needs to slow down and deeply study that solution. Yet, if the SSNN cannot 
achieve the desired error-rate and it reaches the maximum number of epochs 
then the SSNN adds a new hidden neuron. In addition, the mechanism of 
producing the weights in SSNN might be another reason for deriving good 
classifiers since the weights are only saved when the performance of the 
network on the validation data set has improved. However, the FFNN 
algorithm produces the weights that have been achieved in the last training 
epoch. To illustrate further on the error-rates achieved by all algorithms, 
Table ‎5.3 above demonstrates the data sets we considered and the error-rate 
values of each algorithm. It should be mentioned that in order to derive general 
conclusions on the performance of SSNN, we choose large (kr-vs-kp), medium 
(Tic-Tac), and small (Labor) data sets.  
2- Statistical Significance Comparison 
In order to determine the significance in performance, we performed a paired  
t-test between the results of the SSNN and other considered algorithms using 
the WEKA platform (Hall et al., 2011). Paired t-test is a statistical method for 
comparing the result of measuring one set of data twice, i.e. with two different 
algorithms. The comparison is based on the overall accuracy over the 10 
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selected datasets. Table ‎5.4 shows the comparison results between the SSNN 
and other considered algorithms with 95% confidence level in which W 
signifies how many times the SSNN won, and L signifies how many times the 
SSNN losses. From the results we can clearly see that the SSNN achieved a 
significant improvement over C4.5 on most data sets (9 wins and 0 losses) 
when the epoch size is set to 200, 500, and 1000. The SSNN also produced a 
significant improvement over BN and FFNN (5 wins and 2 losses) when the 
epoch size is set to 500. However, at the same epoch size, the SSNN produced 
comparable results (5 wins and 4 losses) when compared to the LR algorithm.  
Table ‎5.4 A statistical significance comparison of SSNN against other algorithms 
Algorithm C4.5 BN LR FFNN 
W L W L W L W L 
SSNN-100 8 1 4 3 3 6 4 4 
SSNN-200 9 0 5 3 4 5 3 3 
SSNN-500 9 0 5 2 5 4 5 2 
SSNN-1000 9 0 5 3 4 5 4 2 
 
3- Relative Accuracy Rate Analysis 
Figures 5.2 - 5.5 show the relative accuracy rate (RAR) that represents the 
difference in accuracy rate of SSNN when epoch size equals 500 (best classifiers 
produced from SSNN) compared with those resulted from C4.5, BN, LR, and 
FFNN. RAR denotes how much bad or good SSNN behaves when compared to 
C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN on the considered data sets. The RAR is calculated as 
per equation 5.4. 
 
 𝑅𝐴𝑅 =
( 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁)−(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)
(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)
 (5.4) 
 
From the results, we find that the RAR of C4.5 is positive on 9 out of 10 data 
sets since SSNN achieves higher accuracy-rate than C4.5 as seen in Figure ‎5.2. 
In Figure ‎5.3, we can see that the RAR is negative in 2 cases only, i.e. in Pima 
and Ionosphere data sets, because the SSNN produces lower accuracy than BN 
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in these two data sets. However, in Figure ‎5.4, the RAR on Breast, Liver, Pima 
and Vote data sets is negative since SSNN achieves lower accuracy-rate than 
LR on these data sets. In Figure ‎5.5, the RAR is negative in two cases only, i.e. 
on Liver and Ionosphere. Overall, SSNN produces higher RAR in most cases. 
That can be attributed because SSNN is able to produce well-structured 
classifiers in terms of number of hidden neurons and weights space.  
 
Figure ‎5.2 RAR (C4.5 and SSNN) 
 
Figure ‎5.3 RAR (BN and SSNN) 
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Figure ‎5.4 RAR (LR and SSNN) 
 
 
Figure ‎5.5 RAR (FFNN and SSNN) 
4- Processing Time Analysis 
The processing time needed to derive the classifiers in SSNN when epoch size 
is set to 500 (best classifiers produced from SSNN) has been contrasted with 
those of C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN. 
Table ‎5.5 shows the time (in seconds) needed for SSNN and other considered 
algorithms. The average time needed for SSNN to derive classifiers is higher 
than the average time needed for FFNN. That can be because SSNN performs 
several sub-trainings in each training session before producing the final 
classifier. In other words, SSNN not only trains the network but also it makes 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
B
re
as
t
La
b
o
r
Li
ve
r
Io
n
o
sp
h
er
e
P
im
a
Ti
c-
Ta
c
So
n
ar
H
ep
at
it
is
V
o
te
kr
-v
s-
kp
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
cc
u
ra
cy
 R
at
e
 
LR SSNN
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
B
re
as
t
La
b
o
r
Li
ve
r
Io
n
o
sp
h
er
e
P
im
a
Ti
c-
Ta
c
So
n
ar
H
ep
at
it
is
V
o
te
kr
-v
s-
kp
R
e
la
ti
ve
 A
cc
u
ra
cy
 R
at
e
 
FFNN SSNN
Chapter ‎5 Page 95 
EVALUATING THE SSNN ALGORITHM 
 
changes on the network structure. However, the average time needed for 
FFNN is just for a single training session only where the network structure is 
static. Nevertheless, in practice, the system designer has to perform several 
training sessions with several parameter settings to decide on the best 
structure.  
In general, the time needed for NN based algorithms, i.e. FFNN and SSNN is 
longer than other considered algorithms. This is due to the repeated process of 
updating the connection weights that requires doing several mathematical 
calculations.  
Table ‎5.5 Time needed to build the model (in seconds) 
Data set C4.5 BN LR FFNN SSNN-500 
Breast 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.78 1.18 
Labor 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.53 
Vote 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.67 1.49 
Pima 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.58 1.32 
Tic-Tac 0.03 0.01 0.12 3.41 5.47 
Liver 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.24 1.08 
Sonar 0.03 0.01 0.06 3.04 5.56 
Hepatitis 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.41 1.01 
Ionosphere 0.03 0.01 0.09 2.23 5.44 
kr-vs-kp 0.02 0.01 0.03 25.75 36.54 
Average time  0.025 0.015 0.049 3.742 5.962 
5.3. Evaluating the SSNN algorithm on Phishing Data 
Set 
5.3.1. Experimental Settings 
This set of experiments evaluates the applicability of the SSNN algorithm to 
phishing websites classification problem and the results will be compared 
against the same set of classification algorithms shown in section ‎5.2.1. For all 
comparable algorithms as well as for the SSNN algorithm, we will use the same 
parameter settings as shown in section ‎5.2.1.  
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Three different feature selection methods will be used including Information 
Gain (Shannon, 1948), Chi-Square (Greenwood & Nikulin, 1996) and Gain Ratio 
(Quinlan, 1993) with the aim to empirically assess these methods and their 
effect on the performance of the SSNN and other comparable classification 
algorithms. The selection for these methods is because they are commonly used 
for feature selection in the domain of phishing websites classification (Pan & 
Ding, 2006), (Ma et al., 2009), (Aburrous et al., 2010 B), (Basnet et al., 2012), 
(Abdelhamid et al., 2014), (Mansour & Alshihri, 2015).  
5.3.2. Validation Technique and Evaluation Metrics 
In this set of experiments, we will use the same validation technique discussed 
in section ‎5.2.3. Following previous studies related to phishing classification 
(Abu-Nimeh et al., 2007), (Zhang et al., 2007), (Fette et al., 2007), (Miyamoto et 
al., 2008), (Basnet et al., 2008), (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), (Abdelhamid et al., 
2014) and (Mansour & Alshihri, 2015) we use a set of evaluation metrics that 
can be derived from the confusion matrix shown in section ‎5.2.3. These 
evaluation metrics are as follows: 
1.  Precision (P): the rate of correctly classified legitimate websites in relation to 
all instances that are classified as legitimate and is calculated as per equation 
5.5. 
 𝑃 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
 (5.5) 
2. Recall (R): is equivalent to TPR (Sensitivity). 
3. F1-score (Harmonic Mean): is the weighted average of P and R. F1-score 
takes both FP and FN into account and is calculated as per equation 5.6. This 
metric weights R and P equally, and a good classifier will maximize both P 
and R simultaneously. Thus, moderately good performance on both will be 
favoured over good performance on one and poor performance on the other. 
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 𝐹1 =  
2 𝑃 𝑅
𝑃+𝑅
 (5.6) 
4. Accuracy (ACC): the overall rate of correctly classified legitimate and 
phishing websites in relation to the total number of instances in the testing 
data set and is calculated as per equation 5.7. 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁
 (5.7)  
Where TP is the number of legitimate websites correctly classified as legitimate, 
TN is the number of phishing websites correctly classified as phishing, FP is the 
number of legitimate websites incorrectly classified as phishing, and FN is the 
number of phishing websites incorrectly classified as legitimate. 
5.3.3. Significant Features across Phishing Websites 
Nowadays, phishers employ a myriad of features to create phishing websites 
and an air of temptation to mislead honest users. James substantiated this 
argument in his book (James, 2005) by suggesting that phishers use a set of 
common features in designing phishing websites to strengthen their deceptive 
tactics and selfish objectives. Depending on a more inclusive set of features, a 
DM model would certainly produce a better performance. Yet, the set of 
effective features might differ from time to time (Ma et al., 2009) (Basnet et al., 
2012).  
In order to collect the distinctive features of phishing websites, we recognize 
that there are two possible ways. One of which is by reviewing previous 
studies; since scholars who have used such features in their studies have 
already confirmed that these features commonly occur in phishing websites. 
However, in this research we followed one more route by analysing a set of 
phishing and legitimate websites to determine the differences between an 
authentic and a fake one. To that end, a data set consisting of 2,604 legitimate 
websites and 2,509 phishing ones have been collected. The data set collection 
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methodology has been described in detail in section ‎5.3.4. We have divided 
phishing website features into four groups as per Figure ‎5.6.   
   
   
Figure ‎5.6 Categorizing Phishing website features 
We managed to collect 30 features. Later, in the experimental section we use 
Information Gain to assess these features. 
5.3.3.1. Address Bar based Features 
1- Using the IP Address 
If an IP address is used as an alternative of the domain name in the URL, such 
as (http://125.98.3.123/fake.html), users are excused if they doubt that someone is 
trying to steal their personal information (Aburrous et al., 2010 C). Sometimes 
the IP address is even converted into hexadecimal code as shown in the 
following link (http:// 0xCA. 0x62. 0xCC. 0x58 /3/paypal.uk/index.htm). To extract 
this feature, we examine whether the domain part of the URL (Figure ‎5.7) 
contains an IP address or not. 
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Figure ‎5.7 URL anatomy 
2- Long URLs 
Phishers might use long URLs to hide the suspicious part in the address bar. 
For example:  
http://federmacedoadv.com.br/3f/aze/ab51e2e319e51502f416dbe46b773a5e/?cmd=_hom
e&amp;dispatch=11004d58f5b74f8dc1e7c2e8dd4105e811004d58f5b74f8dc1e7c2e8dd41
05e8@phishing.website.html 
According to (Basnet et al., 2011) the maximum length of genuine URL is 75 
characters. However, the authors did not clarify the reasons behind their 
chosen value. In another study (McGrath & Gupta, 2008), it has been stated that 
URL lengths peak at 22 characters for legitimate websites in the Directory 
Mozilla6 (DMOZ) (Skrenta & Truel, 2011). However, the same study revealed 
that there are 67 characters for the phishing URLs in PhishTank (PhishTank, 
2011) and 107 for the phishing URLs in MarkMonitor (MarkMonitor, 2013). 
However, phishers are nowadays utilizing smaller URLs in an attempt to add 
an atmosphere of legality to their hostile links. In general, there is no 
agreement on a reliable length that separates phishing websites from legitimate 
ones.  
                                                 
6
 A multilingual open-content directory. 
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3- Using URL Shortening Services (Tiny URL) 
URL shortening is a method on the World Wide Web in which a URL may be 
made considerably smaller in length and still leads to the required webpage. 
For example, a link such as http://portal.hud.ac.uk/ can be shortened to 
bit.ly/19DXSk4. However, it is abnormal to find a legitimate website using 
shortening service. By looking into our data set, we found 107 TinyURLs and 
none of them was found in the legitimate websites data set.  
4- URL with @ Symbol 
One technique commonly used to lure users is by utilizing the @ symbol. The 
existence of such a symbol in the URL leads the browser to ignore everything 
preceding the symbol, since the real address often follows the @ symbol. After 
reviewing our data set, we found 90 URLs having the @ symbol and all of them 
were found in the phishing data set.  
5- .htaccess Redirecting 
The Hypertext Access (.htaccess) is a configuration file used to modify the 
configuration of the Apache Web Server (Starr, 2012). One of these 
configurations is the redirect functionality. Phishers can use .htaccess to redirect 
users to a phishing webpage. The .htaccess looks for any request for a specific 
webpage and if it finds that request, it forwards the user to a new webpage. For 
example, if a phisher wants to redirect users from legitimate.html to 
phishing.html he can use the following syntax: 
redirect legitimate.html http://www.fake.ca/phishing.html 
Any user visiting legitimate.html will end up on http://www.fake.ca/phishing.html. 
However, this technique results in adding double slash (//) at the beginning of 
the redirected webpage as seen in the following example: 
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http://www.legitimate.html//http://www.phishing.html 
We will check the position where the // appears. We have found that if the URL 
starts with HTTP then the // normally appears in the sixth position. However, if 
the URL uses HTTPS then the // appears in seventh position. Otherwise, the // 
will cause the URL to be transferred to another webpage.  
6- Adding Prefix or Suffix Separated by (-) to the Domain 
The dash symbol is infrequently used in genuine URLs (Aburrous et al., 2010 
B). Phishers resort to adding prefixes or suffixes separated by (-) to the domain 
name so that users feel that they are dealing with a legitimate webpage. For 
example: http://www.Confirme-paypal.com/.  
7-  Sub-Domain and Multi Sub-Domains 
Another technique used by phishers to scam users is by adding multi sub-
domains to the URL (Gastellier-Prevos et al., 2011) (Leyden, 2011) as in the 
following URL: http://sigin.ehay.it.ws.ebadell.it.vividsong.com/. 
8-  HTTPS  
HTTPS is a Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) plus Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL). Usually, legitimate websites utilise secure domains every time sensitive 
information is transferred. SSL indicates that the clients are connected to the 
server they presume and not to any other third party. In addition, SSL encrypts 
the network traffic, therefore nobody other than the client and server can 
eavesdrop. The presence of HTTPS is an important sign of website validity; 
nevertheless this is clearly not enough. For instance, in 2005, Netcraft Toolbar 
Community identified more than 450 phishing URLs utilising fake HTTPS 
(Miller, 2005). Fake certificates can be utilised to trick users into thinking a 
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malicious website is legitimate. Therefore, we further need to check the 
certificate assigned with HTTPS, including the certificate age, and the extent of 
a trust certificate issuer. Certificate authorities that are frequently listed among 
the top trustworthy names include (Best SSL Certificates, 2011): GeoTrust, 
GoDaddy, Network Solutions, Thawte, Comodo, Doster and VeriSign. However, by 
testing out our data sets, we have found that the minimum age of a reputable 
certificate is two years. In our phishing data set, we find 2321 URLs that do not 
support HTTPS, whereas in legitimate data sets we found 115 items. Unlike 
previous researches that assume that a URL is valid if it is using an HTTPS 
protocol, we further examine the certificate authority provider as well as the 
certificate age. 
9- Using Free Hosting Domains 
It is abnormal to find a legitimate websites hosted on a free domain-hosting 
server. Commonly, reputable companies pay for web hosting service providers 
to maintain their domain name. In a recent report (Aaron & Manning, 2014 B), 
it has been shown that 25% of phishing websites identified in the first half of 
2014 are using free domain-hosting servers. Information about hosting 
providers can be obtained from WHOIS database (WHOIS, 2005). 
10-  Favicon 
A favicon is a graphic image (icon) associated with a specific webpage. Many 
organisations show favicon as a visual reminder of the website identity in the 
address bar as per Figure ‎5.8.  In our data sets, we have found 139 phishing 
websites using such feature. None of them loads the favicon from the domain 
shown in the address bar but from the genuine domain. This could be 
attributed to the fact that most phishing webpages are simple copies of genuine 
ones.  
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Figure ‎5.8 Webpage where favicon appears 
  
11- Using Non-Standard Port  
Port 80 and port 443 are the default ports for HTTP and HTTPS respectively7. 
This implies that no need for the user to specify the port while he browsing the 
Internet. However, phishers tend to add a port number to the URL in order to 
bypass the security detection tools that may monitor a particular port number. 
In our data set, we have found 28 URLs having a port number other than the 
default ports, all of them were found in the phishing data set.  
12- The Existence of (HTTPS) Token in the Domain Part  
Several improvements have been made on Firefox since the seventh version 
was released. In addition to other improvements, one of the changes made is 
that Firefox no longer displays the (HTTP://) part of a URL. For instance, when 
visiting (http://portal.hud.ac.uk/), Firefox will show (portal.hud.ac.uk) in the URL 
address bar as shown in Figure ‎5.9. 
                                                 
7
 A full list of the common ports can be achieved from: 
 http://www.networksorcery.com/enp/protocol/ip/ports00000.htm 
Favicon 
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Figure ‎5.9 Firefox Does not Show the http protocol  
However, Firefox is still showing (HTTPS://) in the URL address bar when 
visiting a website that uses the HTTPS protocol. The phishers were aware of 
such behaviour, thus they might add the HTTPS token to the URL in order to 
trick users. For example, if we type the following URL in the Firefox address 
bar (http://https-www-paypal-it-webapps-mpp-home.soft-hair.com/), the shown part 
of this URL is (https-www-paypal-it-webapps-mpp-home.soft-hair.com), therefore, if 
HTTPS is used in the domain part of the URL that could be a sign that the URL 
belongs to phishing attempts.  
5.3.3.2. Abnormal based Features 
1- Request URL 
When designing their phishing webpage, phishers might modify a minimal 
part of the targeted legitimate webpage and maintain all other links dispatched 
to the real webpage. This is most likely because mirroring tools are an easier 
way to setup a phishing website. Request URL examines whether the objects 
contained within a webpage such as images, videos and sounds are loaded 
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from another domains (Pan & Ding, 2006). In legitimate webpages, the 
webpage address and most of objects embedded within the webpage are 
sharing the same domain. For example, suppose that the URL typed in the 
address bar is (http://www.hud.ac.uk/students/), hence, we extract the link 
associated with the keyword <src=> from the webpage source code and check 
whether the domain in the address bar is different from that in <src> tags. For 
this feature, we calculate the rate of URLs in the webpage source code that have 
different domain other than the domain shown in the address bar. We compute 
the feature existence rate, not the frequency because the number of request 
URLs fluctuates from one webpage to another.  
2- URL of Anchor 
An anchor is an element defined by the < a > tag. For this feature, we examine: 
1. If the website and the anchor tag have different domains 
2. If the anchor is not linked to any webpage (Aburrous et al., 2010 C),  
such as: <a href=“#”>, <a href=“#content”>, <a href=“#skip”> or  
<a href=“JavaScript ::void(0)”> 
Same as Request URL, we calculated the feature existence rate. 
3-  Links in <Meta>, <Script> and <Link> Tags 
Commonly, legitimate websites to use < Meta > tags to offer metadata about the 
HTML document; < Script > tags to create a client side scripts; and  
< Link > tags to retrieve other web resources. It is expected that these tags are 
linked to the same domain of the webpage. By reviewing the phishing websites 
data set, we have found great portions of these tags are linked to the genuine 
domain. For this feature, we calculate the existence rate. 
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4- Suspicious Action Upon Submitted Information 
As soon as the user submitted his information, an action should be taken upon 
this information. Usually, this task is accomplished using the so-called Server 
Form Handler (SFH). A form handler is a program that runs on the web server 
that takes the information entered in the HTML form and does something with 
it. If the SFH contains an empty string or (about:blank), hence, the webpage is 
considered doubtful (Aburrous et al., 2010 B). In our phishing data set, we have 
found 101 webpages containing either an empty SFH or a SFH pointing to a 
domain different to what is shown in the browser address bar. However, no 
legitimate websites have empty or about:blank SFHs. 
5- Submitting Information to Email 
Web forms allow users to submit their personal information to a server for 
further processing. A phisher might redirect the user’s information to his 
personal email. To that end, server side programming language might be used 
to redirect the user’s information using mail() function. However, a client side 
function might also be used for redirecting user’s information using the mailto: 
function. In our data set, we found 127 data set items in which the user’s 
information sent to a personal email, none of these items was found in the 
legitimate data set. 
6- Website’s Owner  
In any secure website, the digital certificate provides information about the 
website’s owner (Jalal & Peter, 1999). Reviewing our data set, we found that for 
phishing websites, the owner field does not provide any information as per 
Figure ‎5.10. On the other hand, the owner field in secure legitimate websites is 
clearly provided as per Figure ‎5.11. 
Chapter ‎5 Page 107 
EVALUATING THE SSNN ALGORITHM 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.10  A URL not supporting information about the owner 
 
Figure ‎5.11  A secure website clearly supporting information about the owner 
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5.3.3.3. HTML and JavaScript based Features 
1- Redirect Page 
Phishers might use this feature with the intention of hiding the real link and 
asking the users to submit their information to a fake webpage. In a recent 
study (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), it has been found that phishing websites that 
have this feature are redirected three or more times. However, the same study 
revealed that some legitimate websites might also have this feature but they are 
redirected for one time only. The (window.location) object is commonly used to 
redirect the users to another webpage as shown in the following example: 
window.location = http://www.fakewebsite.cc; 
2- Status Bar Customization 
Phishers may use JavaScript to show the URL of the genuine website in the 
status bar as soon as the mouse comes across some hot areas on the fake 
webpage such as the register button and the signin button (Pan & Ding, 2006). 
To extract this feature, we examine the webpage source code, particularly the 
(onMouseOver) event, and check whether it shows a URL with a different 
domain than that is shown in the address bar.  
3- Disabling Right Click  
Phishers may use JavaScript to disable the right click function so that users 
cannot view the webpage source code or save some components such as the 
images included in the webpage (Aburrous et al., 2010 C). However, in our 
data set we have found that some legitimate websites try to block people from 
copying some elements included in their webpage in order to preserve their 
copyrights; therefore, they disable the right click. We have found this feature 40 
times in our data set, 13 in the legitimate data set and the rest related to 
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phishing websites. This ration shows that this feature might not be significant 
in revealing phishing websites. Later in the experimental section we will assess 
whether this feature will be used in designing a new classifier or not. To extract 
this feature, we search for event.button==2 in the webpage source code.  
4- Using Pop-up Window 
It is unusual to find a legitimate website asking users to submit their 
information through a pop-up window. 127 webpages were encountered in 
phishing data set in which the users asked to submit their information through 
pop-up windows. Yet, this feature has been used in some legitimate websites to 
warn users about fraudulent activities or broadcast an announcement, though 
no personal information requested through pop-up windows. To extract this 
feature, we will check if the pop-up window (if exists) has any text fields such 
as username and password. If so, then the webpage is most likely supports 
phishing attempt. 
5- IFrame  
IFrame is an HTML tag used to display an additional webpage into the one that 
is currently shown. It may not be directly obvious that content within the 
webpage is from another source, since phishers depend on the design and 
colours of the webpage containing the iframe. In other words, phishers make 
use of the frameBorder attribute in order to hide the borders of the iframe. 
Hence, when the user browses a webpage, he might not recognise that another 
simultaneous page is loading in the iframe window. In some cases, legitimate 
websites may also use the iframe for different purposes such as showing an 
advertisement, but it is uncommon to find any fields asking for user’s 
information within the iframe.  
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5.3.3.4. Domain based Features 
1- Age of Domain 
Most phishing websites live for a short period of time. In (Zhang et al., 2007) 
and (Xiang et al., 2011), the authors suggest that the webpage is legitimate if the 
domain age is 12 months or more.  
2- DNS Record 
For phishing websites, no record for the domain is found in the WHOIS 
database due to its short life (WHOIS, 2005) (Pan & Ding, 2006).  
3-  Website Traffic  
This feature measures the popularity of the website by determining the number 
of visitors and the number of pages they visit. However, since phishing 
websites live for a short period of time they might not be recognized by the 
Alexa database (Alexa, 2011).  
4- PageRank 
PageRank is a value ranging from 1 to 10 (SEO, 2012). PageRank aims to 
measure how important a website is on the Internet. The greater the PageRank 
value, the more reliable the website (Garera et al., 2007). In our data sets, we 
have found that most phishing website either having no PageRank, or they 
have a low PageRank value due to short life span.  
5- Google Index 
This feature examines whether a website is indexed by Google or not. Any 
website indexed by Google is displayed on the search results (Google Search 
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Console, 2014). Usually, phishing websites are merely accessible for a short 
period, therefore, they are not found on the Google index (Zhang et al., 2007) 
(Xiang et al., 2011).  
6- Number of Links Pointing to the Webpage  
The number of links pointing to the webpage indicates its legitimacy level even 
if some links are from the same domain (Dean, 2013). In our data sets and due 
to their short life span, we have found that 2451 of phishing data set items have 
no links pointing to them. On the other hand, legitimate webpages have at least 
2 external links pointing to them. This feature can be extracted from the Alexa 
database (Alexa, 2011). 
7-  Statistical Reports based Feature 
Several parties such as PhishTank (PhishTank Stats, 2012), and StopBadware8 
(StopBadware, 2010) regularly formulate statistical reports on phishing 
websites. In our research, we used two forms of the Top 10 reports from 
PhishTank those are, monthly top 10 phishing domains and monthly top 10 
phishing IPs published in the last three years. In addition, we used the top 50 
IP addresses from StopBadware. If a URL has several features related to 
phishing and its host server has precedents of accommodating phishing 
websites then the website is most likely supports phishing attempt.  
5.3.4. Collecting Training Data set 
In order to facilitate collecting legitimate websites, we use the same resources 
commonly used in literature (Abdelhamid, 2015), (Mansour & Alshihri, 2015), 
(Basnet et al., 2012), (Alkhozae & Batarfi, 2011), (Aburrous et al., 2010 C), 
                                                 
8
 A non-profit anti-malware organization based in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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(Miyamoto et al., 2008), (Abu-Nimeh et al., 2007), (Garera et al., 2007), (Pan & 
Ding, 2006), those are as follows: 
1- Directory Mozilla (DMOZ) (Skrenta & Truel, 2011). DMOZ is the largest and 
most comprehensive human-edited directory of the Web.  
2- One more source to collect legitimate websites is Alexa Top Sites (AWS, 2013). 
Alexa accompanies web browsers and works with them as they browse 
offering valuable information to Internet users about the websites’ they are 
visiting and recommending related websites. The Alexa Top Sites offers 
access to lists of websites provided by Alexa Traffic Rank (Alexa, 2011). These 
lists are sorted from largest to smallest based on their rank which is 
computed by Alexa Traffic Rank.  
In general, since our legitimate data set items are collected from legitimate 
sources we can certainly assume that our legitimate data set items are in fact 
confirmed real websites. 
Phishing websites are collected from the PhishTank archive (PhishTank, 2011) 
and MillerSmiles archive (Bright, 2011). However, PhishTank is deemed the 
main source to collect phishing websites in this research. PhishTank depends 
on the so-called wisdom of crowds, i.e. considering the unanimous opinion of a 
group instead of a single expert to decide whether a website is in fact a 
phishing one or not. This ensures that incorrect reports will be ruled out. 
PhishTank provides downloadable databases available in multiple formats 
such as XML, CSV and PHP/JASON. We have considered downloading the 
database as a CSV format since it is much easier to deal with.  
A data set consisting of 3869 instances has been collected. Such a data set 
comprises 1772 phishing websites and 2097 legitimate ones. Figure ‎5.12 shows 
the distribution of phishing and legitimate websites in our data set. 
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Figure ‎5.12 Distribution of phishing and legitimate websites in the training data set 
5.3.5. Experimental Results 
Three experiments have been done with the aim of evaluating the SSNN 
algorithm and compare the results with other DM classification algorithms. 
Information Gain (Shannon, 1948), Chi-Square (Greenwood & Nikulin, 1996) 
and Gain Ratio (Quinlan, 1993) have been used in experiments 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. The results are shown in Tables 5.6 – 5.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phishing Legitimate
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Table ‎5.6 Experimental results when using Information Gain for features selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 Average
C4.5 92.12 92.25 91.73 92.25 91.60 94.17 92.25 92.37 92.12 92.12 91.99 92.27
BN 90.31 91.09 91.47 91.21 91.73 92.67 91.86 91.99 92.38 91.86 91.99 91.69
LR 90.31 91.60 91.34 91.09 91.60 93.26 91.73 91.6 91.86 91.99 91.99 91.67
FFNN 91.47 92.64 92.37 91.99 92.51 94.03 93.02 93.02 93.93 92.76 94.32 92.91
SSNN-100 91.73 92.76 91.99 92.37 92.89 94.66 92.76 91.99 93.02 93.02 94.32 92.86
SSNN-200 92.37 92.76 91.73 92.51 92.51 94.52 93.15 92.25 93.28 92.89 93.41 92.85
SSNN-500 92.25 92.89 92.37 92.25 91.99 94.17 93.02 93.67 93.41 93.28 94.41 93.06
SSNN-1000 91.99 92.63 91.99 92.25 92.25 94.39 93.15 93.15 93.41 93.54 94.06 92.98
Average 91.57 92.33 91.87 91.99 92.14 93.98 92.62 92.51 92.93 92.68 93.31 92.54
C4.5 91.50 91.60 91.10 92.40 90.90 93.40 91.50 91.60 91.40 91.40 91.20 91.64
BN 89.10 90.00 90.50 90.30 90.80 91.70 91.00 91.10 91.60 91.00 91.10 90.75
LR 89.10 90.70 90.40 90.10 90.70 92.40 90.90 90.80 91.10 91.30 91.30 90.80
FFNN 90.50 91.70 91.50 91.00 91.70 93.40 92.20 92.30 93.40 92.00 93.80 92.14
SSNN-100 90.90 91.90 90.90 91.40 92.20 94.10 91.90 91.10 92.30 92.50 93.80 92.09
SSNN-200 91.70 91.90 90.70 91.60 91.70 93.90 92.40 91.40 92.60 92.20 92.80 92.08
SSNN-500 91.60 92.00 91.60 91.40 91.20 93.50 92.30 93.10 93.40 92.50 92.70 92.30
SSNN-1000 91.20 91.70 91.00 91.30 91.50 93.80 92.40 92.50 92.80 92.90 93.50 92.24
Average 90.70 91.44 90.96 91.19 91.34 93.28 91.83 91.74 92.33 91.98 92.53 91.75
C4.5 92.70 92.10 92.10 89.90 91.00 91.20 90.40 89.90 90.70 90.70 90.70 91.04
BN 85.70 87.60 88.50 88.50 88.80 89.60 89.60 89.60 90.20 89.30 89.60 88.82
LR 85.70 89.30 88.80 88.50 89.30 90.60 90.20 90.20 90.70 91.00 91.00 89.57
FFNN 88.80 88.80 89.30 87.90 90.20 93.60 89.90 90.70 92.70 91.00 93.80 90.61
SSNN-100 89.90 88.80 87.40 88.20 90.70 93.70 89.30 89.00 90.40 93.30 94.10 90.44
SSNN-200 91.90 88.80 87.60 88.80 90.20 93.60 90.20 89.30 91.00 91.60 92.10 90.46
SSNN-500 92.40 88.80 89.90 89.60 90.20 92.40 91.00 92.40 94.40 90.20 91.00 91.12
SSNN-1000 89.90 88.80 87.90 88.80 90.20 92.40 90.70 90.80 91.90 92.10 93.00 90.59
Average 89.63 89.13 88.94 88.78 90.08 92.14 90.16 90.24 91.50 91.15 91.91 90.33
C4.5 90.40 91.10 90.10 93.00 90.80 95.70 92.50 93.30 92.00 92.00 91.80 92.06
BN 92.70 92.60 92.60 92.10 92.90 93.90 92.50 92.70 93.00 92.70 92.70 92.76
LR 92.70 92.20 92.10 91.80 92.20 94.30 91.70 91.50 92.50 91.50 91.50 92.18
FFNN 92.40 95.50 93.80 94.30 93.30 93.20 94.70 93.90 93.35 93.10 93.80 93.76
SSNN-100 92.00 95.20 94.80 94.90 93.60 94.50 94.60 93.20 93.20 91.70 93.40 93.74
SSNN-200 91.60 95.20 94.00 94.60 92.30 94.30 94.70 93.50 94.20 92.90 93.40 93.70
SSNN-500 90.90 94.90 93.30 93.40 92.20 94.60 93.60 93.70 94.40 95.30 94.50 93.71
SSNN-1000 92.50 94.90 94.30 93.60 92.40 94.20 94.20 93.70 93.70 93.70 94.00 93.75
Average 91.90 93.95 93.13 93.46 92.46 94.34 93.56 93.19 93.29 92.86 93.14 93.21
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Table ‎5.7 Experimental results when using Chi-Square for features selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 Average
C4.5 92.12 92.25 91.73 92.25 91.60 91.73 92.25 92.64 92.12 92.12 91.99 92.07
BN 90.31 91.09 91.47 91.21 91.73 91.60 91.86 92.12 92.38 91.86 91.99 91.60
LR 90.31 91.60 91.34 91.09 91.60 91.60 91.73 92.25 91.86 91.99 91.99 91.58
FFNN 89.02 93.02 92.37 92.51 91.99 92.76 93.15 93.93 93.54 93.67 93.02 92.63
SSNN-100 91.99 92.76 92.37 91.73 92.64 92.38 93.28 93.28 93.67 93.67 93.66 92.86
SSNN-200 91.99 92.64 92.37 92.37 92.76 92.25 93.67 93.92 93.67 93.67 93.02 92.94
SSNN-500 92.62 92.64 92.37 92.51 91.86 92.40 93.90 93.15 93.67 93.67 93.54 92.94
SSNN-1000 92.24 92.76 92.51 93.02 92.25 92.25 93.67 93.28 94.06 92.57 93.02 92.88
Average 91.33 92.35 92.07 92.09 92.05 92.12 92.94 93.07 93.12 92.90 92.78 92.44
C4.5 91.50 91.60 91.10 91.40 90.90 90.90 91.50 92.00 91.40 91.00 91.20 91.32
BN 89.10 90.00 90.50 90.30 90.80 90.70 91.00 91.30 91.60 91.00 91.10 90.67
LR 89.10 90.70 90.40 90.10 90.70 90.70 90.90 91.50 91.10 91.30 91.30 90.71
FFNN 88.80 92.20 91.50 91.60 91.20 91.90 92.50 93.30 92.80 92.90 92.20 91.90
SSNN-100 91.40 91.90 91.60 90.90 91.90 91.50 92.60 92.60 93.00 93.00 93.00 92.13
SSNN-200 91.40 91.70 91.60 91.60 92.00 91.30 93.00 92.30 92.90 93.00 92.20 92.09
SSNN-500 91.70 91.70 91.40 91.70 91.10 91.50 93.20 92.40 93.00 93.00 92.80 92.14
SSNN-1000 91.60 91.90 91.70 92.30 91.50 91.30 93.00 92.60 93.30 92.00 92.20 92.13
Average 90.58 91.46 91.23 91.24 91.26 91.23 92.21 92.25 92.39 92.15 92.00 91.64
C4.5 92.70 92.10 92.10 89.90 91.00 89.30 90.40 91.90 90.70 89.30 90.70 90.92
BN 85.70 87.60 88.50 88.50 88.80 89.00 89.60 89.90 90.20 89.30 89.60 88.79
LR 85.70 89.30 88.80 88.50 89.30 89.30 90.20 91.00 90.70 91.00 91.00 89.53
FFNN 89.00 89.30 89.30 89.00 90.20 89.00 91.60 91.30 91.00 90.70 89.90 90.03
SSNN-100 92.40 89.00 90.40 89.30 90.40 89.30 91.00 91.90 91.10 91.10 91.10 90.64
SSNN-200 92.40 88.80 89.90 89.90 91.00 88.80 92.10 91.60 90.70 92.30 89.90 90.67
SSNN-500 91.90 89.00 89.80 89.60 90.40 89.80 91.90 91.30 91.90 91.30 90.70 90.69
SSNN-1000 92.40 89.00 89.90 91.00 90.70 88.50 91.90 91.30 91.60 89.90 89.90 90.55
Average 90.28 89.26 89.84 89.46 90.23 89.13 91.09 91.28 90.99 90.61 90.35 90.23
C4.5 90.40 91.10 90.10 93.00 90.80 92.40 92.50 92.10 92.00 92.00 91.80 91.65
BN 92.70 92.60 92.60 92.10 92.90 92.40 92.50 92.80 93.00 92.70 92.70 92.64
LR 92.70 92.20 92.10 91.80 92.20 92.20 91.70 92.00 91.50 91.50 91.50 91.95
FFNN 90.30 95.20 93.80 94.30 92.20 94.90 93.40 94.30 94.70 93.10 94.70 93.72
SSNN-100 90.40 94.90 92.80 92.40 93.30 93.80 94.20 93.40 94.00 94.00 94.00 93.38
SSNN-200 90.40 94.90 93.30 93.30 93.10 94.00 94.00 95.00 95.30 93.80 93.70 93.71
SSNN-500 91.60 93.90 93.90 93.40 91.60 94.40 94.40 93.90 94.20 94.80 94.50 93.69
SSNN-1000 90.90 94.90 93.60 93.60 92.30 94.30 94.20 93.90 95.30 93.90 93.70 93.69
Average 91.18 93.71 92.78 92.99 92.30 93.55 93.36 93.43 93.75 93.23 93.33 93.05
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Table ‎5.8 Experimental results when using Gain Ratio for features selection 
 
From the results demonstrated in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8, we can see that the 
SSNN algorithm outperforms the considered classification algorithms in most 
cases, particularly when the epoch size is set to 500. These results are consistent 
with the results achieved in sections ‎5.2.4 and ‎3-. For instance, the average F1-
Algorithm F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 Average
C4.5 92.12 92.12 92.12 91.60 91.60 91.99 92.25 92.12 92.24 92.24 92.25 92.06
BN 90.31 91.21 91.09 91.47 91.73 92.12 91.86 91.86 91.99 91.86 92.25 91.61
LR 90.31 91.86 91.86 92.12 91.60 91.86 91.73 91.86 91.86 91.86 91.86 91.71
FFNN 91.47 91.99 89.92 91.09 92.51 92.76 92.76 92.64 92.64 92.89 93.54 92.20
SSNN-100 91.99 92.24 91.37 91.09 93.02 92.89 93.54 92.41 93.15 93.02 92.89 92.51
SSNN-200 91.99 92.12 90.95 90.70 92.38 93.54 93.02 92.41 93.67 93.67 93.80 92.57
SSNN-500 92.25 92.37 90.05 91.09 91.99 93.15 93.28 93.28 93.67 93.67 93.67 92.59
SSNN-1000 92.25 92.37 90.17 91.09 92.63 92.78 93.28 93.28 93.67 93.28 93.67 92.59
Average 91.59 91.99 90.94 91.31 92.18 92.64 92.63 92.37 92.75 92.81 92.89 92.23
C4.5 91.50 91.50 91.50 91.00 90.90 91.30 91.50 91.30 91.40 91.40 91.50 91.35
BN 89.10 90.20 90.10 90.50 90.80 91.30 91.00 91.00 91.10 91.00 91.40 90.68
LR 89.10 91.10 91.10 91.30 90.70 91.10 90.90 91.10 91.10 91.10 91.10 90.88
FFNN 90.50 91.10 88.90 90.20 91.70 92.10 91.90 91.80 91.90 92.20 92.90 91.38
SSNN-100 91.40 91.60 91.00 90.20 92.30 92.30 92.90 91.70 92.50 92.40 91.89 91.84
SSNN-200 91.40 91.50 90.20 89.70 91.60 92.90 92.30 91.70 93.00 93.10 92.80 91.84
SSNN-500 91.60 91.70 89.00 90.20 91.10 92.50 92.60 92.60 93.00 93.00 93.00 91.85
SSNN-1000 91.60 91.70 89.10 90.20 91.80 92.20 92.60 92.60 92.90 92.60 92.90 91.84
Average 90.66 91.24 90.11 90.44 91.36 91.96 91.87 91.60 92.00 92.10 92.08 91.46
C4.5 92.40 92.10 90.70 88.80 90.70 92.70 91.30 90.60 91.30 91.10 92.20 91.26
BN 85.70 88.20 88.50 88.50 88.80 89.60 89.60 89.60 89.60 89.60 89.60 88.85
LR 85.70 90.20 90.20 89.90 89.30 90.40 90.20 90.20 90.40 90.40 90.20 89.74
FFNN 88.80 88.80 87.40 88.80 90.20 92.90 89.30 89.60 91.00 91.00 91.60 89.95
SSNN-100 92.70 92.70 92.70 92.10 91.00 91.00 90.40 90.40 89.90 89.90 90.20 91.18
SSNN-200 92.40 91.90 90.40 87.90 90.70 92.10 91.00 90.60 91.30 92.40 92.10 91.16
SSNN-500 92.40 91.90 87.60 88.80 90.20 91.90 90.70 91.00 91.30 91.90 91.30 90.82
SSNN-1000 92.40 91.90 87.60 88.80 89.90 91.60 90.70 91.00 90.40 91.00 91.60 90.63
Average 90.01 90.96 89.39 89.26 90.10 91.53 90.36 90.29 90.65 90.91 91.10 90.45
C4.5 90.40 90.40 90.40 89.90 90.80 91.50 92.50 92.30 93.00 93.00 92.80 91.55
BN 92.70 92.40 91.80 92.60 92.90 93.00 92.50 92.50 92.70 92.50 93.30 92.63
LR 92.70 92.00 92.00 92.80 92.20 91.70 91.70 92.50 91.70 91.70 92.00 92.09
FFNN 92.40 93.50 90.40 91.60 93.30 92.40 94.60 94.10 92.80 93.40 94.20 92.97
SSNN-100 90.40 91.10 91.20 91.60 93.90 91.90 94.50 92.90 93.70 92.70 93.40 92.48
SSNN-200 90.40 91.10 89.90 91.50 92.60 93.70 93.60 92.90 94.80 93.70 94.00 92.56
SSNN-500 90.90 91.60 90.40 91.60 93.00 93.10 94.40 94.20 94.80 94.20 94.80 93.00
SSNN-1000 90.90 91.60 90.70 91.60 93.80 92.90 94.40 94.20 95.50 94.20 93.05 92.99
Average 91.41 91.73 90.85 91.66 92.81 92.53 93.40 93.06 93.63 93.18 93.44 92.53
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score produced from the SSNN when using the Information Gain is higher than 
that produced from C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 0.66, 1.55%, 
1.50%, and 0.16% respectively when the epoch size is set to 500. In addition, the 
average F1-score produced from the SSNN when using the Chi-Square is also 
beats C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 0.82%, 1.46%, 1.43%, and 0.24% 
respectively when the epoch size is set to 500. Again, when using the same 
epoch size, the average F1-score produced from the SSNN algorithm when 
using the Gain Ration outperforms C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 
0.50%, 1.16%, 0.96%, and 0.46% respectively. Overall, the high F1-score yielded 
from the SSNN reflects that the algorithm is able to derive classifiers that 
produce good FP and FN rates. That can be attributed due to the well-
structured NN classifiers derived from the SSNN algorithm as a result to the 
good training procedure employed in the algorithm. In general, the F1-score 
produced when using different feature selection methods reflects that the NN 
based algorithms derive better classifiers than other considered classification 
algorithms when applied to phishing datasets in the sense that the second best 
result achieved in all experiments was from the FFNN. However, the highest 
F1-score produced from the SSNN was when using the Information Gain for 
feature selection at 92.30%. This value is higher than the values produced from 
Chi-Square and Gain Ration with margins of 0.16% and 0.45% respectively. 
In terms of average accuracy, and when the epoch size is set to 500, the SSNN 
outperforms C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 0.79%, 1.38%, 1.39%, and 
0.15% respectively when using the Information Gain. In addition, the average 
accuracy produced from the SSNN algorithm when using the Chi-square 
outperforms C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 0.87%, 1.34%, 1.36%, and 
0.30% respectively. Further, the SSNN algorithm beats C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN 
with margins of 0.53%, 0.97%, 0.88% and 0.39% respectively when using the 
Gain Ration. Overall, the high accuracies produced from the SSNN when using 
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different feature selection methods are good sign that the training procedure in 
the SSNN algorithm is able to produce well-structured NN classifiers. Yet, the 
highest average accuracy produced from the SSNN was when the Information 
Gain has been used for feature selection at 93.06%. This value bypasses the 
results achieved from Chi-Square and Gain Ration with margins of 0.12% and 
0.47% respectively. 
In terms of average Recall, we find that the SSNN algorithm has been defeated 
two times from the C4.5 when using Chi-Square and Gain Ration with margins 
of 0.23% and 0.45% respectively when the epoch size is set to 500. However, 
when using the Information Gain, we find that the SSNN outperforms the C4.5 
with a margin of 0.08%. This difference is relatively small. However, a good 
classification model is the model that is able to maximize both Precision and 
Recall simultaneously. Yet, from the results, we find that although the average 
Recall produced from C4.5 beats the SSNN algorithm when using Chi-Square 
and Gain Ration, the SSNN algorithm outperforms the C4.5 in terms of average 
Precision with 2.04% and 1.45% when using Chi-Square and Gain Ration 
respectively when the epoch size is set to 500. Such results confirm that the 
SSNN algorithm is able to derive classifiers that show a moderately good 
performance on both Precision and Recall. The same scenario is also happens 
with FFNN, since the FFNN produced higher precision than the SSNN with 
margins of 0.03% when using Chi-Square when the epoch size is set to 500. Yet, 
when using the same epoch size, the SSNN produced higher Recalls than the 
FFNN with margins of 0.66% and 0.87% when using Chi-Square and Gain 
Ration respectively.  
Overall, the training procedure utilised when deriving NN classifiers using the 
SSNN algorithm has proven to be effective in creating well-structured models 
in terms of number of hidden neurons and weights space. 
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5.3.6. Comparison across Different Feature Selection 
Methods  
The experimental results revealed that the Information Gain is more effective in 
improving the performance of the SSNN and other considered classification 
algorithms when applied to phishing websites data set. For instance, the 
average accuracy produced from the SSNN and other compared classification 
algorithms when using the Information Gain is higher than the average 
accuracy produced from the Chi-Square and Gain Ration with margins of 
0.10% and 0.31% respectively. In addition, the average F1-Score produced from 
the SSNN and other compared classification algorithms when using the 
Information Gain is 91.75%. This value is higher than that produced from the 
Chi-Square and Gain Ration with margins of 0.11% and 0.29%. More details can 
be viewed in Tables 5.6 – 5.8. These results reveal that the Information Gain is 
more effective in improving the performance of the SSNN and other 
considered classification algorithms when applied to phishing websites 
classification problem. These results are consistent with the results obtained in 
(Akinyelu & Adewumi, 2014), (Ramanathan & Wechsler, 2012), (Al-Momani et 
al., 2011), (Whittaker et al., 2010), (Ma et al., 2009), and (Chandrasekaran et al., 
2006). 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, several experiments have been accomplished to assess the 
performance of the classifiers that are created using the SSNN algorithm. Two 
sets of experiments have been conducted. In the first set, the SSNN has been 
assessed against several DM classification algorithms on a number of binary 
data sets from UCI repository. The experimental data sets vary in size, i.e. 
number of instances, and number of attributes. The experimental results show 
that the NN based algorithms, i.e. FFNN and SSNN produce classifiers better 
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than C4.5 and BN in terms of error-rate. From the results, we find that the 
classifiers produced from the SSNN when epoch size is set to 500 have the least 
error-rate on average. In terms of RAR, we find that SSNN produces higher 
RAR in most cases. However, the average time needed for the SSNN to create 
classifiers is higher than the average time needed for other contrasted 
algorithms. That could be attributed to the fact that the SSNN performs several 
sub-trainings in each training session before producing the final classifier. In 
general, this set of experiments show that the SSNN algorithm is able to 
produce good classifiers with good generalisation ability. 
The second set of experiments evaluates the applicability of the SSNN on 
phishing websites data set. Three feature selection methods have been used in 
order to evaluate these methods and their effect on the performance of the 
SSNN and other considered classification algorithms. The results show that the 
SSNN algorithm outperformed the considered classification algorithms in most 
cases. The classifiers produced from the SSNN have been shown to produce a 
moderately good performance on both Precision and Recall. However, the 
experimental results revealed that the Information Gain is more effective than 
other feature selection methods in improving the performance of the SSNN and 
other considered classification algorithms. 
In the next chapter, the SSNN algorithm will be used to create the classifiers 
that are added to the ESSNN. 
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6. CHAPTER 6 
An Application of ESSNN to Phishing 
Websites 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the ESSNN is applied to a major web security problem where a 
virtual concept drift might occur, that is the problem of classifying phishing 
websites into genuine or phishing. The aims of applying the ESSNN to 
phishing websites are: firstly, empirically evaluate the applicability of ESSNN 
to phishing websites and compare its results against other approaches. 
Secondly, assess if the ESSNN can handle the virtual concept drift and offer a 
balance between stability and plasticity to cope with the dynamic nature of the 
phishing websites classification problem.   
Two sets of experimental evaluation are conducted. In the first set, we will 
compare the performance of ESSNN against several offline DM algorithms. As 
shown in sections ‎3.8 and ‎3.9.7, most DM based phishing websites classification 
techniques are devoted to an offline learning strategy according to which as 
soon as the anti-phishing model is created it can obtain no further knowledge. 
Therefore, the first set of experiments aims to compare the results when we 
treat phishing websites as a dynamic problem, with the results when we treat it 
as a static problem.  
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In the second set of experiments, we will compare the performance of ESSNN 
against two different single classifier based stream mining algorithms (window 
based algorithms). As shown in sections ‎3.6 and ‎3.7 phishing websites is a 
dynamic classification problem where a virtual concept drift might occur. 
However, as we have discussed in section ‎2.8 two possible approaches can be 
used to handle the concept drift and offer a balance between stability and 
plasticity those are: a single classifier based approach and an ensemble based 
approach. Yet, the concept drift that occurs in phishing websites is a cyclical 
concept drift, therefore, the main aim of this set of experiments is to assess the 
performance of ESSNN against two single classifier based stream mining 
algorithms in handling the cyclical concept drift that characterises the phishing 
websites. When a classifier is created using single classifier based algorithms, 
the window size is the most important factor that affects the classifier 
performance. Therefore, several window size values are used to derive several 
classifiers. 
We will use the same validation technique and evaluation metrics as described 
in sections ‎5.2.3, and ‎5.3.2 to assess the experimental results. Several DM 
algorithms have been used; these algorithms are reviewed in section ‎6.2. Three 
data sets have been collected in different time span. These data sets are 
described in section ‎6.3. After conducting several experiments in sections ‎6.4 
and ‎6.5, the results are discussed in section ‎6.6. 
6.2. Algorithms used for Comparison 
Two sets of experiments will be conducted. In the first set, five different 
algorithms have been selected, those are, Bayesian Network (Friedman et al., 
1997), Decision Trees (Quinlan, 1998), Support Vector Machine (Cortes & 
Vapnik, 1995), Logistic Regression (Witten et al., 2011), and RIPPER (Cohen, 
1995). These algorithms have been briefly discussed in section Appendix A. 
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The selection of these algorithms is because they are commonly used in the 
domain of phishing classification (Abu-Nimeh et al., 2007), (Zhang et al., 2007), 
(Fette et al., 2007), (Miyamoto et al., 2008), (Basnet et al., 2008), (Aburrous et al., 
2010 C), and (Abdelhamid et al., 2014). The experiments on these algorithms 
are carried out using the WEKA platform (Hall et al., 2011).  
In the second set of experiments, we will compare the performance of ESSNN 
against two single classifier based stream mining algorithms in terms of 
handling the virtual concept drift that occurring in phishing websites. The 
VFDT (Domingos & Hulten, 2000) has been used and coupled with HAT 
algorithm (Bifet & Gavaldà, 2009). These algorithms have been selected because 
the hoeffding tree based algorithms represent the current state-of-the-art in 
single classifier based stream mining algorithms (Gama et al., 2014). However, 
each algorithm applies different forgetting procedure. For instance, the VFDT 
applies a static forgetting procedure, i.e. the examples that currently exist in the 
window will be deleted as soon as a new data set batch arrives. Yet, the HAT 
algorithm applies a dynamic forgetting procedure, in the sense that each node 
in the tree is able to determine which of the pervious examples should be 
maintained and used in the next training session. The experiments on these 
algorithms are carried out using the Massive Online Analysis platform (MOA) 
(Bifet et al., 2010). MOA is an open source framework for dealing with evolving 
data streams. MOA is written in Java and contains several online learning 
algorithms. ESSNN has been implemented in Java. All experiments were 
conducted in a system with CPU Pentium Intel® CoreTM i5-2430M @ 2.40 
GHz, RAM 4.00 GB. The platform is Windows 7 64-bit Operating System. 
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6.3. Training Data sets 
We have used the same data sets collection strategy as shown in section ‎5.3.4. 
Three data sets have been collected in different time span. Several PHP and 
JavaScript codes are written to extract the phishing websites features.  
The first data set is collected from October-28-2013 until January-8-2014. The 
data set consisted of 2456 instances, 1094 of them were legitimate websites and 
1362 were phishing ones.  
The second data set is gathered from May-13-2014 until September-24-2014. 
This data set contained 1355 phishing websites and 1686 legitimate ones. The 
complete data set included 3041 instances.  
The last data set comprised of 1264 legitimate websites and 1624 phishing ones. 
The total is 2887 instances. This data set was collected from December-8-2014 
until April-20-2015. 
Table ‎6.1 shows a detailed description of the collected data sets. Figure ‎6.1 
shows the distribution of phishing and legitimate websites in our data sets. 
Table ‎6.1 Description of training data sets 
Data Set Number of Phishing 
instances 
Number of Legitimate 
Instances 
Total Number of 
Instances 
1 1362 1094 2456 
2 1355 1686 3041 
3 1624 1263 2887 
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Figure ‎6.1 Distribution of phishing and legitimate websites 
6.4. ESSNN vs Other Data Mining Algorithms 
6.4.1. Experimental Strategy 
Three experiments will be conducted. Data set #1, Data set #2 and Data set #3 
described in section ‎6.3 are used in experiments 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In each 
experiment, we will start by selecting the most effective set of features. The 
experimental results obtained in section ‎5.3 showed that the results when using 
the Information Gain were the highest among other feature selection methods; 
therefore, the Information Gain will be used for selecting the most effective set 
of feature in each experiment. Information Gain is a well-known method to 
evaluate features for significance for the classification task (Bramer, 2013), 
(Dash & Liu, 1997), (Yu & Liu, 2004) and is used in many classification 
domains, e.g. (Quinlan & Kaufmann, 1993), (Lee & Xiang, 2001), (Khemphila & 
Boonjing, 2011), (Yang & Pedersen, 1997), (Zhang et al., 2003) and (Basnet et al., 
2012). However, since there is no agreement on a specific ranking threshold for 
picking the most effective set of features, several threshold values will be used. 
The threshold values utilised in our experiments are 1%, 10%, 20% and 30%. 
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The features that pass the threshold value will produce a new data set (minimal 
data set). Consequently, several minimal data sets will be created.  
The set of features in each minimal data set are compared with the features 
used in creating the classifiers currently existing in the ESSNN. If the features 
are different, then a virtual concept drift occurs. Therefore, the minimal data set 
is used to create a new classifier. 
We will use the default parameter settings of WEKA (Hall et al., 2011) when 
creating the classifiers from the considered DM algorithms. However, when 
creating the SSNN classifiers, two parameters should be specified, i.e. the 
number of epochs and maximum number of possible hidden neurons. 
Following some recent studies (Kesari et al., 2014), (Madhusmita et al., 2012), 
(Ganatra et al., 2011), (Insung & Wang, 2007), (Hossein et al., 2003), (Shamik et 
al., 2011), (Paulin & Santhakumaran, 2011), (Amato et al., 2013) we set the 
maximum number of hidden neurons to 15. However, we have used the same 
epoch size as in FFNN; therefore, we set the epoch size to 500 in the following 
set of experiments. This epoch size value has also been shown to produce the 
best results as revealed in chapter 5. As soon as a new classifier is created from 
the SSNN algorithm, it will be temporarily added to the ESSNN to assess the 
improvement the classifier adds to the ESSNN performance. The classifier that 
best improves the ESSNN performance will be added permanently to the 
ESSNN. However, deriving a new classifier from other DM algorithms means 
that the old classifier is removed. The performance of the ESSNN in each 
experiment as well as other considered DM algorithms will be assessed on a 
testing data set consisting of the testing data set achieved from the data set 
used in the experiment and the historical testing data sets (except in the first 
experiment where there are no historical data sets). The main aim of merging 
the most recent testing data set with all historical ones is to assess the 
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performance of ESSNN and other considered DM algorithms in case a cyclical 
concept drift occurs. Finally, the set of examples that are misclassified will be 
kept and used when creating a new classifier. 
6.4.2. Results from the First Data set 
Twelve features have been selected in this experiment when the threshold 
value is set to 1% (minimum considered threshold), such features are shown in 
Table ‎6.2. 
Table ‎6.2 Selected features when threshold=1% (First Data set) 
 
At the end of this experiment, the ESSNN will consist of one classifier. 
Figure ‎6.2 and  
Table ‎6.3 show the performance of the ESSNN and other considered algorithms 
on several threshold values.  
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Figure ‎6.2 Performance of ESSNN and other DM algorithms (First Data set) 
 
Table ‎6.3 Performance of ESSNN and other DM Algorithms (First Data set) 
 
From the results, we can see that the ESSNN outperforms BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, 
and RIPPER in terms of F1-score with a margin of 2.15%, 0.49%, 0.31%, 0.24%, 
and 0.94% respectively when the threshold value is set to 1%. That means that 
the ESSNN shows a moderately good performance on both P and R. At the 
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same threshold value, we find that the ESSNN outperforms BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, 
and RIPPER with 1.83%, 0.40%, 0.20%, 0.20%, and 0.82% in terms of produced 
accuracy. That can be attributed to the training procedure of SSNN algorithm 
that is able to produce a well-structured NN classifier in terms of number of 
hidden neurons and weights space since SSNN algorithm leaves the network 
expansion as a last option and keeps pushing on the learning rate by adjusting 
the desired error rate before adding a new hidden neuron. SVM produces the 
highest TNR among others when threshold value is set to 1%. Yet, SVM 
produces the second lowest TPR after the BN. That means that the SVM does 
not produce a moderate balance between Precision and Recall as we can see in  
Table ‎6.3 since it favours Precision over Recall. Overall, the performance of the 
ESSNN and other considered DM algorithms when threshold value is set to 1% 
is acceptable, and that indicates features goodness in predicting the website 
class. However, the performance of the ESSNN and other algorithms decays 
when the threshold value is set to 30%. That can be attributed to the fact that 
there is not enough information to learn the classifiers because only two 
features are selected at this threshold these are HTTPS and URL of anchor.  
6.4.3. Results from the Secnod Data set 
After applying the IG on the second data set, we find that some features drop 
from the list that has been used to create the classifier that currently exists in 
the ESSNN, i.e. the classifier created using the first data set. These features are 
age of domain, DNS record and Google index. On the other hand, several 
features are added to the list, those are using IP address, suspicious action 
upon submitted information, .htaccess redirect, and statistical based features. 
Hence, a concept drift occurs. Table ‎6.4 shows the selected features when 
threshold value is set to 1%. 
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Table ‎6.4 Selected features when threshold=1% (Second Data set) 
 
To assess the effect of these changes on the ESSNN performance, we consider 
the second data set as a testing data set and pass it to the ESSNN. The results 
show that the overall accuracy drops from 95.71% to 92.28% due to the fact that 
a concept drift has occurred. Therefore, we will create a new classifier using the 
SSNN algorithm and add it to the ESSNN. 
Since we are using four threshold values for features selection, four classifiers 
will be created. The performance of the ESSNN and other considered DM 
algorithms on different threshold values are depicted in Figure ‎6.3 and Table 
6.5. The testing data set used to assess the performance is a combination of the 
testing data sets from the first and the second data sets. By merging these two 
testing data sets, we aim to assess the performance of the ESSNN and other 
considered algorithms if a cyclical concept drift occurs.  
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Figure ‎6.3 Performance of SSNN and other DM algorithms (Second Data set) 
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Table ‎6.5 Performance of ESSNN and other DM algorithms (Second Data set)  
 
 
The ESSNN achieves the best results when the classifier created at 
threshold=1% is added to the ensemble, hence, this classifier will be added to 
the ESSNN and the others will be ignored. At that threshold value, the ESSNN 
achieves 5.05%, 5.10%, 5.05%, 5.26%, and 7.26% higher F1-score than BN, C4.5, 
SVM, LR, and RIPPER respectively. In addition, the ESSNN outperforms BN, 
C4.5, SVM, LR, and RIPPER with 5.20%, 5.21%, 5.20%, 6.78%, and 8.25% in 
terms of overall accuracy.  
These results show that the ESSNN can effectively handle the virtual concept 
drift because the ESSNN contains two classifiers each of which is considered an 
expert on different features space. On the contrary, the considered DM 
algorithms are ineffective in handling the virtual concept drift that occurs in 
phishing websites because of the catastrophic forgetting dilemma. Another 
reason that might also contribute to the good results achieved from the ESSNN 
is that the ESSNN supports reinforcement learning (Cohen & Maimon, 2005) 
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because the set of misclassified examples in the first data set has been merged 
with the second data set and used in learning a new classifier. One more reason 
for the good results produced from the ESSNN is that it uses an effective 
technique in producing the final decision, i.e. weighted voting technique. 
However, when the threshold value is set to 20% and 30%, we notice that the 
performance of the ESSNN and other considered algorithms are very close to 
the results achieved from the first data set on the same threshold values. That is 
because the set of features that constitutes the testing data set (which is a 
combination of testing data set from the first and the second data set) has the 
same significance degree in both data sets. These results support our 
suggestion about not building a new classifier if the set of features has been 
used in creating a previous classifier since this will result in deriving 
redundant classifiers. 
6.4.4. Results from the Third Data set 
The set of features achieved from the IG in this data set when threshold value is 
set to 1% are shown in Table ‎6.6.  
Table ‎6.6 Selected Features (Third Data set) 
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From this table, we can see that a cyclical concept drift occurs because some 
features that are considered significant in the first data set, but drop from the 
second data set become significant again in the third data set. These features 
are, age of domain and Google index. In addition, some features become 
insignificant and dropped from the list achieved from the second data set. 
Those are, .htaccess redirect, PageRank and statistical-reports based feature. 
We will consider the third data set as a testing data set and pass it to the 
ESSNN in order to assess the effect of these changes on the ESSNN 
performance. The results show that the overall accuracy of the ESSNN drops to 
92.02%. Although this accuracy rate is considered acceptable, we will create a 
new classifier and add it to the ESSNN in order to assess if it will improve the 
ESSNN performance. At the end of this experiment the ESSNN will include 
three classifiers. Table ‎6.7 shows the performance of the ESSNN as well as the 
considered DM algorithms on different threshold values.  
The testing data set used for assessing the performance of the ESSNN as well as 
all considered DM algorithms is a combination of the testing data sets from the 
first, second, and third data sets. However, we notice that the same set of 
features has been selected when threshold value is set to 30% in all data sets 
(first, second, and third data sets) these are HTTPS and URL of Anchor. 
Therefore, no classifiers will be created at this threshold value because that will 
result in deriving a redundant classifier as confirmed from the results in the 
second data set.  
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Table ‎6.7 Confusion matrices (Third Data set) 
 
From Table ‎6.7 and Figure ‎6.4, we find that the ESSNN produces the best results 
when we add the classifier created at threshold=1% to the ESSNN. Not only that, 
but also the ESSNN achieves the best results in this experiment compared to the 
results achieved earlier, i.e. experiments on the first and the second data sets in 
terms of specificity (TNR), sensitivity (TPR), F1-Score, precision, and accuracy.  
 
Figure ‎6.4 Performance of ESSNN and other DM algorithms (Third Data set) 
In terms of F1-score, the ESSNN outperforms BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, and RIPPER 
by 3.31%, 3.06%, 7.61%, 4.06% and 4.81% respectively. In addition, the ESSNN 
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produces 3.77%, 3.57%, 8.46%, 4.59%, and 5.40% higher prediction accuracy 
than BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, and RIPPER respectively. That can be due to the fact 
that the ESSNN becomes more talented in dealing with different phishing 
websites that are designed using different features. In other words, the ESSNN 
reaches a stage of having several classifiers (three classifiers) where each of 
which is considered an expert in a particular part of feature space or concept. 
However, at the same threshold value we notice a slight improvement on the 
performance of the considered DM algorithms compared to the results 
achieved from the second data set. That is because of the emergence of a 
cyclical concept drift. RIPPER produces the worst results in this experiment 
among all other experiments when the threshold value is set to 10%. That is 
because RIPPER learns the rules greedily and prunes rules using incremental 
reduced error pruning method (Witten et al., 2011), which results in removing 
some rules that might be useful in determining the website class which in turn 
limits its ability in handling the virtual concept drift.  
Overall, some features have shown to be more significant in predicting the 
phishing websites because they have been selected in all sub experiments when 
the threshold value is set to 1%. Those features are HTTPS, URL of anchor, 
adding prefix and suffix to domain, sub domain and multi sub domains, Using 
Free domain registration, request URL, links in <Meta>, <Script> and <Link> 
tags and web traffic.  
In general, this set of experiments shows that the traditional DM algorithms 
that are commonly used for classifying phishing are not the appropriate choice 
for the application of phishing websites. On the other hand, the ESSNN is able 
to handle the dynamic nature of phishing. 
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The results achieved from the ESSNN in experiments 1, 2 and 3 when the 
threshold value is set to 1% (the classifier that produced at this threshold value 
is the classifier that has been added to the ESSNN in all cases, i.e. in 
experiments 1, 2 and 3) have been compared against other considered DM 
algorithms using the paired t-test in order to observe the significance in 
performance. The results show that the ESSNN algorithm produced a 
significant improvement over other considered DM algorithms (3 wins and 0 
losses) with 95% confidence level when the epoch size is set to 500. This result 
confirms that the ESSNN is able to handle the virtual concept drift that 
occurring in phishing websites.  
6.5. ESSNN vs Single Classifier based Stream Mining 
6.5.1. Experimental Strategy 
This set of experiments aims to compare the performance of the ESSNN in 
terms of handling the virtual concept drift that characterizes the phishing 
websites with two single classifier stream mining algorithms which are the 
VFDT (Hulten et al., 2001) and the HAT algorithms (Bifet & Gavaldà, 2009). 
The three collected data sets are merged together. For both considered 
algorithms, we use the default parameter settings. The splitting criterion 
utilised is IG. The splitting confidence 𝛿 is 0.001. Splitting confidence represents 
the allowable error in a split decision. The tie threshold 𝜏 is 0.05. Tie threshold 
is the value below which a split will be forced to break ties between two almost 
identically useful split features. Several grace period values 𝛾 are used in this 
set of experiments. Grace period (window size) is the number of instances that 
must exist to calculate the hoeffding bound which is used to decide on the 
splitting node in the tree.  
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6.5.2. Results from ESSNN and other Single Classifier 
algorithms  
The experimental results demonstrated in Table ‎6.8 show that the HAT 
algorithm outperforms VFDT in most cases. The HAT algorithm produces on 
average 1.48% higher F1-score than VFDT. In addition, the HAT algorithm 
achieves 1.18% higher accuracy than VFDT. That can be attributed because the 
HAT algorithm uses a dynamic forgetting procedure that keeps the most 
relevant examples (Bifet & Gavaldà, 2009). Each node in the tree produced by 
HAT can determine which of the previous examples are relevant for it. 
Table ‎6.8 Confusion matrices (ESSNN vs VFDT & HAT) 
Algorithm Grace 
Period (γ) 
TPR TNR Precision Recall F1 Accuracy  
VFDT 
200 91.70% 91.00% 90.80% 91.70% 91.30% 91.32% 
400 88.40% 92.10% 91.60% 88.40% 89.90% 90.23% 
600 89.90% 91.70% 91.30% 89.90% 90.60% 90.78% 
800 85.60% 93.40% 92.70% 85.60% 89.00% 89.56% 
1000 85.10% 93.50% 92.70% 85.10% 88.80% 89.34% 
Average 88.14% 92.34% 91.82% 88.14% 89.92% 90.25% 
HAT 
200 91.20% 91.90% 91.70% 91.20% 91.40% 91.54% 
400 92.50% 90.70% 90.70% 92.50% 91.50% 91.55% 
600 92.4% 90.10% 90.20% 92.40% 91.30% 91.25% 
800 91.30% 91.20% 91.00% 91.30% 91.20% 91.27% 
1000 93.20% 89.90% 90.00% 93.20% 91.60% 91.52% 
Average 92.12% 90.76% 90.72% 92.12% 91.40% 91.43% 
ESSNN  96.80% 97.00% 97.80% 96.80% 97.30% 95.61% 
 
However, the ESSNN outperforms both algorithms in all cases, i.e. in different 
window sizes. That can be because of the forgetting mechanism employed by 
single classifier stream mining algorithms. For instance, although the window 
size has had a noticeable impact on the performance of the considered single 
classifier stream mining algorithms, it is difficult to decide on the optimal 
window size that keeps the most relevant examples and excludes the examples 
that represent the outdated concepts. In addition, some examples that are 
considered outdated and drop from the window may return to become 
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relevant in the future, which leaves the classification model susceptible to a 
cyclical concept drift. Figure ‎6.5 and Figure ‎6.6 show the performance of the 
VFDT and the HAT algorithms on different window sizes. However, although 
the examples used to train any classifier in the ESSNN are also forgotten, the 
knowledge achieved from such examples is maintained and used to classify 
examples that emerge from the past concept. This is the main advantage of the 
ESSNN and ensemble based classification approach over single classifier based 
stream mining algorithms. In general, this set of experiments confirm that the 
ESSNN is more effective than the considered single classifier stream mining 
algorithms in handling the concept drift that occurs in the phishing websites. 
 
 
Figure ‎6.5 The impact of window size on VFDT performance 
 
Figure ‎6.6 The impact of window size on HAT performance 
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6.6. Results Discussion 
An intelligent method that reduces the human factor role in predicting 
phishing websites is an urgent need because phishing websites problem is 
expected to become more stylish and tactics used become more complicated. 
Such an intelligent method is expected to remove some of the burden from the 
internet users. DM methods - particularly classification techniques - become 
more viable in creating intelligent anti-phishing models (section ‎3.8). However, 
phishing websites pose a dynamic classification problem that are argued as 
being prone to virtual concept drift as shown in section ‎3.6. Therefore, any 
intelligent anti-phishing method should be updated regularly in order to keep 
pace with the latest phishing techniques and at the same time maintain what 
has been learned previously. Offline DM techniques are commonly used to 
tackle phishing (sections ‎3.8 and ‎3.9.7). Yet, these methods might not be the 
right choice to cope with the dynamic nature of phishing websites. For 
instance, the experimental results demonstrated in Tables 6.5 and 6.7 show that 
the performance of the considered offline DM algorithms drops when the 
virtual concept drift has appeared. This means that these methods may fail in 
predicting phishing if phishers change the combination of features when 
creating their phishing websites, which leaves the users susceptible to phishing 
attacks. Therefore, users may doubt the suitability of the Internet for 
commercial transactions. This throws a great obligation on the anti-phishing 
parties to produce intelligent tools that can produce high sensitivity (TPR) and 
specificity (TNR) rates. DM techniques that are capable of continuous learning 
shine on the horizon as a possible alternative. 
Incremental learning has been debated as a viable solution for the dynamic 
domains as explained in section ‎2.9. Reviewing the literature, we have found 
few incremental learning methods that have been utilised in predicting 
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phishing (section ‎3.6). Window based approach is one of the incremental 
learning techniques as shown in section ‎2.10.1. The window size has a clear 
impact on the overall performance of the window based algorithms as revealed 
from the results shown in Table ‎6.8. However, the window based approach is 
criticized for being ineffective in handling the cyclical concept drift (Gama et 
al., 2014). For instance, in our experiments, we have found that the results 
obtained from the considered offline DM algorithms when the cyclical concept 
drift has occurred (Table ‎6.7) are very close to the results obtained from the 
considered window based algorithms (Table ‎6.8). Such results indicate that 
both techniques, i.e. offline DM technique and window based technique suffer 
from the catastrophic forgetting dilemma.  
Ensemble based methods are another approach that can be used for 
incremental learning scenarios due in part to their ability to handle the cyclical 
concept drift. Such approach is able to learn new knowledge and at the same 
time maintain the previously learned knowledge. Therefore, the ensemble 
based approach can afford a balance between stability and plasticity. Looking 
at the experimental results demonstrated in Tables 6.3, 6.5, 6.7, and 6.8, we can 
see clearly that the ensemble based approach represented by the ESSNN is able 
to learn new knowledge and maintain the previously learned knowledge when 
applied to phishing websites classification problem. For instance, the ESSNN 
makes a positive jump in terms of the overall performance compared to other 
offline DM algorithms when the virtual concept drift has occurred (Tables 6.5 
and 6.7). The experimental results provide convincing evidence that the 
ensemble based approach is more appropriate to contend with phishing 
websites elasticity. The good results achieved from the ESSNN can be 
attributed to several reasons. For instance, the classifiers that constitute the 
ESSNN are well structured in terms of number of hidden neurons and weights 
space. Although the average time needed to derive the classifiers using the 
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SSNN algorithm is higher than other considered algorithms (Table ‎5.5), the 
SSNN is able to produce good results in terms of average error-rate as shown 
in Table ‎5.3. One more reason for the good results achieved from the ESSNN is 
that it contains several classifiers each of which is considered an expert on 
different features space. Thus, it can deal with different phishing websites that 
are created using different features. The use of misclassified websites to learn a 
new classifier is another reason for the good results achieved from the ESSNN. 
Misclassified websites mean that the ESSNN might lack some knowledge. Yet, 
using the set of misclassified websites in deriving a new classifier gives the 
chance for the ESSNN to learn such knowledge.  
However, the ESSNN regularly repeats the features selection process whenever 
a new data set becomes available in order to derive a new classifier and adds it 
to the ensemble. Nevertheless, the features that separate phishing websites 
from legitimate ones are not static. Although we have used many features in 
our study, we believe that phishers may come up with some novel features in 
the future. Yet, it is difficult to anticipate what these new features will be or 
when they might appear. As a result, it would be difficult to determine a 
specific size of the training data set that should be collected in order to create a 
new classifier and add it to the ensemble. Some techniques suggest revising the 
anti-phishing model periodically regardless of what the size of the training 
dataset is. For instance, in (Basnet et al., 2012), the authors suggest creating a 
new anti-phishing classification model on a weekly basis, whereas in (Ma et al., 
2009), the authors recommend merging the newly collected data sets with the 
old one on a daily basis and the resulting data set is used to create a new 
classifier.  
One of the improvements on the ESSNN might be utilizing a method that can 
extract the significant features on the fly. For instance, Deep Learning (Deng & 
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Yu, 2014) is one of the promising approaches that can extract features from 
raw-data. We believe that combining the ensemble approach with the deep 
learning technique can advance the ability of the ESSNN to cope with the 
virtual concept drift. 
6.7. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the ESSNN framework is applied to a vital web security 
problem where virtual concept drift occurs, that is the phishing websites 
classification problem. We started by collecting 30 features that distinguish 
phishing websites from legitimate ones. Two sets of experiments are 
conducted. The validation technique and the evaluation measures used in both 
sets of experiments are discussed. Three data sets are collected in different time 
spans. The results from the first set of experiments show that the considered 
DM algorithms (BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, and RIPPER) that are commonly used in 
designing anti-phishing models are hindered by their prediction accuracy if a 
virtual concept drift occurs. On the other hand, the ESSNN was able to 
effectively handle the virtual concept drift that occurs in phishing websites. The 
IG has been used to select the most effective set of features in each sub 
experiment conducted in the first set of experiments. Several threshold values 
are used to decide on the most effective set of features. Some features have 
shown to be more significant in predicting phishing websites, those are HTTPS, 
URL of anchor, adding prefix and suffix to domain, sub domain and multi sub 
domains, Using Free domain registration, request URL, links in <Meta>, 
<Script> and <Link> tags, and web traffic. Overall, the first set of experiments 
show that the ESSNN can lead to improved results compared to the results 
from any of the individual DM algorithms.  
In the second set of experiments, we compare the performance of the ESSNN 
with two single classifier stream mining algorithms those are, the VFDT and 
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the HAT algorithm. Different grace period values (window sizes) are used. The 
results show that the window size has a noticeable impact on the performance 
of the single classifier stream mining algorithms. In general, the second set of 
experiments show that the ESSNN is more effective in handling the cyclical 
concept drift that occurs in phishing websites. 
Overall, the experimental results show that the ESSNN furnishes a balance 
between stability and plasticity when applied to phishing websites. 
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7. CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1. Research Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis investigated classification in data mining, and explored several 
issues related to classification in dynamic (non-stationary) domains, whereby 
the training data set is continuously evolving. Such data set may contain new 
knowledge which if not discovered may affect the overall performance of the 
classification model. These issues include virtual concept drift, catastrophic 
forgetting, and stability plasticity dilemmas. The result is a classification 
framework based on ensemble self-structuring neural network (ESSNN). 
ESSNN provided a balance between stability and plasticity since it has the 
ability to accommodate new knowledge, and does not forget the previously 
learnt one. The ESSNN creates a set of classifiers (ensemble) each of which is 
produced as a response to the virtual concept drift occurrence. Phishing 
websites pose a web security problem where virtual concept drift might occur. 
The proposed framework has been applied to phishing websites classification 
problem and showed competitive results when compared to several other data 
mining techniques. The classifiers that constitute the ensemble are created 
using an improved self-structuring neural network algorithm (SSNN). The 
SSNN algorithm simplifies constructing NN classifiers with minimum 
intervention from the user.  
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Many contributions evolved from this research and are summarized in the 
following subsections. 
7.1.1. An Ensemble Self-Structuring Neural Network 
(ESSNN) 
For dynamic domains where a virtual concept drift might occur such as 
phishing websites, the classification model should be adjusted continuously in 
order to maintain its performance. Therefore, a classification framework based 
on ensemble self-structuring neural network (ESSNN) that continuously 
obtains knowledge from evolving data sets is proposed in this thesis. The 
framework explores the advantage of regularly repeating the feature selection 
process to provoke new features into play. The framework supports 
reinforcement learning because it uses the set of misclassified instances at time 
ti to derive a new classifier at time ti+1. The classifiers that are added to the 
ensemble are created using the SSNN algorithm. The decision (assigning class 
value) of the ensemble is a collective decision, i.e. all classifiers in the ensemble 
contribute in producing the final decision. The framework does not only handle 
the virtual concept drift, but also furnishes a balance between stability and 
plasticity. The ESSNN (Chapter 4) has been accepted for publication and it will 
appear soon (Mohammad et al., 2016-A). 
7.1.2. Phishing Websites Classification based on 
ESSNN 
The ESSNN framework has been applied to phishing websites in order to 
assess the performance of the framework in handling the virtual concept drift 
occurring in phishing websites classification problem. Two sets of experiments 
are performed. The first set aims to compare the results when we treat phishing 
websites as a static classification problem with the results when we treat it as a 
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dynamic one. The results show that the ESSNN is able to effectively handle the 
virtual concept drift occurring in the phishing websites. Whereas the considered 
offline DM algorithms (BN, C4.5, SVM, LR, and RIPPER) that are commonly 
applied to phishing websites fail to address the virtual concept drift that occurs 
in phishing websites. This set of experiments revealed that some features are 
more significant in predicting phishing websites, those are HTTPS, URL of 
anchor, adding prefix and suffix to domain, sub domain and multi sub domains, 
Using Free domain registration, request URL, links in <Meta>, <Script> and 
<Link> tags and web traffic. 
The second set of experiments aims to assess the performance of the ESSNN 
against two state-of-the-art single classifier based stream mining algorithms 
(window based algorithms) those are VFDT algorithm and HAT algorithm in 
handling the cyclical concept drift occurring in phishing websites. Although 
the considered window based algorithms produced good results, the ESSNN 
has shown to be more effective in handling the cyclical concept drift that 
characterizes phishing websites. In addition, this set of experiments shows that 
the window size has a noticeable impact on the performance of the considered 
window based algorithms. Overall, the experimental results showed that the 
ESSNN affords a balance between stability and plasticity when applied to 
phishing websites. The results of applying the ESSNN on phishing have been 
accepted for publication and will appear soon (Mohammad et al., 2016-A). 
7.1.3. A Self-Structuring Neural Network Algorithm 
As shown in section ‎2.4, two reasons may lead to the occurrence of the concept 
drift, i.e. virtual and real. In this thesis, we focus on the virtual one where the 
set of input attributes (features) changes over time. The virtual concept drift 
might occur naturally or intentionally. The intentional concept drift happens if 
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someone has the ability to comprehend how the classification model processes 
the input features in order to produce the final decision (assign class value). In 
this thesis, we make use of the black box nature of NN in order to tackle the 
virtual concept drift occurring deliberately. Nevertheless, NN models are 
normally created using a painstaking trial and error method, which often 
involves a tedious process. This problem has been tackled in this thesis by 
creating an improved NN structuring algorithm called Self-Structuring Neural 
Network (SSNN). Such an algorithm simplifies structuring NN classifiers. The 
SSNN is a family member of the constructive NN structuring approach. The 
algorithm is considered the cornerstone of the ESSNN because it creates the 
classifiers that are added to the ESSNN. As soon as a new data set is collected 
and after confirming the presence of a virtual concept drift, a new classifier is 
created using the SSNN algorithm.  
In order to assess the performance of the classifiers that are derived from the 
SSNN algorithm, two sets of experiments have been conducted. In the first set, 
several experiments on a number of binary data sets from UCI repository have 
been done and the results have been compared against some well-known DM 
classification algorithms including C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN. The data sets vary 
in size, i.e. number of instances, and number of attributes. In most cases, the 
experimental results show that the SSNN produced lower error-rate than other 
considered classification algorithms. In addition, the SSNN produced higher 
Relative Accuracy Rate (RAR) with compare to other considered classification 
algorithms, which reflects that the SSNN algorithm is able to produce well-
structured NN classifiers. However, the average time needed for the SSNN to 
produce classifiers is higher than the average time needed for other contrasted 
algorithms. This may be due to the fact that the SSNN algorithm performs 
several sub-trainings in each training session before producing the final 
classifier.  
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In the second set of experiments, the SSNN has been applied to phishing 
websites data sets. The results reveal that the SSNN outperformed other 
considered classification algorithms in most cases. The SSNN algorithm 
produced the best results when using the Information Gain for feature 
selection. For instance, the average accuracy produced from the SSNN 
outperformed C4.5, BN, LR, and FFNN with margins of 0.79%, 1.38%, 1.39%, 
and 0.15% respectively when using the Information Gain. Overall, the 
experimental results show that the SSNN algorithm is able to produce good 
classifiers with good generalization ability. 
The SSNN algorithm has been published in (Mohammad et al., 2013-B). 
7.1.4. Providing a new Phishing Websites 
Classification Data Sets 
By reviewing several previous studies related to classifying phishing using DM 
classification methods, and after analysing several phishing and legitimate 
websites, we managed to collect 30 different features that can distinguish 
phishing websites from legitimate ones. Several PHP and JavaScript codes have 
been written to extract these features. Finally, a new phishing websites data 
set has been donated to the University of California Irvine repository (UCI 
Repository) (Mohammad et al., 2015-B). To the best of our knowledge, this 
dataset is the first publically published structured data set. Such data sets have 
been used as a benchmark for evaluating phishing websites classification 
models as in (Abdelhamid, 2013) (Singh & Patil, 2014) (Abdelhamid et al., 2014) 
(Zeydan et al., 2014) (Abdelhamid, 2015) (Qabajeh & Thabtah, 2014) and 
(Mansour & Alshihri, 2015). 
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7.2. Future Work 
In the near future, we intend to carry out several works; those are as follows: 
7.2.1. A Multi-Class SSNN Algorithm 
The SSNN algorithm proposed in this research is inclined towards binary 
classification domains. One of the future works is to improve the SSNN 
algorithm so that it can be applied to multi-class domains. However, this task 
needs in-depth investigations because classifying NN outputs into multiple 
categories is normally done by setting arbitrary value thresholds for 
discriminating one class from another. The one-vs-rest technique (Bishop, 2006) 
is one of the methods that can be used in creating NN classifiers for multi class 
domains. This technique involves training a single classifier per class with the 
examples of that class as positive examples and all other examples as negatives.  
7.2.2. Identifying and Extracting Novel Features  
In this research, we have collected 30 features that can separate phishing 
websites from genuine ones. We believe that some novel features might emerge 
in the future. Identifying and extracting novel features (input data attributes) is 
one of the most difficult and time-consuming phases when creating a 
classification model for dynamic domains where a virtual concept drift might 
occur as in phishing websites classification problem. Novel features might 
emerge for different reasons, for instance, the technical improvements in the web 
browser might be exploited by phishers as shown in twelveth feature in the 
Address Bar based Features, i.e. The Existence of (HTTPS) Token in the Domain 
Part.  
Normally, this process is accomplished manually. The system designer keeps 
looking for any possible feature by analysing a set of legitimate and phishing 
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websites periodically. However, this technique is a long-winded process and 
the model designer has to dedicate a substantial amount of time to studying the 
changes in the input features. 
Nowadays, Deep Learning (DL) (Deng & Yu, 2014) is a new and stimulating 
subfield of ML that attempts to sidestep the feature extraction and selection 
process and learn classifiers directly from the raw-data. In other words, DL has 
the ability to autonomously produce high-level representation from raw-data. 
Essentially, DL has been introduced with the aim of moving ML closer to one of 
its essential goals, i.e. Artificial Intelligence (Deng & Yu, 2014). The training 
process in DL is completely different when compared to traditional NN 
(Schmidhuber, 2015). For instance, the deep network consists of several hidden 
layers each of which is pre-trained with an unsupervised learning algorithm, 
which results in capturing more abstract attributes (features) from input data set 
(Schmidhuber, 2015). DL has been applied across a wide range of fields such as 
image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), text classification (Zhang & LeCun, 
2015), and signal processing (Yu & Deng, 2011). 
A promising future work is to investigate how the ensemble method combined 
with Deep Learning can improve the classification accuracy and apply it to 
phishing websites. 
7.2.3. Phishing in Smartphones and Mobile Devices 
One of the future developments is to explore the need for anti-phishing 
solutions for applications in smartphones and mobile devices. Mobile devices 
or sometimes called handheld devices are available in various forms including 
Tablet PCs, Ultra-Mobile PCs and Smartphones. In 2016, the number of users 
who use handheld devices will surpass 2 billion users, doubling that of the 
number of personal computers (eMarketer, 2014). Trends in mobile application 
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development reveal an intense focus on some applications that are considered 
a fertile environment to start phishing attacks such as, social networking 
applications, mobile commerce applications, and mobile payment applications 
(UAB, 2014). In addition, there is a growing trend towards using mobile 
applications to conduct procurements. Mobile procurement applications 
facilitate completing procurement tasks anytime and anywhere especially for 
people who are most of the time out of their offices, away from their laptops, 
and constantly travelling. However, recent protection methods against 
phishing attacks in mobile applications are still far from ambition. Therefore, 
one of the future works is to develop a robust classification model to predict 
phishing in mobile technology and applications. Yet, the set of features that 
might be utilised to predict phishing websites on mobile phones might be 
different from those features used on laptops and personal computers. 
Therefore, one of the possible future works is to identify the most effective set 
of features that might be used in predicting phishing attacks on mobile phones.  
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Appendix A 
Common Classification Algorithms 
 Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Network (BN) (Friedman et al., 1997) provides a comprehensible way 
to understand relationships between features (Sugumaran, 2007). BN affords 
an efficient method to represent relations between features and relatively 
allows rapid inference of probabilities. Figure 1 demonstrates a simple BN over 
six binary attributes. Normally, every BN has two elements: a directed acyclic 
graph termed a structure, and a set of Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) 
(Sugumaran, 2007). The CPT tells how strong the relationship is between a 
variable and its parents in the network.  
 
 
Figure 1 A Bayesian Network with its Conditional Probability Tables 
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 Decision Trees  
Decision Tree (DT) is a well-known classification method in which a set of rules 
are created and used to classify unseen data (Quinlan, 1979) (Quinlan, 1986) 
(Quinlan, 1993) (Quinlan, 1998). Two steps are recursively repeated to create a 
DT model:  
1. Selecting the best feature for splitting the data set examples  
2. Dividing the examples based on the value of the selected feature  
The same procedure is applied iteratively until all the answers in all nodes give 
the same value; or the tree cannot be divided to any further extent (Quinlan, 
1979). Picking the best attribute for splitting the data is done greedily to reduce 
the heterogeneity of the created partitions. The feature selection process should 
be done carefully because it might affect the distribution of the classes in each 
branch (Quinlan, 1979). Several feature selection algorithms might be utilised. 
The most commonly used technique (Bramer, 2013) among others is 
Information Gain (IG) (Shannon, 1948). Once the DT has been created, every 
single path from the root to the leaf nodes will produce a new rule. The 
connection between the root node and the leaf node is called rule antecedent. 
On the other hand, the rule consequent is the majority class that is associated 
with the leaf node. Several pruning mechanisms might be implemented to 
make the rules much simpler and to eliminate redundant rules (Quinlan, 1998).  
 Support Vector Machine   
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a computationally expensive classiﬁcation 
technique (Witten et al., 2011). SVM forms a hyperplane or set of hyperplanes 
in a high or infinite dimensional space that can be used for classification, 
regression, or other tasks (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995). A hyperplane separates a set 
of examples having different class memberships so that the examples are 
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divided by a clear gap that is as wide as possible as shown in Figure 2. SVM 
can handle multiple, continuous, and categorical variables. 
 
 
Figure 2 SVM for binary classification domain 
 
 Logistic Regression  
Logistic Regression (LR) is a statistical model widely used in domains where 
the class has binary values and it measures the relationship between the 
categorical dependent variable and one or more independent variables (Witten 
et al., 2011).LR gains its reputation due to its simplicity and interpretability. LR 
acts perfectly well when the relationship between the examples is almost linear 
(Hill & Lewicki, 2007).  
 Rule Induction  
Usually, a rule induction algorithm such as Repeated Incremental Pruning to 
Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) (Cohen, 1995) divides the training data set 
with respect to class labels. Then, starting with the least frequent class set it 
builds a rule by adding attribute values to its body until the rule is perfect, i.e. 
the number of negative examples covered by the rule is zero. For each 
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candidate empty rule, RIPPER uses the Information Gain to pick the best 
attribute value in the data set and appends it to the rule body. RIPPER keeps 
adding attribute values until the rule becomes perfect. This phase is called rule 
growing. However, while building the rules, RIPPER uses an extensive 
pruning method to reduce rules redundancy and eliminate unnecessary 
attribute. The algorithm stops building the rules when any rule has a 50% error 
or in a new implementation of RIPPER when the minimum description length 
(MDL) (Rissanen, 2004) of the rules set after adding a candidate rule is larger 
than the one obtained before adding the candidate rule. The description length 
is defined by the number of the misclassified instances. After creating the rules 
set, one more pruning process is also done to produce the final classifier.  
 Artificial Neural Network  
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a computerized model of the human 
brain and nervous system. Equally, the ANN and the human brain are 
consisting of a network of interrelated processing units called neurons (Kandel 
et al., 2000). From a biological perspective, the neuron controls the learning 
process and it consists of three elements: the dendrites, the soma or cell body, 
and the axon as per Figure 3. The dendrites receive inputs from the 
surrounding environment and is connected to tens of thousands of other 
neurons. The soma or cell body is the processing element that controls at which 
threshold the neuron will respond. During the learning process, the threshold 
value is adjusted several times to ensure that the soma becomes more talented. 
The axon is the elongated fibre that extends from the cell body to the terminal 
endings and transmits the neural signal. The larger the axon, the faster it 
transmits information (Widrow et al., 1990).  
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Figure 4 Simple feedforward ANN 
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Figure 3 Biological Neuron 
 
From the perspective of computer science, an ANN consists of a set of nodes as 
shown in Figure 4. Each node represents a neuron or a processing unit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The arrows represent the connection between the neurons. The node’s output 
depends on a parameter called the connection weights W or synapse strengths 
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(Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000). Such weights are updated several times during the 
learning phase.  
The most important elements in any ANN model are the connection weights 
and they denote the relative importance of each input to a specific processing 
unit. How the neurons are connected and the strength of these connections 
defines the behaviour of the ANN. Normally, the weights are adjusted using an 
error correction rule called delta rule or “Widrow-Hoff learning rule”. Firstly, the 
error-rate is calculated as per equation 1.  
 𝑒𝑟𝑟 (𝑖) = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (1) 
After calculating the error-rate, the result is passed to the delta rule shown in 
equation 2. 
 ∆𝑊(𝑖) = 𝜂. 𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑖). 𝑥(𝑖) (2) 
 Where ΔW is the adjustments weight for the i-th neuron, x is the input value, 
and η is the learning rate. After calculating the adjustment weight, the old 
weights are updated as follows: 
new weight = old weight + adjustment value 
The learning rate controls the speed at which the ANN finds the best solution. 
If the learning rate value is very big then the learning will be fast but with the 
risk that the network will diverge from the best solution. On the other hand, a 
small learning rate might cause the network to take a very long time to 
converge to the best solution (Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000) (Widrow et al., 1990). 
Traditionally, the learning rate value is a static value and it does not change 
during the learning phase. 
ANN models can be either supervised or unsupervised. The performance of 
any supervised ANN model can be easily measured by finding the difference 
between class values inferred by the ANN model and the true values in the 
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testing data set; such measurement is called cost function. One of the 
frequently used cost functions is the Mean Square Error (MSE). However, for 
unsupervised ANNs, there is no clear measurement indicator to evaluate the 
model. Two main architectures can be cited in supervised ANN (Wilamowski, 
2009) those are, multi-layer feedforward neural network and recurrent neural 
network. Multi-layer feedforward NN processes the input variables in a 
unidirectional manner starting from the input layer towards the output layer. 
On the other hand, recurrent NN is a bidirectional data flow, since the values 
achieved from the output or hidden layer may propagate back to earlier layers 
through a feedback connections. These feedback connections could be either 
between neurons of different layers or a loop type self-connection.  Several 
learning algorithms can be used in the feedforward ANNs such as 
Backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1988), Levenberg-Marquardt (Marquardt, 
1963), BFGS Quasi-Newton (Gill et al., 1982), Resilient backpropagation 
algorithm (Riedmiller & Braun, 1993) and Scaled Conjugate Gradient 
backpropagation (Møller, 1993). However, backpropagation algorithm is the 
most commonly used and the simplest learning algorithm among others 
(Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000) (McCaffrey, 2012). 
During their travel from the input layer to the output layer, the data set items 
are processed several times to learn the NN and update the connection weights 
between the neurons. For each layer, an activation function processes the data 
set items and then they are passed to the next layer. Several activation 
functions might be used, and they might differ from one layer to another. 
Firstly, the network calculates the net-input for each neuron by multiplying 
each input value with its corresponding weight, the result is passed to the 
activation function for further processing. The commonly used activation 
functions are as follows: 
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1. Hard limit activation function. Two types of this activation function have 
been introduced; binary activation function and bipolar activation function 
as per Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. The binary activation function 
produces 1 if the net-input is positive. Otherwise, it produces 0. On the other 
hand, bipolar activation function produces 1 if net-input is positive and -1 
otherwise. 
 
Figure 5 Binary hard limit  
 
Figure 6 Bipolar hard limit  
 
2. Piecewise linear activation function. This function produces 1 if the net-input 
is greater than or equal + 
1
2
, and -1 if the net-input is less than or equal -  
1
2
. 
However, if the net-inputs lies between positive and negative 
1
2
  it will 
produce the net-input itself as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Piecewise linear activation function  
 
3. Sigmoid activation function. This is the most commonly used activation 
function because of non-linearity and derivation simplicity (Han & Moraga, 
1995). This function has an S shape as per Figure 8. This function is also 
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called logistic sigmoid or log-sigmoid. The function produces positive values 
only; and is calculated as per equation 3. Where ∑ is the net-input. 
f(Σ)=‎
1
1+e−Σ
 (3) 
  
4.   Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid activation function (TANH). This function 
ranges between -1 and 1 as per Figure 9. The TANH output is calculated per 
equation 4. 
f(Σ)= 
𝑒Σ−𝑒−Σ
𝑒Σ+𝑒−Σ
 (4) 
 
 
Figure 8 Log-Sigmoid 
 
Figure 9 TANH function 
